The REVIEW *of* RELIGION

Volume III NOVEMBER, 1938 Number 1

EDITOR
Raymond C. Knox

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Herbert W. Schneider

SECRETARY
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

William Adams Brown
Cornelius Clifford
Horace L. Friess
Louis H. Gray
Arthur Jeffery
Eugene W. Lyman
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
Cyril C. Richardson
Ryasaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1938 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

Vestiges of Basilian Monastic Life in Puglia. By ALBA MEDEA 3

Religious Awareness and Knowledge. By BERNARD E. MELAND 17

The Perplexing Faith of a Moralist. By PETER A. BERTOCCI . . 38

BOOK REVIEWS

Fung Yu-lan: *A History of Chinese Philosophy.* (Homer H. Dubs) 52

Richard Bell, translator: *The Qur'ān.* (Arthur Jeffery) 55

Albert Vincent: *La Religion des Judéo-Araméens d'Éléphantine.* (Ralph Marcus) 60

Sergius Bulgakov: *The Wisdom of God: A Brief Summary of Sophiology.* (Clarence A. Manning) 67

(Continued on next page)

Hugh Ross Mackintosh: *Types of Modern Theology*. (Henry P. Van Dusen) 70

François Mauriac, R. P. Ducatillon, Nicolas Berdiaeff, Alexandre Marc, Denis de Rougemont, H. Daniel-Rops: *Le Communisme et les Chrétiens*. (Margaret I. Lamont) 72

Charles Lemuel Dibble: *When Half-Gods Go: A Sketch of the Emergence of Religions*. (Louis H. Gray) 76

Aldous Huxley: *Ends and Means*. (Adrienne Koch) 79

Critical Comments. A Comment on Van Dusen's Dismissal of Dewey. By Marion J. Bradshaw. The Right Understanding and Criticism of Karl Barth. By Peter H. Monsma 97

Book Notes. P. Radin: *Primitive Religion*. J. G. Frazer: *Aftermath*. L. Franz: *Die Muttergöttin im vorderen Orient und in Europa*. Ch'u Ta-kao: *Tao Tê Ching: A New Translation*. Mrs. Rhys Davids: *To Become or Not to Become*. B. K. Sarkar: *Creative India*. Emily Solis-Cohen: *Hanukkah: The Feast of Lights*. S. Belkin: *The Alexandrian Halakah in Apologetic Literature of the First Century C.E.* H. W. Robinson: *The Old Testament: Its Making and Meaning*. R. Falconer: *The Pastoral Epistles*. H. J. Schroeder: *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils*. Dom A. Morey: *Bartholomew of Exeter, Bishop and Canonist*. T. Lyon: *The Theory of Religious Liberty in England, 1603-39*. W. W. Sweet: *Makers of Christianity*. L. P. Thomas: *Seminary Militant*. P. E. Shaw: *American Contacts with the Eastern Churches*. V. Ferm: *First Chapters in Religious Philosophy*. M. Chaning-Pearce: *Religion and Reality*. E. H. Reisner: *Faith in an Age of Fact*. R. H. Grützmacher: *Religionsgeschichtliche Charakterkunde*. E. G. Howe: *War Dance*. A. M. van der Mensbrugghe: *Anakephalaiosis*. E. Jordan: *The Aesthetic Object*. H. Hart: *Skeptic's Quest* 105

Among the Periodicals 122

VESTIGES OF BASILIAN MONASTIC LIFE IN PUGLIA

By Alba Medea
Milano, Italy

On the rough wall of the abandoned cave chapel of S. Lorenzo in Fasano, in the province of Brindisi, which one reaches after a long walk across the fields, and where the peasants still come, recalled by the ancient tradition, to bring flowers and to light a candle to the titular saint, one can still see a faded painting of ample design, dark and subdued in coloring, which represents St. Benedict and St. Basil, standing side by side. Thus those two, for so long a time thought of as the patriarchs of western and eastern monasticism respectively, appear together in the darkness of this poor chapel lost in the solitary countryside,—two dignified figures, clad in their typical garments, the dark cloak of the monk covering the head, and the bishop's *paenula* with the Ψιακόλιον on the shoulders,[1] holding in their hands, one, the staff in the shape of a T, the other, a richly bound book. Their names can still be read in the fragmentary inscriptions near their haloed heads: ΟΑΓΙΟ ‖ -ΒΑCΙ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖- Ο ΑΓΙΟ ‖ -ΒΕΝ ‖ -ΔΙ-ΤΤ ‖ ‖

As late as the end of the nineteenth century it was thought that the Archbishop of Cesarea had given his rule to all "Greek" monks, that is to say, to all monks of the Byzantine discipline, and that all of them belonged to one vast Basilian order. This idea had its origin in a passage in St. Benedict's Rule, in which he speaks of St. Basil's Rule,[2] but we know now that the eastern monks do not consider St. Basil their principal, or only, founder, but merely as one of the masters of the ascetic life. The ancient religious groups differed greatly from an "order," as we now think of it. Each monastery was independent, and directed by its own archimandrite, igumenos, or abbot. But the archimandrite of one of the more important monasteries might be the

1. P. Orsi, *Le Chiese basiliane della Calabria* (Firenze, 1929), Tav. III, pp. 29; 39, n. 19.

2. "Nec non et collationes Patrum et instituta et vitae eorum, sed et *regula sancti Patris nostri Basilii*, quid aliud sunt nisi bene viventium et oboedientium monachorum instrumenta virtutem?" (73).

president of a confederation, having the right to inspect and watch over the others. Even to this day eastern monks belong to one special monastery, and not to wider congregations. So the term 'Basilian order,' which has been so widely used and misued, seems to be of Roman coin. "L'ordre basilien est une création de la curie romaine [the word appears constantly in the papal bulls, '*ordo Sancti Basilii*'] appliquée à des monastères de rite byzantin mais tous catholiques, et . . . ce n'est que par une extension illégitime, démentie par tous les textes orientaux, qu'elle a eté appliquée aux moines orientaux de ce même rite, separés de Rome depuis le schisme de Cérulaire."[3]

In strict exactness, the history of the Basilian Order ought to start from 1579, that is to say, when Gregory XIII gave it a constitution uniting in one congregation all the Byzantine monasteries of southern Italy. This was the conclusion of a great deal of activity in the reorganization of the Byzantine monasteries, which were reduced to a sad condition, and fallen very low as to discipline. The idea of a federation had been formulated by Eugenius IV, who, as early as 1446, appointed three visitors to restore order and discipline. The protection of Cardinal Bessarione had been valuable to the monks, for not only had he given a new shortened form to the rule of St. Basil (*σύντομος ἐκλογή*), but he had also convoked a general chapter for the express purpose of reorganizing the order. Thus had the Church protected the Byzantine monasteries, and saved them by giving them a constitution, though it would have been easy to make an end of a dying institution which had powerful enemies.

In the seventeenth century the Basilian monks of Italy became closely affiliated with the Spanish branch of the congregation, founded in 1561, with the western, or Roman, rite. The monks passed easily back and forth between the two, sometimes changing rites more than once. And during this time the eastern rite itself was undergoing many a transformation, so as to form a so-called "mixed rite." More than once generals of the order had asked for the passage of all the monasteries over to the Roman rite, and the request was granted for the monasteries of Calabria in 1748. This decision was revoked, however, by Benedict XIV. But the connection with the Latin group, and the political suppressions of 1861, and of later years, reduced the

3. C. Korolevsky, "Basiliens italo-grecs et espagnols." *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographie ecclésiastique*, VI (1922), col. 1183-1184.

Italian congregation to its present state. It is now limited to the monastery of Grottaferrata, near Rome, and that of Mezzojuso, in Sicily.

It was during the twelfth century that the monks, formerly migrating hermits, passed from cells and caves and "lauras" into real monasteries. It is interesting to observe how the Byzantine monks got protection, not only from the Roman Church, but also from the Norman rulers, who thought it better diplomacy, instead of suppressing them, to help them, and make them directly dependent upon the Holy See. Gradually the Greek bishops were replaced by Roman ones, and the monasteries brought under their control, instead of under the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. In some cases, such as the Patir in Rossano, founded by the igumenos Bartholemew of Simeri,[4] and endowed in 1103 by King Roger II, the monasteries were not dependent upon the archibishop, but directly upon Rome. Bartholemew also founded another famous monastery in Messina, upon which, at one time, forty-nine other monasteries were in their turn dependent.

It is impossible to mention here all the monasteries, centers of culture and of the religious life, which sprung up during those years, such as the famous one of S. Nicola in Casole, reduced today to the remains of an arch in the midst of a farmhouse. We can only attempt to trace the progress of Greek monastic life in southern Italy, and its transformation from the eremitical existence in isolated cells and caves, to the life of the "lauras," and finally to that of the monastery. In a sense the ideal of St. Basil himself was respected in the course of this development. For was it not he who wished to create a form of life combining the advantages of the solitary life of the desert with those of great colonies of monks, thus uniting contemplation and work, and avoiding both the excesses of isolation, and the dangers of a too bustling and worldly activity? And he did not think the presence of other brethren necessary for the exercise of humility, charity, and patience?

Perhaps, however, the great monasteries created by the Normans were not as distant from political agitations as his rule prescribed, nor from the troubles attendant upon the administration of vast properties. St. Basil wanted his monks to live by their own work, and to avoid

4. P. Batiffol, *L'abbaye de Rossano* (Paris, 1891).

travels which might dissipate their piety. His spiritual sons were to exercise control over their feelings, speak only when necessary, be kind, charitable, and sweet to all, drink only water, and eat vegetables, get up early, work, read and pray, and sing hymns. Schools for children were connected with the monasteries, where a mild, Christian education was to be given. Strict rules decided concerning the admission of slaves, married men, and minors to the monastery in accordance with the civil laws of the time. Thus there was perfect harmony between the society formed by the monks and the vast social life surrounding them, and the monastic colonies fitted in perfectly to the social organization of the country.[5]

Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries figures of great saints appear in South Italy as living examples of the eremitical, and the monastic life. Moving restlessly from one place of retirement to another, fleeing before the dangers of the Muslim invasions, and travelling up the peninsula to visit Rome, they furnish ample material, with their adventurous lives, for the marvellous tales of the hagiographers, and to reports of incredible episodes.

In Sicily an important center of monastic life from which came several saints, was San Filippo d'Argira, on the side of Mt. Etna, destroyed in 960 by a Muslim invasion. Niceforo was the hegumenos of this vast Basilian community, and it was here that Vitale of Castronovo, Luca of Demona, future founder of the community of Armento, Leoluca of Corleone, Cristoforo of Collesano, Macario, and Saba were trained in the religious life. All of them lived and travelled in Calabria, living most austere lives, and sometimes founding new communities. They had relations with important officials of the state who held them in high esteem. At the time of the Emperor Otto II's invasion of Italy, St. Saba was sent by the Byzantine Patriarch to persuade him to abandon the expedition, and although he was not successful, he was received by the young Emperor with every sign of respect. During his last years the saint had a kind of supervision over all the monasteries of Calabria and Basilcata. Also from a Sicilian monastery, Enna (Castrogiovanni), came St. Elia, founder of the monastery of Salinas in Calabria, probably situated between Capo dell'Armi and Pentedattilo, who died in Trebizond on his way to visit the Emperor.

5. A. Caffi, "Santi e guerrieri di Bisanzio nell'Italia Meridionale„ in P. Orsi, *Op. cit.*, pp. 249-250.

Another Sicilian from Syracuse became the hegumenos of the famous group of monasteries of the Mercourion in Calabria, the exact situation of which is still in doubt.[6]

In Calabria, at Reggio, was born a second St. Elia, called the Speleota for his long living in caves. A scion of a rich family, he was moved by the counsels of a monk, met casually in a church, to embrace the solitary life of a penitent. After long travels, and many adventures, including journeys to Rome and Patrassos, he finally founded the monastery of Melicuccà. His attitude toward state officials was always full of strength and dignity, and fidelity to the basileus. A devotee of the first St. Elia, whose body had been brought back to Italy and buried in the monastery of Aulinas, he had, during a visit to the tomb, received the announcement of his own approaching death. But greatest of all the Calabrian saints was St. Nilus of Rossano, the well known founder of Grottaferrata.

Such was, in those days, the intense religious life that populated southern Italy with numberless monasteries, and filled the solitary caves with hermits and penitents. Now that we have explained the meaning of the word "Basilian," let us examine some of the ancient monuments left by these monks of the eastern rite in the remote regions of the peninsula. Travelling through the provinces of Puglia, searching in the rocky sides of solitary ravines (the so-called *gravine*, or *lame*)—those curious, deep wounds of the earth, mysterious hollows in the tufa rock,—or in the monotonous immensity of the stony plain, one cannot but be deeply moved by pity at the impression of disconsolate neglect. For the only monuments left, after so many centuries, as evidence of a religious activity which turned this distant spot into a new Thebaid, are these poor ruined caves. One seems to hear once more the prophetical words of the hegumenos St. Fantino, who received St. Nilus in the monastery of Mercurion, that wonderful center of religious life through which so many saints have passed. In those agitated years of the tenth century, St. Fantino went from monastery to monastery shedding abundant tears, for he could foresee the day when those abodes of prayer and culture would become stables for

6. J. Gay, *L'Italie méridionale et l'Empire byzantin depuis l'avénement de Basile Ier jusqu'à la prise de Bari par les Normands (867-1071)* (Paris, 1904), p. 246; B. Cappelli, "L'Arte mediaevale in Calabria," in Paolo Orsi (*1859-1935*) *a cura dell'Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania* (Roma, 1935), pp. 283-287.

donkeys and mules, when tradition would die, and the beautiful books of the rich libraries be scattered and burnt.[7]

What the saint foretold has come to pass, and it is in sheepfolds, and among cattle and donkeys, in cellars and storerooms, that we must look for the frescoes which alone remain to recall the great work of penetration of the Greek Church in southern Italy,—its contribution to culture, and the triumph of Hellenic thought in this remote land, meeting-place of the most diverse civilizations. In recent years a renewed interest in these vestiges has arisen, and an attempt to bring back to life this forgotten world of memories. Students are beginning to investigate more thoroughly that period during which representatives of various races, and of all the religions of the Mediterranean world, passed over the soil of southern Italy,—that period which prepared the way for the brilliant civilization of the Norman epoch. In Sicily Senator Orsi, creator of the archeology and art history of Calabria and Sicily, has been able to trace Byzantine influence back to the beginning of the sixth century, when the seat of the Empire was removed to Syracuse; but in the region of Puglia we can find in provincial works only traces of the epoch called the Second Golden Age of Byzantine civilization.

We cannot here outline the history of the early Christian tradition of South Italy, so intimately connected with that of the East, nor that of the two streams of eastern monasticism, Syrian and Byzantine, uniting there, for the period which concerns us is a later one. It is enough for us to remember that the earliest Acts of the Martyrs, both of Sicily and South Italy, are in Greek, and the saints whose images surround the walls of the cave chapels are those commemorated in the Byzantine Menologium. South Italian monasticism is as early as that of Alexandria and the Egyptian desert, and of the same kind, having been brought to Italy from Egypt. It was later reinforced, first by the rise of Islam, and the Saracen incursions into Africa and Sicily, and second, by the Iconoclastic persecution. In the sixth century, from Egypt and North Africa, came the followers of St. Anthony and St. Pacomius, driven further and further north by the Saracens, and in the eighth century came the Byzantine monks and nuns, fleeing from the Iconoclastic persecutions. Thus have two separate streams of eastern influence united, sometimes in the same *lauras*, leaving their mark on

7. J. Schlumberger, *L'épopée byzantine*, Partie 2, "Basile II" (Paris, 1900), p. 239.

religious life and art.[8] Under their influence eremitical life persisted long in South Italy. It was the life of the *laura*, groups of cells on the hillsides, cut in the rocks around a chapel. Not until later did real monasteries appear, built and endowed by the Normans, such as the famous one of S. Nicola of Casole, near Otranto, and those near Taranto.

But of neither of these two currents of monastic immigration can we find definite traces, although a persistent tradition sees in every cave the dwelling-place of monks in flight, who restored in obscure chapels the banished image-worship. Nowhere can we be sure of having found vestiges of those legions of monks who, the legend says, landed on the coast of Bari. It is a recent legend, without historical proof. After the defeat of the young German Emperor Otto II, in July 982, the anti-Byzantine hopes failed utterly, and the power of the basileus spread ever more widely over Southern Italy, until it reached the Adriatic coast, and the Gulf of Policastro. Hellenism increased, notwithstanding the strength of the German army, the restlessness of the Langobard princes, and the weakness and cruelty of the Byzantine governors. This was due, not only to the powerful officials of Byzantium and the Orthodox clergy, but also to the active example of the austere life of the Basilian monks.

The history of St. Nilus (told by St. Bartholemew of Simeri), that athlete of faith whose figure appears strong and luminous in those dark days, ever ready to stand up for justice against governors and powerful nobles, and even to reprove the Emperor himself, conveys a clear impression of the veneration which was accorded the monks, and the influence which they exerted on the people. Encouraged by the Byzantine officials, monks and hermits travelled upwards through Italy from Sicily and Calabria. Probably the caves around Taranto were first cut and inhabited by these monks. These caverns show us the directions along which Basilian monasticism penetrated into Italy, one route going from Sicily to the Aspromonte, and the Sila, in Calabria. Monte Consolino, above Rossano, was pierced with caves prior to the foundation of the Patir monastery. Further on, beyond the river Crati, the caves multiplied in the region of Mercurion, then around Lagonegro, and in full Langobard soil in the mountains of

8. G. Robinson, "Some Cave Chapels of South Italy." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 50 (1930), pp. 186-209.

Cilento. Beyond the Sinni, in the tenth century, St. Vitale cut his caves in Mt. Raparo. The other route took the Greek monks from Otranto to Matera through Gravina, and left vestiges in several caves.

Unfortunately the frescoes of these solitary caves, often very difficult to reach, and always difficult to inspect regularly and protect, have been very much neglected, and are constantly exposed to the menace of dampness. But their importance to the student of religious art is very great. Diehl, to whom we owe the only study made of them up to the present, says of them: "Dans l'Italie Méridionale mieux qu'en Orient, on peut étudier l'histoire de la peinture byzantine du douzième au quatorzième siècle, parce qu'en Italie les peintures n'ont pas été restaurées, portent parfois des dates exactes et sont souvent inspirées par les prescriptions minutieuses du *Manuel de la peinture Byzantine.*"[9] And of this vast number of monuments a great many still may be visited. I have been able to collect direct information on seventeen in the province of Bari, eighteen in Brindisi, thirty-eight in Lecce, and sixty-one in Taranto, the richest province of all.

Of these only a few can offer true "cycles" of frescoes, or even a still fairly well preserved decoration of the whole chapel. We may, therefore, group together several cave chapels: those of S. Croce in Andria, recently restored; S. Vito Vecchio in Gravina, lately discovered; S. Lorenzo in Fasano; S. Biagio in S. Vito dei Normanni, near Brindisi; SS. Marina and Cristina in Carpignano; and Poggiardo, restored in 1932; the Virgin of Cirimanna, or Coelimanna, in Supersano; S. Stefano in Vaste; the Favana in Veglie; S. Nicola in Faggiano, also recently restored; and finally, S. Margherita and S. Nicola in Mottola. In all the others we often find only one painting still visible, the principal subjects being, the Virgin and Child, the Deesis, the Archangel Michael, and other saints. In especially fortunate cases exceptional circumstances have permitted an almost perfect preservation of the frescoes, as in Faggiano where they look as if they had only just been painted. In other cases, alas, one can only make a catalogue of ruins.

From the point of view of construction the caves fall into two types: first, those which are cut in the sides of steep ravines, as in the region of Taranto, and near Brindisi; and second, those which are dug into

9. Quoted in C. De Giorgi, *La pronvincia di Lecce: Bozzetti di Viaggio.* (Lecce, 1882-88), Vol. II, p. 210.

the ground just like wells, as in the Terra d'Otranto. The first type were often either natural caves, or very ancient ones once inhabited by prehistoric troglodytes. As in Cappadocia, the monks merely adopted a local custom.[10] We can also make a distinction between cave chapels of isolated hermits, and others which seem to be the center of a group of caves turned into dwelling places, and storage rooms for food supplies. Thus the conditions varied, from the strict isolation of the hermit to an almost cenobitical existence of a number of monks in grouped *lauras*.

The architectural form of these chapels is generally the same, except where the original form of a natural cave has been preserved. The most usual type is the simple rectangular chamber with one niche, or apse, and walls entirely covered with frescoes. Another, and more elaborate style, is the chapel with three apses, separated by pillars cut in the rock, as in the case of S. Nicola in Mottola, district of Taranto (Plate I). There are even remains of the iconostasis to be found (Poggiardo, S. Simone and S. Leonardo in Massafra, and Le Petrose near Taranto), sometimes with the three traditional openings cut in the stone. The ceiling is generally flat, but there are instances where the tufa has been shaped into lenticular cupolas. The Candelora, in Massafra, has, not only cupolas, but also barrel vaults over the naves, and in Giurdignano, near Otranto, there is the cave chapel of S. Salvatore, complete with iconostasis, diaconicon, and prothesis in perfect condition. Thus these poor monks, to the best of their ability, strove to make their simple places of worship conform as far as possible to the architectural requirements of the Greek rite.

At the foot of the hill where the small town of Ostuni rises with its white houses and its dark cathedral, is a group of fishermen's cottages, the so-called Castello of Villanova. Not far away there lies one of those deep and narrow valleys, called *lame*, or *gravine*, in the local dialect, of which we have spoken. This one, indicated with the name of Campitoni, or St. Margherita, indifferently, descends towards the sea, its rocky sides pierced with caves, and in summer covered with a rich verdure. Diehl, who visited this solitary spot years ago, thinks it was the dwelling-place of some community of hermits. He saw, not only the numerous caves still visible today, but also a curious kind of cell cut out of a huge block of stone in the middle of the valley, in which

10. E. Bertaux, *L'art dans l'Italia Méridionale* (Paris, 1904), Vol. 1, p. 134.

the door and window openings were still to be seen.[11] I have not been able to discover this block, though I have long searched for it. Half way down the valley, and high up in the side of it, is the entrance to the cave of S. Margherita. It is a natural cave, semi-circular in shape, with a small wall, probably of recent construction, protecting the entrance. The cave is very large, and offers shelter to shepherds and their flocks. Near the entrance one can still detect the remains of frescoes,—three saints, framed in colored bands. One of them, St. John the Theologian, wears a white tunic and a pinkish cloak, with dark pink and violet shadows and white high-lights. The hands, which are very well drawn, are giving the benediction according to the Greek rite. Next to him stands St. Nicholas, wearing the costume of a bishop, with a pallium, and carrying a book of the Gospel. Although the paintings were executed on only one layer of undercoating, they show a certain knowledge of design and modelling. The oval shape of the faces, never too long and thin, the delicate hands, the shape of the eyes, slightly raised towards the temples, the deep shadows representing the folds in the drapery, and the remains of Greek inscriptions,—all contribute to the conclusion that the frescoes must belong to the twelfth century, and have been inspired by Byzantine tradition, even though the artists were local. Only poor remains, these, yet they prove that this was no ordinary cave, but a place of prayer used by all the monks who dwelt in the surrounding caves.

The *gravine* grouped around the curious village of Massafra (Taranto) contain a number of the most famous cave chapels, such as the Candelora, S. Marco, S. Leonardo, and S. Simine in Pantaleo,—a veritable little Thebaid in a rocky wilderness. Another important center is the village of Castellaneta, also in the province of Taranto, where in one single valley, the burrone of S. Marco, are to be found three cave chapels with remains of frescoes. Passing to the province of Bari, near Gravina we find another interesting group of chapels, one of which, S. Vito Vecchio, discovered in 1927, contains a number of remarkable frescoes.[12] One of these paintings is especially interesting as a proof of a predominating western influence in this particular

11. C. Diehl, *L'art byzantin dans l'Italie meridionale* (Paris, 1894), pp. 90-92.

12. For a detailed description of this chapel see A. Medea, "Mural Paintings in Some Cave Chapels of Southern Italy." *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. XLII, p. 20, Plates II, IX.

place. The subject is the visit of the three Marys to the sepulchre, one of the earliest of the Gospel scenes in Christian art. The subject appears here in its occidental form, adopted in the fourteenth century by the Greeks and the Slavs. That is, *three* women are represented bearing the myrrh, according to the Gospel of St. Mark (16: 6), instead of two, as in the Gospel of St. Matthew (28: 1). And the inscription, ECCE—LOCUS—UBE—POSITUS—ERAT, is in Latin instead of Greek, and is taken from St. Mark (although with a slightly different reading). This western custom of representing the three Marys has an explanation in liturgy, for from very early times the Roman Church has read the Gospel of St. Mark on Easter.[13]

In the province of Lecce it is rare to find such centers as these, where a number of caves and cave chapels are found grouped close together. There is generally only one chapel, a cave dug into the ground, with a few dwelling-caves nearby. A good example of a dwelling-cave is the cave of S. Lasi in the village of Sanarica (Lecce). It is an elliptical cave roughly dug in the rocky ground, and divided into three cells by four pillars cut out of the rock. It is 1 m. 63 in height. In the first cell is a sleeping place cut in the stone, 98 cm. long, and next to it a small excavation, probably for a lamp. In the second cell the sleeping place is longer, and there is an opening to admit air, and two small niches. On the pillar near the entrance is carved a cross inscribed in a square. In the third cell, instead of a sleeping place, there is a kind of seat, and a large opening for air. The three cells all face the same direction. There are no remains of frescoes, and apparently there never were any. Such were the living places of the monks.

The chapels where they met to pray in common are of two principal types, the small rectangular room with one apse, and the more complex one with three naves with apses, divided by pillars, which imitate roughly the plan of a basilica. Typical of the first style is the cave of S. Biagio, near S. Vito dei Normanni, in the province of Brindisi. It is entirely covered with frescoes, and is especially interesting because it is one of the few in South Italy containing a complete series of Gospel scenes. In the Annunciation scene the Virgin is represented holding a distaff and spindle in the style of the eleventh century. The prophet Isaiah, and David, ancestor of Mary, appear in two round medallions (Plate II). The other Gospel scenes are also interesting in iconog-

13. J. de Jerphanion, *La voix des monuments* (Paris, 1930), p. 231, n. 2.

raphy.[14] On the ceiling there is a remarkable painting of Christ Pantokrator, with a long, sad, solemn face suggesting the famous Pantokrator of Monreale (Plate III). In the cave chapel of S. Giovanni, also in S. Vito dei Normanni, there is a Deisis with a very similar representation of Christ dating from the thirteenth century.

An example of the more complex type of chapel is the cave of SS. Stefani in Vaste, which, though in a sad state of decay, presents some of the most ancient and most beautiful frescoes of the region. Its three naves are divided by three arches and several pillars, all cut out of the tufa. There are three niches between the pillars on the lateral walls of each of the minor naves. The chapel was once entirely covered with frescoes,—pillars, walls, apses, and niches. The remains of these paintings, which are of great interest to the student of art, may be divided into groups belonging to different times, and executed by different hands. To the twelfth century group with a marked Byzantine influence belongs one of the finest paintings in the chapel, representing the Archangel Michael. Unhappily it has been very badly damaged, and the top of the head is missing. But even in this distressing condition the great figure of the archangel, whose wide, outspread wings occupy the whole of the small apse, still preserves a peculiar grandeur, harmony, and solemnity. He wears a richly embroidered white tunic, over which falls a wide mantle with a clasp of precious jewels. There is more freedom and movement than in other representations of the same subject, such as those of the cave chapel of S. Giovanni in S. Vito dei Normanni, and SS. Eremiti in Palagianello (Taranto). The difference in the drapery is especially marked. In the two latter representations the robes are hard and rigid under their heavy embroidery, while at Vaste the tunic moves freely in soft folds. Notwithstanding many clear differences in style, and in quality, the Vaste St. Michael makes one think of the solemn archangel who appears in all his glory in the church of Daphni.

In the left apse appear three of the saints whom the Greek Church has cherished most,—St. Nicholas, St. Basil, and St. Gregory Nazianzen (Plate IV). The noble figures of these saints, though they may seem excessively long, are certainly among the best paintings in the chapel. They all wear bishop's robes, and there is great delicacy and fineness in the rendering of all the details of their costumes. Their

14. For a detailed description see A. Medea, *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-28, Pl. VIII.

PLATE I

CAVE CHAPEL OF S. NICOLÀ IN MOTTALA (TARANTO)

NAVE WITH APSE

PLATE II

CAVE CHAPEL OF S. BIAGIO IN S. VITO DEI NORMANNI (BRINDISI)

THE ANNUNCIATION



PLATE III

CAVE CHAPEL OF S. BIAGIO IN S. VITO DEI NORMANNI (BRINDISI)

CHRIST AS PANTOKRATOR

PLATE IV

CAVE CHAPEL OF SS. STEFANI IN VASTE (LECCE)

ST. BASIL, ST. NICHOLAS, ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN

expressions are full of life, and differences of character are duly represented. The beautiful, serene face of St. Basil, with its dark, pointed beard and vivid eyes,—the extremely thin face of St. Gregory, with its projecting cheek bones,—and the white beard and large eyes of St. Nicholas, are still clearly visible. One can still repeat the words of Diehl: "Les trois figures sont également remarquables par l'habile arrangement des draperies, par le soin minutieux avec lequel sont traités les cheveux at la barbe, par l'éclat inaccoutumé qui brille dans les yeux; malgré le manque de proportions qui exagère la hauteur des statures, ces saints immobiles et calmes ont une grande et fière allure."[15]

Another fresco belonging to the same twelfth century group is one on a pillar, representing St. Philip, a youthful figure with strong features, giving a Greek blessing. The painting is Latin in style, with good design and fine modelling. On the opposite pillar is St. Stephen, in a white tunic, tight at the waist, with richly embroidered neck and sleeves, with a short mantle on his shoulders,—the typical costume of a Byzantine nobleman of the fourteenth century. This is an example of a fourteenth century painting substituted for the twelfth century original. The earlier frescoes are all painted on one coating-layer only.

The latest example of decoration in this region is in the cave chapel of the Favana in Veglie (Lecce), and dates from the fifteenth century. The chapel has the usual rectangular shape, flat ceiling, and apse. There is a small room at the left which was probably used as a vestry. On the ceiling is painted a representation of the Christ in Glory similar to the one at S. Biagio (Plate III). Around him are grouped four angels, the symbols of the four Evangelists, seraphs, and eyed wheels, in a sky spangled with stars. The Christ, who appears in the aspect of the Pantokrator, clad in white, holds a book with the inscription:

ΕΓΩ ‖ = Μ' ‖ ‖ Θ ‖ ΡΑ = ΙΕΜΪΝ̈ =
ΕΑΝΤΙϹ = ‖ ΙϹΕΛ ‖
ϹΩ ‖ ‖ ‖ (John 10:9)
·ΤΕΚΕΗϹ‖
·ΛΕVϹΕΤΕ

This subject is always painted on the ceiling, or at the summit of the

15. C. Diehl, *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

cupola, in accordance with the rules laid down in the *Guide de la Peinture* based on the most ancient traditions.[16] The walls of the chapel are covered with frescoes representing various saints, some Latin, i.e., St. Francis of Assisi, and others Greek, as well as the Trinity, the Virgin and Child, etc. They are unique in style and execution. In all of them the drapery falls loosely and heavily, in big, bulky folds. Although they have no great artistic beauty compared to the others, they are important as perhaps the last complete group of paintings in a cave chapel. They also prove the late persistence in this region of the Greek language and traditional subjects. Thus the Archangel Michael, represented here wearing the imperial robe and *loros,* although so different in style, is still a brother to those of S. Vito, Pallagianello, and Poggiardo, and to those more splendid ones which appear triumphant in the "Last Judgment" of Torcello. The ancient tradition has not failed in this late provincial painting,—last echo of a great art.

16. M. Didron et P. Durand, *Manuel d'iconographie chrétienne grecque et latine* (Paris, 1845), p. 423. M. Didron, *Iconographie chrétienne: Histoire de Dieu* (Paris, 1843), p. 296.

RELIGIOUS AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE

By Bernard Eugene Meland
Associate Professor of Religion, Pomona College

The problem of how we know what we claim to know concerning the qualitative character of the vast exterior has presented one of the most baffling inquiries with which the human mind has undertaken to wrestle. Supernatural theories solved the difficulty simply by ascribing the active role of communicating knowledge to the divine order, and placing man at the receptive end. Plato, by identifying the reasoning soul with the divine world of ideas, resolved the problem even more simply, and his method has been the procedure in all forms of idealistic thought which have identified the mind of man with the mind of the divine. Whenever cognition is recognized to be a sensory act, or in any way dependent upon the senses, the problem of religious knowledge becomes increasingly difficult. It ceases then to be merely a matter of metaphysical reflection and becomes an intricate problem of psychology as well. In a discussion of religious awareness and knowledge, three problems present themselves. (1) What is the relation between awareness and knowledge? (2) What is the specific nature of religious awareness? (3) What may we say concerning the character and extent of religious knowledge in the light of these foregoing factors?

I

If we may assume the point of view that is commonly accepted among empirical philosophers and psychologists, that the act of knowing is the maturing end of perception, then the problem of knowledge and its relation to awareness narrows down to three basic matters: the sensitivity of the organism in response to stimuli; the nature of the activity, whereby undefined awareness passes into cognitive meaning or knowledge; and the character of the symbols employed in giving cognitive meaning to perceived events. Perception is basically an organic response, the nature and clarity of which depends upon conditions in the psycho-physical organism, and the character of stimuli to which the organism is habitually exposed. By conditions in the psycho-physical organism we would include both the physiological and the

mental factors. An individual born with a sluggish reaction to stimuli, or with a vibrant aliveness to environment is predestined to embrace realities in one manner or the other. Every development within the organism making either for precision of response, or for fogginess (which in extreme forms may make for deception amounting to hallucination), shapes the course of perception. Likewise, every event involving attention imposes a conditioning upon the organism which in time may become accumulative to the extent of setting definite limits to sensation and awareness. Thus the established mores of a community, the routine of one's vocation or even avocations, tend to create a structure of response that becomes habitual and unyielding.

Through association we tend to build up a familiarity with certain stimuli, which in turn attaches emotional feeling to events in which such stimuli appear. Familiarity is not the only source of such emotional association, although it generally enters in some form to give appeal or persuasiveness to the event. Thus perception is conditioned by the kind of habituated experiences that give rise to emotional feeling impelling attention. But while the influence of such emotion is strong concerning ordinary men, circumscribing their responses, it is possible to achieve a measure of independence from such persuasion through critical reflection. Consequently the disciplined person is less likely to be limited in perceptions to the customary stimuli.

The point I am trying to suggest here is, that over a period of years individuals develop a certain kind of probable response to realities in environment. And this subjective outreach not only colors the character of things experienced, but it actually determines what may be perceived. For as James has said, "Just in proportion as an experience is probable will it tend to be directly felt." This point may be made more explicit by comparing familiar types of sensitivity. We generally contrast the prosaic and the poetic, the ruthless man and the person of feeling, the analytic person and the one responsive to unity and patterned relationships. Now, it is not accurate to say, as is so often assumed, that the one is less sensitive than the other—that the prosaic mind is less sensitive than the poetic type, or the ruthless antisocial person less than the socially conditioned person, etc. Certainly the prosaic person is inclined toward blindness to other forms. He catches immediate implications that aid the day's work. He senses the utility or the impracticality of suggestions and ventures. Where the

poet might be oblivious to the engineering feat, transforming the desert waste into a thriving community, the man of a practical turn stands fascinated in a way that allows no incident of importance to escape his gaze. On the other hand, the poet's world of vision is an enigma to the prosaic mind. If there is contagion of feeling and elation, there is little exchange of meaning between them.

Similar is the contrast between ruthless and socially sensitive folk. Through habitual disregard for sentiment and sentient feeling, one can develop an immunity to the expression of pain or distress. The art of objective workmanship consists, to some degree, in remaining "stoic before the wincing eye," otherwise sentiment would deflect one from the necessary goal. Where this objective attitude is employed for other than helpful ends it assumes a ruthless character. One would not say that the ruthless person is less sensitive than the socially conditioned individual; rather, he is sensitive to a different area of stimuli. The thief, when he has attained organic consistency, is alive to the most subtle turns of events that announce his peril, because these are integral with the end he serves—himself; while the person of rare feeling for others may be indifferent to happenings that threaten his own safety.

This same element of contrast in perception appears in reactions of analytical and contemplative mentalities. Part of the conflict between science and philosophy, and between science and religion, arises from this contrast. What men see differs so widely by reason of their focus of vision. Over a period of years one can become so habituated to attending to specific facts and entities out of context, that the whole phenomenon of relationships may appear as but a vague background upon which specimens are pinned. Its dynamic, organic character may simply seem not to make a difference. The envisagement of pattern, or of subtle relations that unify or correlate existences, is a form of seeing that reverses the analytical process. The undisciplined, or common-sense, mind tends naturally toward this kind of seeing, but only to the degree that the seeing serves common-place existence. Common men are not attentive to unities and relations to the degree that marks the disciplined observer of the contemplative or poetic sort. Now between these two varieties of disciplined vision there is a vast difference in perceptual habits, and in things perceived. So extreme can this contrast become that the datum of one experience may appear as sheer illusion to the other.

The conclusion that this analysis leads to is, that awareness and knowledge are so related to the forms of feeling and attention that their character may be said to be in direct relation to the habitual associations and their persisting stimuli. The music lover, through continually hearing significant music, comes to be peculiarly aware of musical meanings and values. The lover of art, through constant observation of recorded genius, achieves a competency of perceiving and knowing art values. The skilled workman, by his continual association with tools and the shaping of materials, acquires a capacity for sensing and knowing defects and values of workmanship. Religious awareness and knowledge are similarly related to associations and persisting stimuli, bringing the realities of religious import into focus. One who never contemplates these may no more be expected to envisage their existence, or their significance of meaning, than one who never turns to music may be expected to be sensitive to that sphere of facts and meanings. There is point to the penetrating utterance: "They who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled"—and only "the pure in heart" really "see God."

But the further fact is equally important. The character of that persistent outreach conditions the quality of awareness as well. If men are sensitized to discern religious meanings, they are also conditioned to see certain religious meanings, and to see them in a certain way. This fact throws important light, not only upon the varieties of religious experience, but also upon the varying views and emphases that enter into theologies and philosophies of religions. Every formulation of thought is an autobiographical utterance.[1]

Deriving knowledge from sense awareness, while a simpler and more reliable process than reporting insights, since it involves only the communication of meaning within a single nervous system, is nevertheless difficult at best. Although a child, before he has acquired the social symbols essential to conversation, may derive meanings in the form of a soliloquy as he responds to the exciting downpour of environing stimuli, the scope of meaning is obviously limited: hardly more than distinctions between pleasurable and undesirable sensations, familiar or unfamiliar events. The growth of social symbols, as the child takes on maturity, enriches the meaning of experiences. But

1. For an elaboration of this point see H. N. Wieman and B. E. Meland, *American Philosophies of Religion* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 11-14.

always the content of meaning is delimited by the vocabulary of meaningful symbols. Where experience surmounts the horizon of the obvious, or where there is an inrush of unexpected beauty or peril—a glimpse of a purple mountain, the tremble of mother earth, or an overpowering awakening to the slumbering strength of the sea—ordinary symbols of language may fail to elicit, or to record, meaning adequate to the experience. The emotionalizing of language, as in poetic description, is the attempt to stretch the garment of words to envelop the form of experience. Even to oneself, where experience is impelling, perception outruns the bounds of cognitive meaning. Always a penumbra of undefined awareness hovers about, giving us a sense of life that resists translation into knowledge. The prevalence of myths among early, uncritical people may be explained in part by the restless sense of wonder reaching toward meaning. Our continuing sense of mystery, when we contemplate existence as a creature experience, is the modern man's response to this surplusage.

If solitude leaves one baffled in confronting some moments, the attempt to communicate experience can only add to that bafflement. The mystic is not the only one to experience frustration in the attempt to communicate experience. His variety of experience accentuates the difficulty; but no one is ever wholly free from the dilemma. That we do not sense the difficulty simply means that we are easily content with an approximate communication of meaning. We let it go at that. For most conversation serves practical ends. When the ends are served, interest in the communication of meaning for that instance ceases. To the degree that communication goes beyond the mere give-and-take of the common life, and becomes appreciative, reflective, or charged with religious import, the difficulty of reducing awareness to knowledge presses upon one. The indescribable wealth of data in awareness exposes the impoverishment of language. I once heard neighbors of the late Rudolf Otto, in Marburg, puzzling over his health and mental condition because of his frequent remark, "Silence is the most profound form of speech." So senseless a statement, they thought, could only come from one whose judgment was failing, or being warped by mystical absorption. Sober reflection upon the relation between awareness and communicated meaning will readily disclose that Otto's statement, however abnormal to the common man, is both pertinent and accurate.

Difficult as the process may be, we do not hesitate to derive meaning

from the moments of awareness that come upon us in rapid succession. That is because the course of the day's work depends upon our achieving some interpretation. Should demands be abated, one might conceivably exist in the state of suffused awareness, allowing the stream of conscious experience to play over his being without compelling peaks of meaning to arise. Day dreaming and sensuous awareness suggest such a state except when they tend toward indolence and insensitivity. There is awareness of this full, inarticulate sort in the passage that follows:

> It was a fine day. The water was almost calm, the sky blue, a few clouds. I was lying on my back, my arms outstretched beyond my head. I was looking upward, just doing nothing. I could see nothing of the town or the boats or people, only the sky, a few clouds. The water was in my ears. Sometimes it splashed a little. I could feel, or seem to feel, the slight pressure of the ripples. A gull was above me, a great bird flying without motion. He was planing against the breeze, still, fixed by some strange tension there in space. Then I let go, somehow. I relaxed, settled down a little in the water. And I felt I was not anywhere. I was everywhere; I was always. I looked at the gull, at the clouds. I felt myself one with them as I imagined the gull felt himself to be. I made no separation. I was nowhere. I made no distinctions between myself and them. There was no distinction. We were the same. I cannot tell you how it possessed me. I was somehow drowned in them; drowned, or shall I say awakened from the particular dreams of life? Drowned in being; awakened to being? I do not know. I lay there forever, which I suppose was a few minutes.[2]

There can be no question but that this relaxed state of awareness yields a sense of knowing, although it can hardly be designated knowledge in any cognitive form. What is it then? It is, to be sure, the kind of knowing which the mystic calls intuition. To most mystics it is considered a special form of knowing that transcends sensory experience and reason. That it transcends reason is doubtless true, but only in the sense that its expanse extends beyond the focus essential to cognition. The mystic's error is more psychological than philosophical. Such awareness does not transcend sense experience, for it is above everything else thoroughgoingly sensuous. It is existence without tension. It is the opening of the organism to a maximum impact of data. It is the nearest the organism can come to being wholly immersed in the stream of events without losing consciousness of the stream, and of

2. Baker Brownell, *Earth Is Enough* (New York, 1933), p. 249.

the self's participation in the stream. When the mystic, upon emerging from such a rhapsody, struggles in vain attempt to make his experience articulate or meaningful, he is laboring with the task of engulfing the ocean in a tea cup. This wealth of sensuous knowing will not be thus contained.

Cognition, therefore, is not the act of giving definite form to this formless stream; it is rather bringing tension into the relaxed rapport with that stream. Cognition is becoming attentive to certain portions of the stream. It is focusing certain relations to the exclusion of others. It is an arbitrary reduction of the data for purposes of clearer envisagement. What the laboratory scientist does as a matter of specialized technique, when he extricates phenomena from their context for closer observation, the attentive individual, in the act of conscious reflection, does continually with the data of sense awareness.

To press this point too far, however, would be to falsify it. This is what the mystic seems to do, when he concludes from this observation that the rational process, or cognition, is the mechanizing of experience, breaking it up into artificial units. Cognition never actually extricates experience to the extent that the laboratory scientist extracts his phenomena for observation. The mind is an organic functioning, just as surely as is the nervous system in its less mental functioning. Its selection of data, therefore, never uproots realities, nor ignores completely the context of relation which floods into awareness though not into conscious attention.

At any moment one event of knowing may pass into a new event rising out of sense awareness without any break or barrier between the successions of cognitive events. And over a period of time these series of acts of knowing, in the normal mind, disclose an organic relationship that makes each event relevant, to some degree at least, to every other event of knowing. Thus the "life of the mind," taken as the accumulative, or total mental response of any one individual, presents a peculiarly qualitative functioning integral to the life of the organism. Yet by the very nature of its procedure, it imposes an instrumental structure upon experience, which is at once more expressive of meaning, and emptied of meaning. Both of these factors are important for an estimate of the knowing function. For this intensified meaning, while it yields clearer and more adequate understanding of the data in focus, excludes all meaning, or all possible meaning, rele-

vant to the wealth of data outside of the instrumental structure brought into operation by cognitive activity. Thus the nature of the intensified meaning may give a clue to the kind of awareness and knowledge a mind is capable of, or apt to achieve.

Again the contrasts between the poetic and the prosaic types may be recalled to illumine this point. The poetic mind is one whose habits of reaction tend to bring into focus certain obscure relations in environing events that carry signal qualitative meaning concerning those events. This habitual reaction is due partly to a certain condition of sensitivity in the organism that predetermines perception; but it follows also from the structure of mind and impulse, arising as a cumulative condition from this persistent preoccupation with the obscure, rather than the obvious data of events. A *Sandburg* sees beauty in ugliness, where other people detect only ugliness, partly because of his sensitive response which catches much more of things than most people; but also because, after long years of such observation and discernment, he has become conditioned for attending to rare and obscure profundities in common things. A *Robert Frost* envisages and communicates the alluring sensuous quality of earth-life, partly because of the peculiar sensitivity of his perceptions, flooding his moments of awareness with the rich sounds and smells and shapes of growing things; but again, because through such preoccupation the total accumulative response of his organism has developed a *tropism toward* such data.

A prosaic mind not only may be devoid of the stimulus from environment, impelling such envisagement; it may be utterly unresponsive to the imagery even when it is communicated. But now it is important to recognize that the prosaic person manifests a kind of attention peculiar to the *set* of his organism, which opens up a field of data, and renders him responsive to a kind of stimuli which may never come to focus in the poetic mind. The contrast between the poetic and the prosaic mentality, then, is qualitative only in the sense that each embraces a content peculiar to its way of seeing. And this way of seeing follows from the focus of attention, which in turn goes back to the sensitivity of the organism, and the structure of mind and impulse resulting from habituated activity.

A similar characterization might be made of mentalities operating in specific fields and environments. There is an artist mind, a political

mind, a commercial mind, a domestic mind, an academic mind, a laboring mind, etc. This is but a generalized, and not altogether accurate, way of saying that the intensified meanings, rising out of awareness are always related to, and to a degree, limited to the field of data in which mental response or attention takes place.

From this analysis of cognition in relation to awareness, certain minimum conclusions may be drawn concerning knowledge of that reality which is designated "God" in relation to our experience of that reality:

1. Awareness of God depends upon a kind of sensitivity which opens the organism to that area of data in which the "divine" reality functions. The common expression of this fact is that "only the pure in heart see God." This is but the poet's way of designating the nature of the stimuli which arouse men to the experience of God—the divine designating that operating reality, that developing order of relations that comes into visible or experienceable form to those whose order of living has the sensitivity of the pure in heart.

2. The meaning of the experience of God, as it comes in the solitary moment of awareness, is subjectively conditioned. No one escapes completely the limitations of the symbols which bring him meaning. Soliloquies are no less affected by this limitation than are conversations.[3] One's own mind and organic sensitivity impose impassable barriers, whatever the experience or the object of experience. The critically imaginative mind is less bound by this limitation than the uncritical and unimaginative one; for, by sensing his predicament, he may then refuse to be content with the symbols immediately available for interpretation. Where this corrective is active, men's views of God are less anthropomorphic.

3. When the difficulties of cognition are recognized, the effort to know God becomes properly tempered. On the one hand, doctrines concerning the divine which presume knowledge derived from cognitive meaning are seen to be excessive and presumptuous. The mind therefore assumes a humility appropriate to its capacity, content to derive such meaning as it may properly acquire. On the other hand, one acknowledges the persistence of mystery as inevitable. With the poet he confesses he "cannot apprehend," not being equipped with the

3. Conversation does involve a further complication attending the exchange of symbols, and the diversity of meaning in socially shared symbols.

organ of apprehension; or should we say rather, "with an adequate organ of apprehension"?

4. To the degree that awareness does yield cognition, however, men may strive for at least minimum knowledge of this reality *in their midst*. The sense of mystery is not impaired, but enhanced, where one undertakes to discern meaning, in so far as meaning may be derived. Here the empirical method may bring an advance upon the purely mystical, or purely agnostic approach to reality. When the empiricist is fully alert to the limitations of the cognitive process, he will not be tempted to profane the divine mystery with an arrogant use of the scientific method. On the contrary, he will employ it to bring such data as are within the human grasp of understanding into clearer focus. He will bring such cognitive tension into the experience of reality as will sensitize men to its meaningful operation in their midst. Worship may then become an act of devotion, that is intelligently directed toward God as a visible cause. Such knowledge of God, however meager or minimum, may lift the religious life out of the state of sheer sentimental attachment to a vague sense of God, into a more realistic venture of devotion to discernible value—the supreme value to which the heart is lured, and which the mind, with all its limitations, acknowledges and approves.

Unless I am misreading his meaning, the statement of Cornelius Benjamin, in his recent book, *The Logical Structure of Science*, would seem to validate this procedure of designating the religious reality by operations in the empirical order, which, according to a defensible theory of value, seem expressive of supreme value. His statement follows:

> We are required to define the obscurely given occurrent through its relation to the realm of the clearly given, but we find that this relation is itself given only obscurely. Hence we replace the relation by the operation which is presumably its equivalent. We now have available all of the material in terms of which the obscure occurrent is to be defined. But since we wish to talk about this occurrent in advance of any clear awareness of it, we must replace the occurrent by a symbol for it; when an entity is not given clearly, we replace it by something which acts as its substitute and yet may be given clearly. Hence our problem is now to define the symbol for the obscure occurrent through the proper operational route. Immediately the suggestion arises as to whether we cannot define the symbol by that ultimately satisfactory method of definition, viz., the denotative method, or

the method of pointing. But the denotative method necessarily fails in the case of obscure occurrents; they are obscure precisely because we cannot unambiguously point to them. Yet the ultimate meaning of our symbol must be found in some sort of denotative reference. If we cannot point to the occurrent itself, we can perhaps point to another occurrent which is clearly given and with which the obscure occurrent has known relations. This is the only possible method for locating it in the realm of the given; it becomes "reduced" to the given by virtue of its intimate union with the given. Hence, the symbol for the obscure occurrent with the clear occurrent is not unmistakably given, it is replaced by its operational formulation. We then define the symbol for the obscure occurrent content in the only way in method by directing the observer to a situation to which something must be done before he can experience the occurrent in question.

II

To become aware of the "clearly given" which, in minimum form defines "the obscurely given," however, one must be capable of religious vision. That there is such a thing as religious vision, in the sense that there is poetic vision or aesthetic vision, or inventive vision becomes increasingly clear. There is a way of viewing the world of relation and of events which brings into focus the operations that constitute the religious quality of existence. Conversely, there is also a way of viewing the world which excludes all awareness of the data that might otherwise give rise to religious knowledge. To carry this observation further, we need first to inquire into the data of religious awareness.

Any effort to define the data of religious vision will push one back upon the term, religious. I find the resolution of this problem aided by the realization that, just as the aesthetic vision is the focus of attention disclosing a pattern of relations which is called beauty, so the religious vision is a particular form of attention disclosing a distinctive pattern of relations.

What is the character of relations that becomes peculiarly apparent in the religious vision? It is the qualitative form of unity in life designated by the word "good." "Good" is a much used word in the vocabularies of theologians and philosophers, often with ambiguous meaning. It is important, therefore, in making "good" the basic word in defining the religious vision, to be clear about its meaning.

The Good, used in a nominative sense, may be distinguished from "good" used adjectivally. The former is a religious concept, the latter

is an ethical distinction. There is a sense in which the two are coterminous (at least related), but given certain ethical suppositions, "good" may cease to have any nominative equivalent, being simply an expression of comparison as between relative conditions of satisfaction. If one speaks of "goods," referring to specified ethical judgment, the noun "goods" is still adjectival in implication, in that it denotes the collective interests or ends judged good at one time or another.

To speak of "the good" in a nominative sense is to pass from ethical observation to a standard, or a nominative criterion, for judging what is ethically good. This point might be sharpened if we digress long enough to observe its application in current thought. Many are sensitive to the antithesis between the type of thinking which loosely goes by the name of liberalism and the religious thought represented by Mr. Wieman, but few seem to have noted the basis of the tension. When Mr. Wieman's thought confronts religious humanism, the tension becomes sufficiently acute to reveal the dividing issue. This is simply because religious humanism is an extreme and forthright expression of what is implicit in liberalism, namely, relative value. Liberal theology has been sheltered from the chill winds of relativism by remaining reasonably moored within the haven of Christian tradition. Or to state it more aptly, it has avoided the logic of relativism by its anchorage to the historic Jesus. (Gerald Birney Smith once characterized this Christocentric form of liberalism as the last ditch of a receding orthodoxy.) One need only to observe the liberal's concern, insistent at times, to become clear regarding the mind of Christ, to see how utterly dependent he is upon this last ledge of the absolute. While he talks lustily about ends-in-view, and of value in terms of situations as they arise, the liberal covertly depends upon a theological assurance after all, which points him back to an historic ideal. Nevertheless, both liberal and humanist speak the language of relativism, and are quick to protest against any tendency in thought that suggests placing the criterion of value outside the flow of events within the social stream.

Now Wieman has sought to remain empirical, but has all along been concerned to place experience, and the judgments of experience, in relation to objective criteria in order to avoid, on the one hand, a relativism that tends to dissipate all discrimination, and, on the other hand, to avoid making absolutes of human desires and ideals themselves, lest all incentive or possibility of growth vanish. Thus "good"

in Wieman's thought has assumed a nominative character in terms of a pattern of relationship. He achieves a qualitative unity in terms of the growth of connections that makes for the increase of mutual value and meaning in the world. This, I believe, is a verifiable condition of good, and may be shown to be the descriptive character which points to the quintessential core of the Christian concept of good.

The Good is both existent and potential. It is manifest in every operation that makes for mutual meaning and value. It is discernible in latent, or perhaps, incipient, form in the structures of inorganic materials. It is operative to a degree in every phenomenon of organism. It is more visibly apparent in the phenomena of personality: its growth and shaping, as well as the persistent processes established through habitual response. And it appears in varying degrees of control and effectiveness in the human personality: in the personality that is inhibited and frustrated, as well as in the one that is unified in its powers. To the degree that the personality integrates its life with the extensive environing reality, it takes on a fuller measure of this qualitative unity we call goodness. Goodness, as an operating unity, is observable in the life of a family, a community, and the commonwealth. A superficial glance will not reveal it, but discerning attention will disclose the silent, steady weaving of sentiments, hopes, and affections into an enduring enterprise of loyalty. Attaining the religious vision, then, is achieving the capacity to discern and to respond to this growth of connections that makes for mutual value in the world.

In one sense, the capacity to see this silent working depends upon the ability to think abstractly. For this working is process. And the envisagement of process is a highly conceptual achievement. Let us say that this sort of insight adds metaphysical meaning to the religious vision; but it is not to be confused with religious awareness. This metaphysical imaginativeness may stimulate the mind to religious awareness, and reinforce with logic what many are compelled to take *on trust*. Every faculty, in fact, aesthetic or philosophic, that helps to sensitize mind and feeling to this wider working, which is the good, contributes to religious awareness. But awareness of the good is a far more simple seeing. It involves being sensitive to growing things of beauty, flowers, trees, and nature's creatures. It is recognition of persons, of the fine feelings, sentiments, love and friendship that bind men and women in common living and devotion. It is discrimination be-

tween that which preserves and promotes personal living, and that which impairs and destroys the tissues of mutuality. Religious awareness is the envisagement of the active good in the world, in much the same way that the perspective of friendship is the focusing of good in a person. There need be no more blindness to error and evil in the one than in the other; but in each there is attentiveness to actual and responsive good. This simple form of apprehending the good is a kind of tropism, resulting from an inward compulsion. It is awareness arising out of the "hunger for righteousness." The theologian might call it "volitional"; the psychologist would call it "visceral." No matter. It is an organic response that accompanies strong desire for, and commitment to, the good. All insight of any profound proportion is born of a feeling after something, a yearning that impels to action and commitment. The feeling precedes the recognition. Scientific insight, in its most prosaic form, is the synthesis of vision and works, or shall we say, vision rising out of works. Whoever would see beauty must hunger and thirst after the beautiful. The capacity to respond to the stimulus, and to become aware of the reality, in each case, comes as a result of vision rising out of an incessant striving. We live the good life, therefore, not simply because we have beheld the good, but in order that we may *come to know it*. Or, to soften the contrast and state it more accurately, having beheld the good in part, we need to live for the good that we may envisage it more completely. And, as in the life of friendship, the awareness of good in the religious vision grows and matures with the experience of its object; which is a way of saying that living the good life leads one to a fuller knowledge of the good.

This would argue that the saint is more capable of the religious vision than men who have lived less worthily, however discerningly. And the vision of common men may be more clear and revealing than that of the metaphysician who feeds upon thought alone. There is danger in such an assertion. Men have been all too ready to repeat the stinging words, "foolishness to the Gentiles, but the power and wisdom of God to them who are called." Yet the truth remains that such insight as the religious vision yields can become apparent only when there is the will to discern, arising from the outreach toward what may be discovered to be good. Hence, the "plain man," with outreach and a sense of wonder, may apprehend significant meaning where the

disciplined mind, unattentive to relations involving "value," would discern nothing worthy of attention.

This throws light on the relation between works and redemption, or between ethics and mystical experience. Character comes as a quiet growth, as imperceptibly as the acquiring of a stride, a stance, or a look of the eye. Life is lived for objectives, and that living imposes its own conditioning. Where life is lived for beauty, one achieves an absorption of self in the artist's role, which makes for rare perceptive powers peculiar to that role. Where life is lived for truth, one achieves absorption in the role of a philosopher, making for keenness of intellectual discernment. Where life becomes an unqualified commitment to the realization of the good, the same degree of absorption may be expected, making for awareness of spiritual meanings, peculiar to the pure in heart.

III

There remains the problem of determining the nature of religious knowledge that arises from awareness of the religious reality. Here I think some distinctions are necessary. Clearly there is a kind of verifiable religious knowledge, possible under certain circumstances where the religious data are observable, which is on a par with, or at least comparable to, scientific knowledge. In addition, there are various forms of *felt* insights that carry persuasion, if not conviction, yet which seem to elude every effort to give them factual basis or form. For lack of a better term I shall designate them by the phrase "emotive insights." They include:

(1) Ambiguous, but compelling feeling-states that presume a kind of knowing.
(2) The more refined intuitive form of insights that bring a sense of certitude.
(3) Inferred ideas on grounds of rational surmise.
(4) Inferred beliefs on grounds of moral interests.
(5) Inferred beliefs on grounds of emotional preference or necessity.

The troublesome question is, how shall we consider this vast amount of *felt-belief?* One procedure is to follow the suggestion of the logical positivists and say, as Carnap and the Vienna group have said concerning metaphysical propositions, that these intuitional and inferen-

tial ideas, like a lyric poem, have "no assertional sense, no theoretical sense"; consequently, they "do not contain knowledge."[4]

If knowledge is to be taken to mean verifiable knowledge only, this is certainly true. We need to be careful, however, in stressing this objective character of religious knowledge, that we do not overlook or minimize this area of certitude, so important to the religious man, which does not come within the verifiable pattern, yet which provides a kind of knowing. All cognition involves this penumbra of yet undesignated-fact, which hovers over the known as a promise of further frontiers. However, in respect to certain kinds of data—scientific data, for example—this yet unknown area is always before us as explorable, and as reducible to tested fact. While this sort of frontier of new facts is certainly involved in our knowledge of the religious reality, we may not assume confidence in our ability to carry the exploration to the degree of certainty sought in the sciences. This is because the datum of the religious reality, both in nature and form, transcends human vision. And this surplusage, while it cannot enter sensuous awareness to the extent that we may derive knowledge from it, nevertheless imparts profound overtones of significance which somehow leave us with the impression that we do know. That is, we feel we know more than we have a right to say we know. It is in relation to these overtones that the use of poetic language in religious utterances is justifiable as a means of grasping, in communicable symbols and with intuitive feeling, depths of meaning that resist definitive symbols and language. I am referring now, not to the super-empirical extension of reality (for that, to be sure, presents a mystery beyond resolution), but to the more-than-observable dimension of reality within this empirical order. This suggests that while the effort to develop a "science of God" is highly important to the task of increasing our factual knowledge of the religious reality, the concern to extend our poetic and aesthetic feel for that reality is equally imperative, in order that this factual knowledge shall be kept related to this wider area of significant operation. I feel the importance of the intuitive outreach too strongly to be willing to dismiss it completely from the area of religious knowledge. Something more than the logical positivist's procedure, therefore, seems necessary to deal adequately with this phase. While lyrical poetry, and even music, are clearly "expressional" rather than "asser-

4. Rudolph Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London, 1935), p. 29.

tional" mediums, they nevertheless seem to create a condition of awareness whereby something more total than facts is brought to vision. I should be willing to say with Wieman that here we have undefined awareness which can yield knowledge only after it has been subjected to proper tests. But the fact that it may potentially yield knowledge—even though it may not be completely reduceable to observable facts, seems to make the logical positivist's statement—"they do not contain knowledge"—too extreme.

If this interest is kept in focus, however, I think there is some advantage in applying the distinction of the logical positivist to religious epistemology. One then keeps the search for factual knowledge concerning the religious reality cleared of the vagaries that attend the intuitive outreach, and thus provides a sound basis for a minimum of scientific certainty regarding religious beliefs.

What, then, is religious knowledge of the verifiable sort? It relates to all tested facts growing out of experiences, common, or especially projected, which express, demonstrate, or illumine the operations of the Good, defined as "the growth of connections making for mutual value and meaning." It is the knowledge of profound working that issues from the emerging life of the growing boy or girl. It is the knowledge of significant meanings rising out of friendships formed and nurtured. It is the knowledge of God resulting from the experiment of several people, undertaking to blend their desires, needs, interests, and activities into the organic unity of a home. It is the knowledge of God arising from observations of the growing cohesions and loyalties of corporate life, wherein society and individuals achieve a relationship of mutuality rather than of regimentation. In a word, it is a knowledge of the "clearly given" which points to the "obscure occurrent."

Prevailing conditions of evil may be equally revealing of facts essential to a science of God. For every situation of maladjustment involving frustration, or even dissolution of value, manifests the reality of God as a tragic imperative. Life proceeds this way! Dramatize it as you will, there appears to be a way of living that leads to life and more life; and the neglect of that way is death and dissolution. It is a hard truth, but it becomes increasingly inescapable the more one inquires into the process of growing up, the process of reaching fulfilment of life, the process of growth within cultures, and every possible phase of

human relations. The social and biological sciences make its meaning increasingly potent, and the ignoring of it imperiling. For the sciences are continually adding to our knowledge of these silent forces within the Creative Order, shaping life's destiny and broadening the possibility for man's fulfilment. Religious knowledge at this point becomes indistinguishable from scientific knowledge. Or to put it more aptly, all scientific knowledge bearing upon the nature and operations of this Creative Order making for man's fulfilment, the ignoring of which results in loss of value and in dissolution, becomes religious in import, since it points the way to the kind of religious devotion that relates men healthfully to the empirical working of this reality.

In all these instances, envisagement of the empirical working of the religious reality may attain a certain degree of objective validation because, within the limits of observable operation, the criterion is verifiable in relation to the theory of value. Conceivably one could remain within the field of empirical data, making no effort to draw inferences beyond the verifiable observation that the good operates in human life. The manner of interpretation here will determine whether this empirical method in dealing with the religious reality is theistic or humanistic. If it is viewed as sub-human activity, conditioning human activity, or the accumulative response of human behavior, humanism is the most appropriate term applicable. If, however, these operations are viewed as but the minimum observable functioning of a wider working, whose meaning and scope is considered superhuman, theism is applicable.

Theism in its customary sense, however, would arise where one ventures to draw specifically homiletic inferences from these observable data concerning the vaster working of its operations. It is at this point, namely, where one moves beyond the empirical data to "legitimate" inference concerning the religious reality, that the subjective factor looms large. For here we have the kind of cognitive procedure (intensification of meaning) which not only must draw upon available meaningful symbols to give character to the inference, but must pursue those inferences along channels of thought, or within patterns of reflection, that make such extension of our knowledge of the religious reality intelligible and persuasive. Here we come upon one of the most common characteristics of the theistic venture: its personal and cultural coloring. Men's views of God, when carried beyond the field of

empirical data, take on the characteristics relevant to the mental life of the individual thinkers, and to the cultural habits and outreaches in which such thinking is done.

This observation seems to suggest two things. First, the minimum conception of religious reality, based upon such observation as the field of empirical data affords, may transcend individual bias and cultural limitation of expression, since its condition of expression is not wholly dependent upon these subjective symbols, or patterns of meaning. Second, the effort to go beyond this minimum level of meaning to the basis of inference automatically restricts what is accomplished to the specific cultural area in which these inferred, extended characterizations carry persuasive meaning.

This conclusion may suggest the further observation that the concern to go beyond the minimum knowledge of God arises chiefly from a practical interest. And such conclusions as are reached are instrumental to the homiletic or institutional functioning of religion. The philosopher of religion, in so far as he seeks to relate his thoughts to the wider than personal or cultural area—that is, to think interculturally, will be impelled, either to hold to this minimum level of meaning, or to take but one step beyond the empirical field to acknowledge "the mystery out there," without presuming to give cognitive meaning beyond the minimum conception.

Organismic philosophy has brought back into religious thinking the stimulus to venture beyond the empirical area, and to designate, by way of metaphysical construction, a causal ground in terms of the larger organic unity, presumably to get beyond the subjective limitations upon religious epistemology, and to provide a way to interpret the extended areas of reality over religious responses. I do not see that this gets away from the view, however, that such knowledge concerning reality as is achieved by this method, continues to be of the inferential sort. Its advantage is that it provides a system of inference, making each step of the procedure more substantial and defensible. But even so impressive a construction as Whitehead's conception of the consequent nature of God seems to rest essentially upon emotive rather than rational persuasion. This does not discount its merit, but it designates the character of its merit, and the end it serves.

If the procedure we have followed here is valid, I feel impelled to conclude that such certainty as philosophy of religion is capable of

achieving concerning the nature and meaning of the religious reality must necessarily appertain to this reality's empirical working. We can know God and co-operate with his "Great Eternal Cause" as we are able to discern his working in our midst. What goes beyond this, becomes a venture of the mind prompted by the heart, and can be undertaken only with grave apprehension of the risk of illusion. Perhaps it is better to take this risk than to incur the opposite danger of losing that outer vista and the "further range." Is it not enough to acknowledge the Eternal Mystery, and to serve the present reality as it floods our awareness and experiences in the common life, keeping this acknowledgment always in focus through poetic contemplation, wistful wondering, and prayerful outreach? Philosophy of religion thus may explore the meaningful areas of the operations of the Reality we call the Good; our methods of religious living may increase our devotion to this creative working in our midst, and progressively improve our envisagement of this "clearly given"; worship will become preeminently[5] the adventure of orienting us emotionally to the vaster frontier, that "obscure occurrent" which presents the further range of this reality empirically known. Knowledge, devotion, and the attitude of wistful faith and outreach, keeping us sensitive to the over-plus of the empirically given, these seem to me to provide the bases for the religious relation with Reality.

This would argue that the saint is more capable of the religious vision than men who have lived less worthily, however discerningly. And the vision of common men may be more clear and revealing than that of the metaphysician who feeds upon thought alone. There is danger in such assertion. Men have been all too ready to repeat the stinging words, "foolishness to the Gentiles, but the power and wisdom of God to them who are called." Yet the truth remains that such insight as the religious vision yields can become apparent only when there is the *will to discern,* rising out of the outreach toward what may be discovered to be good. Hence, the "plain man" with outreach and a sense of wonder may apprehend significant meaning where the disci-

5. I say "preeminently," because clearly worship has the twofold function of sensitizing individuals and groups to the implications of the "clearly given"—the reality of God in our midst—, and of increasing men's awareness of the "obscure occurrent"—that further range that may not be cognitively known, yet which may be apprehended and emotionally grasped through the poetic and aesthetic symbols of religious expression.

plined mind, inattentive to relations involving "value" would discern nothing worthy of attention.

This throws light on the relation between works and redemption, or between ethics and mystical experience. Character comes as a quiet growth, as imperceptibly as the acquiring of a stride, a stance, or a look of the eye. Life is lived for things, and that living imposes its own conditioning. Where life is lived for beauty, one achieves an absorption of self in the artist's role, which makes for rare perceptive powers peculiar to that role. Where life is lived for truth, one achieves absorption in the role of a philosopher, making for keenness of intellectual discernment. Where life becomes an unqualified commitment to the realization of the good, the same degree of absorption may be expected, making objective verification, such inferred knowledge is necessarily more conditioned by the subjective limitations attending cognition. A further factor enters here, arising from the motives back of such extension of religious knowledge. These motives are practical, not because knowledge of the religious realities beyond the empirical is indispensable to adaptation and commitment to the Good, but for the reason that men find difficulty in becoming emotionally oriented or responsive to that Reality without this further mediation and extension of meaning. Since the conditions making for adequate orientation are individual and cultural, this construction of non-empirical insight concerning the religious reality becomes a homiletic procedure. It is the task of extending the empirical awareness of the Good in ways that will communicate its emotional meaning and significance to religious men and women of a certain persuasion. Such a procedure within a Hindu milieu would require emphasis and amplifications different from that within a culture shaped by the Christian tradition. In the *one* case the *impersonal* character of the reality might carry persuasion; in the other, there is apt to be an insistence upon a personalized conception of God. These instrumental concepts should not be confused with religious knowledge attained through verifiable means. Yet they should not be ignored since they become useful, even imperative, meanings for making verified knowledge emotionally significant. Let the philosopher of religion search out that process and reality that enter significantly into the life of the world and men. But let the theologian give such setting and form and concrete fullness to these insights as will communicate that significance to eager men and women who hunger for righteousness and aspire to purity of heart.

THE PERPLEXING FAITH OF A MORALIST

By Peter A. Bertocci
Instructor in Philosophy and Psychology, Bates College

If a man is seriously convinced that of all facts those of our own moral struggle are the most immediately sure and certain, that we have more intimate assurances of the reality of love and hate, virtue and vice, than of the reality of atoms or electrons, I do not believe that he is in much danger of reducing Theism to the level of a metaphysical speculation or a 'permitted' hypothesis."[1] In these lines may be found the persistent conviction of A. E. Taylor's *The Faith of a Moralist*. The schoolboy who had suffered "acute distress" from doubt whether all recognized distinctions between good and bad might not be purely subjective prejudice, confesses at a riper age: "What I looked for in philosophy was some sane defence of convictions which I felt were essential for the conduct of life against what seemed to be the disintegrating influences of scholarship and biological science."[2] Hence Taylor candidly asserts that he faces the most important problem, the relation of value and reality, with "no spirit of affected neutrality and aloofness, but from the point of view of one moulded by education in a definite moral and religious tradition. . . ."[3] And as he justifies his faith, his transparent earnestness and vitality, the many wayside insights, and the suggestiveness of his analysis amply reward the effort expended in following arguments wandering in an "unstudied, even conversational" style. In this paper, we shall devote ourselves to a critical review of the more significant points in Taylor's moral argument for God.

It is always revealing to discover why a particular theist accepts the particular argument which leads him to belief in God. Taylor, for example, finds *some* force in the cosmological and teleological approaches to God, for they suggest that an intelligent Will, a "being above mutability and having no succession of phases within itself,"[4] exists. Yet along these pathways the footprints only of the loving Father are discernible, and Taylor thereupon turns to man's moral

1. A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist* (London, 1930), I, p. 120.
2. J. H. Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy* (London, 1925), II, p. 270.
3. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
4. E. G. Selwyn, *Essays Catholic and Critical* (New York, 1926), p. 58.

nature for the "image" of God. In so doing, Taylor joins a number of his English contemporaries, with the telling exception of F. R. Tennant, in the insistence that apart from man's moral and religious experience there is insufficient evidence for a God who is more than Intelligence. The goodness of God can be maintained, not by inference from the actualized values of experience, but by trust in cognitive revelations of a realm of values independent of man. Now this particular moral argument for God, resting as it does upon the moral consciousness of an uncreated realm of values, involves the belief that we do or can possess valid knowledge of such a realm. It therefore usually proceeds by denying, on the one hand, any moral dualism between man and Nature ("Nature" being ambiguously defined), and asserting, on the other hand, an organic unity between them which insures, of course, the true cognition of the realm of eternal values. Taylor's general agreement with this procedure begins to be evident from the quotation: "Even were there nothing else to suggest to us that we are denizens at once of a natural and a temporal and of a supernatural and eternal world, the revelation of our own inner division against ourselves afforded by Conscience, duly meditated, is enough to bear the strain" of theism.[5] Let us elaborate Taylor's argument.

A. Taylor asserts that his attack is directed against the "absolute and rigid divorce between fact and value," a divorce which if real would imply that only an accidental conjunction exists between actuality and value. Religion, however, is "bound up with a final coincidence of existence and value in an object which is at once the most *real* of beings and the good. . . ."[6] Accordingly, Taylor confronts us with *either* divorce *or* coincidence—no courting period allowed—between reality and value. The problem thus narrowly posed is of great moment for Taylor especially, since he does not believe that a high, sacrificial morality is rationally justified if a disjunction does exist between fact and value.

However, such a "supposed rigid disjunction of fact from value is, after all, a mere prejudice, too hastily conceived by philosophers. . . ."[7] This, despite Taylor's own assertion than an honest intellect, viewing

5. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
6. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 32.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 33.

the normal trend of nature and human society would be unable to pronounce it good! "The best in what is actual," says our Platonist, "has its recognisable defects; were there no other its very impermanency would be a defect."[8] Nevertheless, disjunction is still held to be due to faulty analysis and the forgetfulness of some philosophers who, having abstracted values from their concrete embodiments, treat them absent-mindedly as nominalistic universals and deny their reality. Yet, obviously, "what we commend is not courage or temperance 'in the abstract,' an 'universal' concept, but the characteristic life of a courageous or temperate man."[9] Again, mercy has always a reference to a concrete, *personal* activity. The goodness of an act is not an added quality contributed by the spectator. Indeed, "good" as applied to a person really means that his nature has a *nisus* towards a goodness which is never fully actualized in him.[10] The good, then, is both the immanent drive itself, and the end of that drive. It is the realization of the real's possibilities, and not one of two "adjunct" realms. Moreover, a merciful act is not good because it happens to have pleasant and profiable consequences, but solely because it is merciful. And Taylor is led so far as to state: "There are truths which no man knows, truths which, it may be, no man ever will know, beauties which have no human spectator, heroisms and delicacies which no man's actual conduct has exhibited, . . ."[11] despite his assertion that "in all such judgements of value the reference to *personal* activities is always more or less explicitly present."[12] In short, Taylor is carried (by enthusiasm or reason?) from an insistence on the reality of mercy as a characterization of the individual's action to the insistence that values are independent of finite individuals.

But this conclusion is not warranted by an argument which simply suggests that values are real as personal reality, and which at its best would indicate that values are conjoined to personal reality. We have seen men perform heroic acts, but heroism and mercy without the personal activities they are supposed to inform fill us with exceeding wonder!

B. But Taylor, in partial anticipation of such an objection, inveighs

8. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
10. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies* (London, 1934), pp. 406-410.
11. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, p. 44.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

against the curse of epistemology, the failure of philosophers to realize that the psychical processes are instruments for seeing objects, not adding to their content. The knower does not stand over against discontinuous, sensational atoms; rather is he in the presence of a continuum the analysis of which simply reveals both primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities as the mind becomes increasingly sensitive to distinctions within the whole. "In life as we all . . . live it, *all* is given, facts and valuations together, in an undivided whole." In the last analysis, moral, artistic, religious, and scientific traditions, "are also as much facts and part of the given to which we have to make our response as the pressure of the atmosphere."[13] As a matter of fact, if the ideals and the traditions were manufactured "valuations" imposed on the real facts of life from the outside, they would lose all of their inspiration. Fortunate is it, therefore, that they are taken to be "the very bones and marrow of life itself."[14] Interpretation may not be severed from the given, for all human knowledge is already interpretation, and all human action, no matter how far back we go, is not mere blind "appetition." Nay, man's history is "the story of the gradual clarification and progressive definition of apprehensions, contacts with the 'given,' cognitive and practical alike, which have been there all along in vague and implicit form, in any life we can recognize as being qualitatively of a piece with our own."[15]

Yet, even this does not take Taylor beyond the human realm. Furthermore, in this reasoning, has not the *given* been confused with what is simply present to the mind? Nobody would deny that we start with an assimilated given, that human interest determines our attention to and interpretation of the datum. But does this alter the psychological fact that no matter how much our valuations vary (granting that some valuation is always present) the impressional given is refractory and controls us? It is by virtue of this brute control over us that we become relatively sure that the experience is given and not created. Our epistemological, aesthetic, and moral evaluations of the rose may fluctuate, but no fair effort will change its size and color at the moment of observation. Furthermore, on Taylor's view it is difficult to see why interpretation is spoken of, for the mind's activity

13. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 65.

seems limited to simply reading off what is in the datum, and all alterations are due simply to the greater ability of the mind to read what was always there.

Again, perhaps Taylor has been misled in his treatment of Goodness by the assumption that it is similar to Beauty, the third member of the almost hackneyed triad. Now, Beauty *might* be said to inhere in the qualities and relations of a datum, to hover over the surface of a flower, for example. But on reflection we see that moral goodness at least is predicable of volitional activity and is inconceivable apart from volition. For the observer, moreover, willed action is an inference from behavior and not given, as are the parts of the rose, or of the overt activity. Hence, that David loves Jonathan as should a true friend is an inference drawn by the spectator from certain activities willed by David. We never see Mercy or a merciful activity (except as we introspect our own merciful willing), but we do observe an activity which we *interpret* as being merciful by virtue of its effects and its intention. If this is true, Mercy cannot exist apart from willing. Yet, deluded by what would seem to be a good analogy between Beauty and Goodness, we suppose that Goodness too consists of qualities and relations independent of our volition. But, whatever the ultimate status of Beauty, moral goodness seems to inhere in the very activity of willing an end which is deemed consistent with the Good for man (of which moral goodness is at least a part). Since, however, the Good is an attribute of some human state of satisfaction, it is extremely difficult to understand how it can be perceived as existing independently of man. Again, if the moral goodness of an act consists not in the relations of the parts of an activity, but in the further dynamic relation of that activity as a whole to the approved satisfactions of men (the Good), moral goodness may indeed be said to inform the actions of men. But that human moral goodness and the Good-*for-man* exists in a reality beyond men is yet to be proved!

C. But Taylor has only broken ground in this argument against the dichotomy of value and fact. He sows his seed when he argues that the existence of God is implied in the experience: "What I ought, that I can be." To be sure, what a man ought to be is never a clear and distinct idea, but something which grows on him as he develops. But this indistinct idea of the Good is not the extreme nominalist's abstraction. It is rather the blurred vision of something beyond man,

blurred by the fact that man is never quite sure what he *is*. The categorical imperative insists that I be what I really am, but: "I am a riddle to myself, and it is only through the process of the *Werden* that I, slowly and painfully, gain some insight into my *Sein*."[16] Hence, we gradually realize that the good life is not simply a monotony of 'one damned thing after another,' but the successive revelation of something abiding which is expressing itself in the temporal sequence. And Taylor argues that moral endeavor is the struggle of this abiding pattern, which is not built up by moral experience, to appear fully all at once, an effort involving a conflict with a temporality which contaminates everything by its succession. Thus Taylor says: "As morality becomes conscious of itself, it is discovered to be always a life of tension between the temporal and the eternal, only possible to a being who is neither simply eternal and abiding, nor simply mutable and temporal, but both at once."[17] And the final goal of moral living is described thus. "We can imagine a kind of life in which all our various aims and interests should be so completely unified by reference to a supreme and all-embracing good that all action had the same character of completeness which is imperfectly illustrated by our enjoyment of a musical pattern."[18]

Such a goal, on the one hand, cannot be realized through any temporal and secular good. On the other hand, moral aspiration must have a real basis. Hence, Taylor argues, "we may fairly infer that there *is* a non-secular good to which moral endeavour is a growing response."[19] Again, we have seen that the moral life is a straining toward a fruition impossible as long as there is a straining. Hence: "If we are justified in treating our own existence and peculiar *Sosein* as moral beings capable of throwing any light whatever on the character of the actual and real as a whole, we might then reasonably infer that we may argue, here as elsewhere, from the existenc of a function to the reality of an environment in which the function can find adequate exercise."[20]

Before considering Taylor's reinforcement of this specific moral argument for God, we may remind ourselves that the *facts* Taylor

16. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
20. *Loc. cit.*

has in mind are amenable to another interpretation, that another avenue from them to God is open even to the moralist. We need not deny that the goal of moral striving embodies the yearning to reach a state beyond the perishing of fleeting desire, where all the movements and themes of the moral life will be so co-ordinated as to achieve a triumphant symphony. It must be granted, also, that if morality is to reach its goal, the conditions under which man lives must not effectively thwart *his* attempts to achieve the Good. But from this it does not follow that the goal must be already metaphysically realized in its entirety. On the other hand, the observant moralist finds that, to date, conditions suitable for moral development have, on the whole, been present, and that he must be grateful to the ultimate Reality for creating him with his particular characteristics in this particular environment. He is conscious that his ideals are both imperfectly conceived and imperfectly realized, and that he may never realize perfection. Yet is he spurred on by the consciousness that any state of the progressive realization of an ideal is more satisfactory than the last, and that all is lost if he turns back. And he may reason that the very fact of the creation and recreation of value in world history affords grounds for supposing that the future may yet make possible the further improvement of man's moral activity and the realization of even greater value. By such a procedure the moralist has not been carried beyond empirical facts about man's experience in this universe, and yet he can be optimistic about the future while grateful for the present.

Taylor, however, contends that actualized values are insufficient to prove the ultimate goodness of reality, and hence takes the other pathway. The argument is now from the reality of a human function, a moral yearning, to a metaphysically eternal environment. But Taylor is in reality arguing, not from a function to an environment in which it *may* function, but from the unproved premise that the function could not and would not function at all unless it were assured of *complete* satisfaction. This is to maintain, more specifically, that good living would be impossible unless there is a guarantee that its *highest* aspirations are to be fulfilled, the guarantor being a God in whom the Good is completely realized.

Yet not only is a more empirical pathway less difficult, but it avoids the actual obstacles rising in Taylor's way. A preliminary objection

already suggested is that if Taylor's Goodness is the Good-*for-man*, it is hard to see how the Good for man, whether conceived as individual or social, can be metaphysically and completely realized, except in the action and lives of men themselves. The goodness of God himself is goodness as for a divine being; the realization of Goodness on his part cannot be identical with the Good in its specific meaning for man. On the other hand, the goodness *of* God *toward* man may significantly indicate the divine providence in creating this particular universe and this particular human nature, so that, certain physical and psychological laws having been obeyed, life may be complete and joyous. Such a provident God is required as a basis for faith in the ultimate success of moral endeavor, but He cannot be the embodiment of a "Good-*for-man*" which man must perceive with a moral eye and proceed to realize in his own life. Man will find the nature of Goodness for his species by becoming sensitive to his own mental and emotional possibilities, and by continuous experimentation with the very nature which is developed through mental and moral experience. God is needed as a teleological and cosmological cause for man's nature and development, not as a guarantor for epistemological knowledge of perfection or for the inspiration of morality!

Another basic difficulty in Taylor's position seems to lie in his conception of moral functioning as if it were the functioning of eyesight, a conception which prevents him from fully realizing that the will, unlike other human functions, may superimpose another environment of its own making on the environment given it. It may do this by legislating its own laws, derived, not by reading off a non-temporal realm, but by criticizing and generalizing all of its psychological *experiences* of value. Taylor supposes that the plan from which the moral eye reads is non-human and non-temporal. His tendency to emphasize cognition (most of his examples of moral eternity involve aesthetic objects, and his favorite verbs are "apprehend and enjoy") rather than creation of value, may explain the readiness with which he thinks that the moral consciousness, like the biological eye, must have an environment in which its objects already exist in completion. On the contrary, it is possible that man, contemplating his own nature and past experience in this environment, might build an imaginative ideal of the Good, which, though not completely realized, is not intrinsically unrealizable. But it is man's own conative, emotional, and

cognitive nature, expressed in a given environment, that constitutes the control-datum in his knowledge of the Good.

D. The final argument for the existence of God is to be found in Taylor's practical psychology of moral living, which underlies, in our judgment, the remainder of his reasoning. For Taylor is persuaded that the regeneration of the self, the life of sacrificial altruism, is impossible apart from the communication of goodness by God. "The moral quest will be self-defeating unless there is an object to sustain it which embodies in itself good complete and whole, so that in having it we are possessing that which absolutely satisfies the heart's desire and can never be taken from us."[21] Nor can the moral quest be satisfied with any good of this world. For it is characteristic of any temporal Good that it is constituted by goods, which no one can enjoy all at once, and each of which can only be realized through the sacrifice of another. The maturity of age is acquired at the loss of the enthusiasm of youth; social security is bought with the blood of individuality, and the increase of international good-will makes impossible the previous patriotic zest for the fatherland. No, the object of our quest must be something infinite and eternal, realized in the life of God. If a naturalistic or secular ethics is all, then there is no hope of a "regeneration and remaking of the self in the likeness of a contemplated eternal good,"[22] for the highest good will be a this-world good, and involve an infinite *prospectus* impossible to achieve in our life-time. (Yet, granting all this, it is difficult to see how Taylor's own solution, which involves immortality, rids us of this *prospectus*.) Mere humanism will not satisfy the moral consciousness; but neither will any theosophic view of the soul as intrinsically divine be adequate, for the condition of moral living, Taylor realizes, is the real distinction between the divine and the human. If man *becomes* divine there is real progress; but moral sloth may close forever the path to the life eternal. "The divinity accessible to man must be not *deity* but *deiformity*, transfiguration into a character which is not ours by right of birth, but is won by an effort, and won as something communicated from another source, where it is truly underived and original."[23] Only if there is an eternal good shall we be able to release our hold on worldly goods

21. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

"neither sullenly nor recklessly, but freely and gladly,"[24] and cultivate the right mean between attachment and detachment toward temporal goods.

This argument is reinforced by the consideration of Green's "vicious circle." For indeed no earnest person is ever satisfied with a relatively better, but, ever disturbed by a divine discontent, he is driven beyond the better to the very best. Yet, though the Best is never clearly conceived by him, he cannot feel that any present moral institution is "worthy to be eternised because it gives us the best,"[25] especially since all balmy Utopias never "ensure that the inhabitants shall be 'true Israelites' in whom there is no guile."[26] "Your Eden may be cunningly and strongly fenced, but no fence will keep out the old serpent."[27] Despite this, however, the moralist is driven to conceive the best only by reference to what exists, and to decide "that advance to a better state still means progress along the same road."[28]

There is little doubt that Taylor's viewpoint represents an emotional mood which overtakes us all, especially in moments of discouragement. But besides practical objections, there are theoretical difficulties with this position. First, the idea of communication is no clearer than it is in the work of Plato. Furthermore, it certainly is a puzzling state of affairs when our effort does not create our good for ourselves, but merely renders us ready to *receive* our eternity. Taylor is explaining moral growth as growth by accretion, as it were, after the necessary conative and volitional steps are taken preparatory for the communication. Yet to visualize growth thus is to confront difficulties similar to those of transeunt causality. Moral growth cannot be explained adequately by transfer of power, knowledge, or goodness, any more than biological or mental growth can be explained by analogies from the physical world. It is certainly possible that conative and volitional activity may lift us to a state in which we become more sensitive to divine stimuli, but the experience which results from such stimulation must, like all other experience, be a joint-product of the nature of the causal entity and our *free* response to it. This, however, could certainly not be called a "communication" of goodness or power.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 141.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

Second, as Taylor himself ultimately admits, our eternal city can only be described in terms of earthly treasures. And it does seem unfair to disparage secular Utopias without pointing out basic defects due to other factors than human freedom. Weighty arguments against Utopias must be based on some intrinsic and inescapable evil which arise out of their very essence. Again, Taylor's very conception of moral eternity is ever infected by this humble secular origin. If our moralist is sure that the serpent will not creep into his eternity, it is only because it has been plucked out arbitrarily. In any case, if we can pass to the ideal limit of temporal experience and accept an eternity thereby derived, why can we not accept an Utopia empirically derived? But we turn to a more significant criticism.

The very viciousness of Green's circle leads us to suspect Taylor's position. The *fact* upon which Taylor's *theory* is built is that at no point in the moral struggle can the sensitive moral agent be satisfied, and that he consequently seeks a better. The theory offered by Taylor is that this discontent is caused by a realized Best *which is never clearly visualized*. Nevertheless, this Best must be there even though at any stage we can actually point only to a better than what we have; and yet when we arrive at this better we know it is not the Best! Now, it seems to us that Taylor is allowing a difference in words to stand for a difference in reality. That is, is it not clear that in every instance of present dissatisfaction the Best is "one better" than any conceivable alternative, that the Best is the more inclusive good (whatever that may be on any ethical theory), is a better than the contending good minus one? All we ever know *is* a better, as Taylor must admit, since on his own admission our vision is dim! We continue to consider the Best (or the better-than-anything-else) "the best" until the very process by which we achieve that better has in a mysterious way so developed our moral sinews and satisfactions that, once we arrive at the goal, we realize that we are pilgrims who can "tarry but a while" on the way to a newly-conceived and empirically derived Goodness. Our moral dissatisfaction is caused not by the pricking of the independently existing Good, not by an ill-conceived future Best which lured us on even though we saw it dimly. It is rather due to the discovery, as we proceed toward a goal, that we are human beings with capacities of which we had not even dreamed. The very ascent reveals hitherto unsuspected peaks of psychological satisfaction, and new alternatives to be faced.

The paradox and the mystery of life is this growth, but the pricking is in the very constitution of our own growing nature, which we did not ourselves create. Nor did we create the spiritual laws which we find within our very growth and which, evidently, must be obeyed if we would find peace. Such *are our* natures, and they grow from within, in a personal and physical environment. As to this internal moral growth, we seem to be independent Leibnizian monads; and if our windows are open to the Eternal, the acceptance of influence must not violate human free will. Communication, or the passing of influence as described, is, however, incompatible with free will.

As for the problem of moral incentive, it still is proper to insist that ethical living finds its own reward in the satisfaction attainable at no other level. Yet, evident as this may seem, it is denied by Taylor's contention that ethical living is doomed unless there is an assurance that the Good can be achieved. The appeal, then, must be to experience. Is it reasonable to assert that the moral man, who is gladly and joyously moral, who is not always counting his "sacrifices," would turn back or cease striving even if he were sure that he could not achieve the end? For, does he not know that he would be a fool to degenerate simply because he cannot go further? Does the student cease studying because he cannot know all? If a lover of music knew that he was doomed in ten years to the loss of his art, would he therefore discontinue his pursuit? Why should it be otherwise with the lover of the good life?

The truth is, as Taylor himself insists, that we do not know whither we are bound. At every level we know that life has greater meaning than in the stage just traversed. After we have experienced a number of levels and realize that what we thought was the Best could be superseded, we naturally make the generalization that there is probably a better than whatever level we may experience. We realize that we can never be too sure about any Best, and consequently we *infer* from past experience that we see the Best but dimly, the Best here being simply one word referring to what seems at the time a valid generalization or idealization of past and present experiences of value. And yet, under the influence, both of the eye-metaphor and of the obsession for objectivity which deceives us into thinking that all our ideas must have metaphysical objects *beyond* ourselves as their cause, it is a simple step to hypostatize that Best, and then assert that moral discontent is

caused by our dim sense of it. At any particular level, however, the Best is the hypothesis that a certain state will be better than another, and we can only know that it is the Best by living it—therein lies the venture and risk of moral living, as Taylor himself would grant.

He would also grant a good part of our general position. But he, characteristically, insists that unless a man is convinced that the moral law is not "originally mine, nor that of any man or all men," he cannot reverence it "without reservations."[29] After all, "What is to supply the driving force which will fan languid and faint desire [note the words!] for the best into flame? How are we to be made to care enough for the highest?"[30] Taylor devotes pages to variations on the theme that the transformation of the self involves an extra-human cause of regeneration. "The initiative in the process of 'assimilation to God' must come from . . . God who first comes to meet us, and who, all through the moral life itself, 'works in us,' in a sense which is more than metaphorical."[31] God is the moral environment to which our moral endeavors are responses, and without Him morality "would amount to a prolonged attempt to breathe *in vacuo*, or to feed one's body on its own fat."[32] Without the assurance of immortality, the only reason for not degrading one's personality would be that in making a beast of myself I am committing an offence against God.

But why, we ask, should I not commit an offence against God? I certainly cannot hurt *his* character! Must not the ultimate reason lie (not in my cognition of certain imposed commands but) in the realization that if I make a beast of myself the very laws of satisfaction which govern my happiness are broken? But these empirically discovered laws of my nature are rationally binding *here* and *now*, regardless whether God exists or not. If God does control or affect my actions, he does so by having so constituted my original nature that lasting satisfaction is not attainable apart from a certain kind of living. And if I give my life in sacrifice, I am justified by the very fact that in so doing I have actually found an inexplicable satisfaction and peace, in itself seemingly unrelated to any question of immortality. The ethical life seems to be such that it does not back-slide for lack of a God or eternity. Rather does it supply its own initiative through its

29. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

very struggle. On the other hand, we should be the last to deny that the philosophical moralist, intent on the most probable explanation of a universe in which such living is possible, is led to belief in a creative, loving Father. Nor should we deny that the moralist who can find sufficient grounds for believing in a good God has just cause for greater moral inspiration and confidence than is available to his unbelieving brother. But, we should insist, within the moral life itself there is neither desire nor rational sanction for the cessation of effort. Indeed, should the cosmic struggle with evil eventuate in failure, should immortality be denied, the moral man is still grateful for the joys actually experienced.

In the last analysis, our problem still is: What is man's given nature? As one rereads Taylor, he comes to feel that the root of the whole argument lies in Taylor's conviction that man without God would degenerate into a complete victim of selfish desires, that man, without the divine breath, returns to clay. Now, of course, if man *is* earth-born, he naturally cannot be a denizen of heaven without the efficient causality of the divine. But once this moral, metaphysical causality is introduced into the moral struggle, especially in the sense in which Taylor seems to mean it, man's free-will disappears and with it the reality of the moral life itself. On the other hand, given a human nature driven by an intrinsic *conatus*,[33] not only for living, but for better living, and the very process of moral growth in the human and natural environment comes to reveal laws of human satisfaction, which themselves provide further inspiration for better living and a significant clue to the nature and purpose of the Ultimate.

33. This notion is given more adequate treatment in the author's article, "The Authority of Ethical Ideals," *Journal of Philosophy*, May 7, 1936.

BOOK REVIEWS

A History of Chinese Philosophy: The period of the philosophers, from the beginnings to circa 100 B.C. By FUNG YU-LAN. Translated by DERK BODDE. Peiping, China: Henri Vetch, 1937. (Also obtainable from Allen & Unwin). xx + 457 pp. $6.00.

What would Greek philosophy have been if it had been founded and given its bent by the respected teacher of civic virtue, Protagoras, instead of by the mathematician and scientist, Thales, especially if the development of mathematics had been delayed until after the period of the great philosophers? This book provides a conception of what might have been produced, for the situations in Greece and in China were similar in many respects. Ancient China, a group of city-states located around a fertile plain, continually fighting with each other, produced a succession of teachers and political advisors quite comparable to the Greek sophists, and also a few master-minds who gave permanent direction to the at first confused welter of thought. But China had no Egyptian or Babylonian tradition, already thousands of years old, from which to draw the mathematical and scientific ideas that so profoundly affected Greek thought. Hence the Chinese development was different from the Greek, and equally interesting.

The study of Chinese philosophy has suffered from the fact that many pious forgeries and myths have made it as complicated a subject as the Bible. Only in the last few decades has literary criticism of the Chinese classics in China reached the point where it compares with occidental Biblical criticism. Professor Fung takes for granted the results of this criticism. As a consequence, his account differs considerably from the traditional one. The mysterious Laotzu, supposedly a sixth century B.C. older contemporary of Confucius, becomes the historical Li Erh of the third century B.C., whose son became a general and a noble, and whose descendant was known to the first century historian, Szu-ma Ch'ien. Yang Chu's *Garden of Pleasure,* instead of having been written by a contemporary of Mencius in the third century B.C., becomes a work of the third century A.D. These critical results are quite adequately justified, but unfortunately Professor Fung merely refers to discussions in which this proof is presented, for this book was originally written as a textbook for his students.

Confucius now becomes the real founder of Chinese philosophy.

He appears as the first professional teacher of advanced students, the founder of the scholar class that has since ruled China. A conservative, who taught the best traditions of his highly cultured state to the young people of aristocratic families, he read into the literature of the past his own high ideals and emphasized a civic and personal moral code of the highest type.

Motzu, who was born in Confucius' ancestral state about the time that Confucius died, and who reacted against Confucius' conservatism so vehemently that he had to go to a neighboring state, becomes, perhaps, the most interesting of these ancient Chinese. He bent his energies towards ending by moral means the continual internecine warfare, teaching universal love and a puritan simplicity, deriving the justification for his moral code from a non-hedonistic utilitarianism, and giving it a religious sanction by making it the will of a perfectly righteous and all-loving God and the omnipresent and righteous spirits, who reward virtue and punish wickedness. Motzu organized his opposition to war in a successful school for training loyal and devoted officials, for whom he secured positions, and whom he had dismissed if they engaged in offensive warfare. In his own state he organized a devoted brotherhood, pledged to absolute obedience to their leader, and willing to die in the defence of their city. He taught them the art of defensive warfare, and so persuasively pointed out in person his superiority in defence that he dissuaded at least one powerful prince from attacking. While he failed to do more than check temporarily the Chinese internecine struggle, yet his cogent reasoning has been largely responsible for the influential pacifistic tendency in Chinese thought.

The most brilliant of these Chinese was Laotzu, the recluse, who found in metaphysical speculation and quietism a relief from the bitter realities of his age. He trenchantly criticized the dogmatic assumptions of the other schools, delighting, like a mischievous schoolboy, in making pungent fun of their most sacred conceptions. Heaven, the righteous God of Confucius and Motzu, said Laotzu, treats all men like straw dogs, exhibiting no kindliness or moral qualities. The universe, or Tao, is an effortless universal activity, and whenever men tamper with its natural order, disorder ensues. Hence civilization is a mistake, and men should return to the good old times. Tao has two fundamental principles, being and non-being. Laotzu was free from the unproved

assumption with which Parmenides has prejudiced European thought, that non-being cannot be. Laotzu not only took non-being as a fundamental metaphysical category, but he assigned it the positive utility found in the empty interior of a jar, or a house, or the hub of a wheel. Thus we find in ancient China a fascinating philosophical development whose value is incalculable for the purpose of contrasting it with Greek and European thought.

Professor Fung received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and has been professor of philosophy at the prominent Tsing-hua University, Peking. His *History of Chinese Philosophy* has long been recognized in China as the outstanding work in that field. This book is the translation of his first volume, devoted to the ancient period, made by a capable American, now teaching in this country.

The book is so good that there is little fault to be found with it. It is the first extensive account of Chinese thought in the English language. From the occidental viewpoint, perhaps its greatest defect is that it exhibits too much the spirit of Chinese historians—it concerns itself primarily with presenting the facts, reducing interpretation to a minimum. This characteristic also has its advantages. Once in a while the work is uncritical, as when it quotes speeches from the *Tso-chuan*, a work of the fourth century B.C., as representing more ancient times (pp. 34, 38, 314). In the main however, it is quite critical. Once in a while it makes a misleading statement, as when it says that Hsüntzu's Heaven contains no ethical principle (p. 286), for Hsüntzu identified ethical and metaphysical principles, so that Heaven, while impersonal, yet incarnates all the Confucian moral ideals. Professor Fung has also failed to see that Kung-sun Lung, the logical realist, used Laotzu's concept of non-existence to function in precisely the same fashion as does the occidental concept of subsistence, so that his interpretation of the "Discourse on *Chih* and Things" (pp. 209 f.) goes quite wrong. But these are incidental matters, quite excusable in what is really the first critical work of its kind.

The translation is also very good. Dr. Bodde has improved the book by adding an historical introduction and eliminating much of the author's introductory chapter, which was written for Chinese students. He has also added a chronological table, a bibliography, an excellent index, and a map. Occasionally he adds a useful footnote. Rarely, as in translating an historical passage requiring special knowledge (p. 17

par. 3), he blunders. On p. 252 he has carelessly omitted the account, in the original, of space, which should come after the account of time. These, however, are minor defects in what is really a first class achievement, for nothing is so difficult to translate as Chinese philosophy. It is to be hoped that the translation of Professor Fung's second volume will appear soon, and that the present volume will have a sale commensurate with its merits. Every occidental philosopher who reflects upon the development of the tradition in which he has been reared will be helped immeasurably by setting it against the background of similar developments in China.

HOMER H. DUBS

Duke University

The Qur'ān. Translated by RICHARD BELL, with a critical re-arrangement of the Surahs. Vol. 1, Surahs, i-xxiv. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937. xiii + 343 pp. $6.00.

A work of this nature can be adequately reviewed only when it is completed. As, however, it is a work of fundamental importance for Islamic studies, this preliminary notice may serve to indicate its importance, and introduce it to students interested in such studies.

It has commonly been held against translations of the Qur'ān that they are unreadable, presenting a text of such bewildering confusion, such a jumble of inconsequential fragments of discourse, such wearisome repetition, that it is only by an effort that the ordinary reader can get through the book. Rodwell tried to remedy this by arranging the Sūras in some sort of chronological order, so that the early, and more interesting poetical passages came first, and in a sense prepared the way for the later masses of controversial and legislative passages. This was a help, but as it is well known that many of the Sūras are composite, containing material from different periods of the Prophet's ministry, Rodwell's translation, which left each individual Sūra intact, could present only a partially chronological arrangement. Certain modern Indian Muslims who have made English translations of the Qur'ān have attempted an analysis at the head of each Sūra to make its contents more intelligible, and to demonstrate that there is definite purpose and order in the present arrangement of the material. These attempts, however, have been quite unsuccessful, and it must be admitted that, save to the little group of scholars who have made a

special study of the Qur'ān, the book still appears largely unintelligible. In Dr. Bell's new translation we find for the first time a Qur'ān which reads intelligibly.

In 1925 Dr. Bell delivered in Edinburgh the Gunning Lectures on "The Origin of Islam in Its Christian Environment," and in preparing the material for those lectures he faced the fact that, if the results of his critical investigations into the origins of Islam were to be adequately set forth, a new translation of the Qur'ān would be necessary,—a translation which would not only embody the results of recent scholarship in the rendering of many words and phrases, but a translation so arranged as to show at a glance the various strata of material which have gone into its composition, and which are hopelessly jumbled together in the present text. The present volume offers us one half of the results of that work.

Dr. Bell's working theory is that Muḥammad himself, who first came forth as a mere preacher of righteousness, late in his ministry set about preparing the materials for a Scripture for his growing community. Contrary to universal opinion among Muslims, and to the preponderance of opinion among Western scholars, he believes the Prophet was able to write, and indeed wrote with his own hand a good deal of material for his Scripture. For the purpose of his book he worked over many revelations, discarding some passages in favor of others, utilizing passages from his earlier "sermons" by adapting them, altering them, and if need be, adding rhyming endings. Some pieces he revised more than once. As writing material was scarce in those days, passages being prepared for the book would often have to be written on the back of bits of writing material that had been used for earlier revelations and now discarded. In the case of a long piece the backs of three or four such scraps, each containing some different discarded passages, might have to be used.

Now the Prophet died before his book was ready. His material was inherited by his immediate successors, who after a few years undertook to issue the book. They carefully pieced together *all* the material available, including the first drafts of a passage along with its final revised form, putting in rejected scraps along with the material that had been written later on the other side, saving broken pieces which have neither beginning nor ending, but which must originally have belonged to some longer passage. Often a passage meant to be a unity

they broke up, because it happened to be written on two or more pieces of writing material, and after each piece they copied in what was written on the reverse side, though it belonged to some entirely different connection. Thus, in the text as we have it, there is this bewildering confusion. It contains scraps of material that certainly come from the Prophet, but which the Prophet himself would never have included in his book—scraps of sermons, deliverances *ad hoc*, notes on matters which he later elaborated in polished form, drafts —sometimes first, second and even third drafts—of proclamations, perhaps even personal communings. The compilers faithfully pieced together all they could find, guided by similarities in rhyme rather than by subject matter. Occasionally they had pieces of considerable size, where it concerned proclamations, or pieces of legislative material which the Prophet had had written out at the time, or pieces which had been used liturgically in the community, or revelations which the Prophet had already prepared in their final, polished form. In general, however, what they had to work with was a mass of small scraps of writing material, miscellaneous in character, which they had to arrange as best they could.

The sutures are visible to the eye, even in an English translation such as Rodwell's. A passage will suddenly break off, the next line taking up an entirely extraneous matter, and the original subject be taken up again some lines further down. Over and over again in a Sūra will be found longer or shorter insertions which have no connection whatever with the matter preceding or following them. In a Sūra which, in the main, consists of short lines full of poetic fire and imagery there suddenly appear verses of prose in long, unwieldy sentences dealing with some matter of legislation or controversy. To the reader of Arabic the sutures are still more evident, for not only are there breaks and abrupt changes in subject matter, but sudden changes of rhyme, of style, and of vocabulary.

Every Western scholar would agree as to the patchwork character of the present text of the Qur'ān. Indeed, it accords with the earliest Muslim tradition as to the construction of the standard text. That tradition tells how the little committee appointed by the Caliph 'Uthmān sat at the entrance of the Mosque in Madīna, and copied down what was brought them by the people, who came in obedience to the Caliph's command that any Muslim in possession of revelations de-

livered by the Prophet should bring them to him. We learn that this committee would accept no revelation unless it was attested by two witnesses, and there are statements which seem to imply that there was discussion among them as to where to incorporate certain pieces of revelation as they came in.

Dr. Bell's theory differs from the above tradition in that he assumes the material to have been in writing in the hands of the Prophet, and partially prepared for publication before he died. He holds that the two, or sometimes three, slightly different versions of the same thing are due to revisions by the Prophet, and not to the fact that the collectors got three versions from three different persons, and, on the ground of their being somewhat different, included them all. The curious explanatory afterthoughts that accompany so many passages, he considers due to interlinear revisions and additions by the Prophet himself, made when he was going over the written passages. Even the arrangement of the material into Sūras he thinks was, to some extent, the work of the Prophet.

This is in direct opposition to the whole body of tradition. The orthodox belief is that the Prophet could neither read nor write, and so would have been quite incapable of preparing the material himself. It is not necessary, however, to take this too seriously, and even if it were true, Dr. Bell could argue that he altered and arranged the material through his amanuensis who sat by his side and read to him, just as a blind author does for his publications at the present day. A more serious fact is that our oldest strata of tradition tell us quite plainly that when the Prophet died there was no collection made of his revelations. The earliest stories of the recensions of the text all agree that, when the attempt at gathering the revelations was made, it met with the solid objection, "Why do you do this thing which the Prophet of Allah did not do, and as to which he left no injunction?" If the text of the Qur'ān had been compiled from material left by the Prophet himself, one would think that such material would have been most jealously kept and guarded, yet not a word about any such material has been preserved anywhere, save in a Shī'a source which says that the Prophet left his material to 'Alī, his son-in-law, a source which is, however, suspect on many grounds.

In spite of all our modern suspicion as to the genuineness of much of the corpus of Muslim tradition, it must be confessed that it is diffi-

cult to reject the unanimity of early tradition of this matter, when it was in the interests of orthodoxy to claim, as in later tradition they did claim, that all the material for the Qur'ān had been arranged for publication by the Prophet himself. If Dr. Bell's theory is to hold against the weight of tradition, it must do so on the ground that his solutions of the difficulties and obscurities of the text are better than those possible on any other theory. This matter can, of course, be adequately examined only when the complete translation is before us.

The ideal thing would have been to split the text up and arrange the material as far as possible chronologically. For practical purposes of reference, however, this was not possible, so Dr. Bell has left the Sūras in the order in which they occur in the printed text, which indeed, on his theory may possibly be the order in which Muḥammad meant them to be. In his translation, however, he has split up the individual Sūras into their component parts, arranging parallel versions, revisions, adaptations, etc., in parallel columns, separating out by printing devices late additions and insertions, and adding rubrics to suggest date, order, etc. This might be expected to present the reader with pages of confusion worse confused, but actually it is not so. The attentive reader can easily keep the thread through the page, and to those familiar with the old arrangement this arrangement brings order into the old confusion in a way that is little short of amazing.

Probably the gravest objection that critics will bring against the rearrangement is that it is so largely subjective. In a first attempt, such as this, many suggested dispositions of material must necessarily be tentative, and Dr. Bell has often marked them as such. Where external data of a chronological kind are almost entirely lacking, and the scholar must depend on internal evidence, there must always enter the subjective element to a greater or less extent. In the present case the amount of subjectiveness is really more apparent than real, because Dr. Bell has been unable, from considerations of costs, to print his extensive notes, which make clear the grounds on which his decisions rest. To the reader of the English text it may often seem quite arbitrary to state that one set of verses is later than another, whereas in the Arabic text the phraseology, the vocabulary, the type of rhyme, any one of a score of little pieces of evidence, may be quite decisive.

The translation has attempted to be literal rather than elegant.

At times, indeed, its literal renderings may even be thought to border on inelegance, but it is a faithful and reliable translation. In some quarters it will doubtless be condemned because it so often departs from traditional interpretations of the text. It is true that we cannot entirely neglect the Muslim commentaries, and Dr. Bell tells us that he has had Baidawī ever close to his elbow, but those who have worked at all with these Commentaries know well how great uncertainty there was as to the original meaning of the Qur'ān even at the time the earliest of them began to compile their work. It is thus impossible to bind the modern translator, who works by a different method and starts from different presuppositions, by their interpretations. While exercising his own judgment Dr. Bell has tried to utilize both the useful material that can be drawn from the Commentaries, and the results of the researches of modern scholars.

While testing the principles by which this new translation is worked out must await the completion of the work, it may be said at once that this is, without doubt, the most important piece of work on the Qur'ān that has appeared since Theodor Nöldeke in 1860 published his *Geschichte des Qorans*. Whatever judgment scholarship may ultimately pass upon the work, it is a pioneer work which opens up a new stage in the investigation of, and in the understanding of, one of the world's most influential Scriptures, and as such it may unreservedly be commended to interested students.

Arthur Jeffery

Columbia University

La Religion des Judéo-Araméens d'Éléphantine. By Albert Vincent. Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1937. Pp. iv + 723. Fr. 150.

About thirty years ago the German archeologist Rubensohn, in excavating on the island of Elephantine opposite Syene (modern Assuan) near the first cataract of the Nile, discovered a number of papyri written in Aramaic; these proved to be documents relating to the affairs of the Jewish community settled there by the Persians as a garrison to protect the border between Upper Egypt and Nubia. Most of the papyri, which number about seventy, are legal documents concerning contracts, sales, etc.; a few contain portions of the well known folktale of Achikar; and a half-dozen record the correspondence between

the Jews of Elephantine (or Yeb, in Aramaic) and the Persian governors in Egypt and Judaea and the leaders of the communities of Jerusalem and Samaria in the reign of Darius II, concerning the destruction of the temple of the Jewish god *YHW* (=biblical Hebrew *YHWH*) by the local Egyptians. Since the first publication of the papyri by Cowley and Sayce in 1909 there have appeared at least half a dozen important works dealing with various aspects of the life of this previously unknown colony of Jews in Egypt, but there has been no comprehensive and detailed study of their religion and ritual. This study has now been undertaken by Vincent, an unusually competent Catholic scholar, who is *Maître de Conferences* in the University of Strasbourg.

The material collected by Vincent and the conclusions reached by him are of great importance, not only because of their bearing on the culture of this small Diaspora group, but also because, as the author has convincingly argued, the Elephantine papyri have preserved for us at least the outlines of the syncretistic religious beliefs and practices of the inhabitants of the region of Samaria and Bethel, from which the founders of the colony in all probability came, as they existed at the time of the Assyrian conquest of the kingdom of Israel and in the following century. Thus they enable us to supplement the biblical records of Israelite religion during the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries, and at the same time serve as a fixed point from which to measure the influence of the prophets and the Deuteronomic reformers on the development of religious belief in Judaea. Vincent has collected such an abundance of literary, epigraphic and archeological material on Semitic religion in general and on Syro-Palestinian religion in particular, and has synthesized them with so much judgment and skill, that his book must be considered a useful handbook of biblical religion as well as an indispensable reference-book for the specialist in the history of the Second Hebrew Commonwealth. Another excellence of the volume is the extensive use made of modern literature; some three hundred books and articles are quoted, many of which have appeared within the last five years. The reviewer is glad to note that Vincent promises another volume on the political organization of the Jews of Elephantine.

There are, of course, a number of details concerning which a reader may justly differ from the author; these will be considered below.

Here two general criticisms may be expressed: one, that the author is somewhat too ready to advance an hypothesis where the evidence is insufficient; and the other, that he is somewhat repetitious, particularly in the first part of the book. For the rest, the work fulfills all the requirements of good scholarship. As for the more technical aspects, it is pleasant to report that the contents are well arranged, the texts are accurately reproduced (there being only some half-dozen errors in Hebrew type), and that the indices are quite adequate. Moreover, each chapter is headed with an outline of the argument, and is concluded with a brief but helpful summary.

The subjects treated are as follows: (1) Yahweh-Yahô at Elephantine; (2) Yahweh-Seba'ot; (3) The gods and the "god of heaven" at Elephantine; (4) Sacrifices at Elephantine; (5) Passover at Elephantine ;(6) The temple of Yahô at Elephantine; (7) Theophorous names at Elephantine; (8) The priests of Yahô at Elephantine; (9) Prayer at Elephantine; (10) Oaths; (11) Temple revenues; (12) The God Bethel at Elephantine; (13) The god Ḥarambethel at Elephantine; (14) The goddess 'Anat at Elephantine; (15) The god Ašîmbethel at Elephantine.

It would take far too much space to comment in detail on all the arguments and conclusions stated in the volume, or even to summarize the findings of the separate chapters. The reviewer must therefore content himself with selecting for comment, whether favorable or adverse, what seem to him the most significant, interesting or controversial passages. The marginal numbers in the following paragraphs refer to the pages of the book.

46 ff. The author gives favorable consideration, rightly so in the reviewer's opinion, to the theories of Koenig and G. R. Driver concerning the derivation of the divine name *YHWH;* these scholars suggest that originally it was composed of the exclamatory particle *ya* and the personal pronoun *huwa,* thus meaning "O He." Compare the use of the pronoun in Second-Isaiah as a divine appellative. The derivations from the root *hwh* "to be" seem to the reviewer less satisfactory. Incidentally, Vincent does not mention Albright's theory that *YHWH* is an abbreviation for *yahweh-ašer-yihweh* "he causes to exist what comes into existence"; this explanation is very unsatisfactory for the reason that the root *hwh* has no causative form. That Moses and his contemporaries believed the name *YHWH* (with

whatever vowels it was pronounced) to be connected with the root *hwh*, as indicated by the famous passage, Exod. 3:14, is quite possible. There may have been an older Palestinian god whose name was Yahû (rather than Yahô, as Vincent supposes), and this name may have been interpreted, as the biblical text shows, to mean "the one who exists." Vincent may also be correct in suggesting that the form *YHWH* of the Hebrew Bible represents the solemn and official name of the Hebrew god, while Yahû or its contraction Yô are the popular forms, still surviving among the Jews of Elephantine, that go back to the pre-Mosaic period.

63. The speculations about the divine appellative *YHWH Ṣeba'ot*, "*YHWH* of hosts," and the increased virility of the Israelite tribes in the wilderness in contrast with their pacific life in Egypt seem fanciful. Vincent neglects to consider the problem of just what tribes were in Egypt and how numerous they were. Moreover, if the Hebrews formed part of the Hyksos invasion, as recent discoveries seem to make more and more probable, they could hardly be supposed to have led a pacific life in Egypt.

75 ff. The suggestion that the appellative "God of hosts" was closely connected with the cult centers of Bethel and Shiloh where the ark was deposited is quite plausible. Here Vincent might well have referred to Torczyner's studies of the history of the ark, which seem to confirm his hypothesis. There seems to be no reason for rejecting Vincent's hypothesis that the Jews of Elephantine kept the traditions of "God of hosts" that were current in the seventh century at Bethel, from which they presumably fled to Egypt when Josiah carried out his reforms, as described in II Kings 23.

99 ff. Vincent is perhaps right in explaining the absence of the name El in proper names of the Jews of Elephantine as due to the popular nature of their religion in contrast to that of Palestine where, during the kingdom and down to the end of the Persian period, names compounded with Yô (the contraction of *YHWH*) were by far the most common.

101 ff. The suggestion that the Persian governor of Judaea, named Bagohi, may have been a Jew, because in writing to him the Jews of Elephantine mention "Yahu the god," seems quite improbable. The reference only proves that they expected Bagohi to know who their god was.

108 ff. The argument that the appellative "god of heaven" was peculiar to Samaria and Bethel and came to the Elephantine Jews from these cult centers is somewhat precarious, but the point deserves consideration.

143 ff. More doubtful still is the argument that the Jews of Elephantine consciously took advantage of the fact that the Persians worshipped a "god of heaven" to suggest to them that they and the Jews worshipped the same god under different names, although among themselves the Jewish colonists conceived of Yahû as a national god. From all that we know about the Hebrews of this period we can only conclude that they were never diplomatic in matters of religion. Even in Elephantine where their worship was undoubtedly syncretistic, the foreign elements admitted were at least Palestinian. There is no reason to suppose that they would have, even by indirection, tolerated the worship of a Persian god any more than that of an Egyptian god —and this in spite of the fact that they may have intermarried with Egyptians or used Egyptian names.

154 ff. The comments on the technical names for the sacrifices are also rather speculative; they make it appear that Vincent is forcing the argument to support his theory, otherwise well established, that the cult at Elephantine preserves a good many archaic practices which had been altered in Judaea.

218. The word *l^{e}bônah* is used alone for "incense" in the papyri, while the Hebrew Bible uses both this word and *q^{e}ṭôret*. Vincent claims this as additional proof for the theory that the Elephantine cult is archaic, on the ground that the early biblical texts use *l^{e}bonah* while the late texts use *q^{e}ṭoret*. So far as the reviewer can determine, *l^{e}bonah* is used chiefly in late biblical texts. There is therefore no evidence that its exclusive use in the papyri is archaic. One may, however, accept with reservations Vincent's conclusion (p. 233) that while the sacrifices at Elephantine are on the whole similar to those of the Hebrew Bible, some of them may go back to early Semitic practice and have not followed the "normal evolution of true Mosaic ideas."

235 ff. In connection with the Passover papyrus (No. 21 ed. Cowley) Vincent conjectures that the Hananiah therein mentioned may be the brother of Nehemiah, who had the same name, and that he came to Egypt in B.C. 419 to authorize the celebration of Passover; also that the papyrus preserves the text of a letter dictated by Ne-

hemiah to his brother. This is very interesting but lacks all substantiation.

257 ff. More of this tenuous speculation appears in the pages dealing with the problem why the authorities at Jerusalem interceded for their co-religionists in Egypt in B.C. 419, when they received instructions concerning the celebration of Passover, but failed to do so in B.C. 408 when they asked for help in rebuilding their ruined temple. Vincent supposes that on the first occasion the Judaeans were merely ensuring the proper observance of Passover, while on the second occasion the priests at Jerusalem objected to the existence of a temple outside Jerusalem. But the same objection should have been made to the celebration of Passover in B.C. 419. The reason for their change of feeling must be sought in the political situation at Jerusalem.

270 note 2. Vincent argues that in the Mosaic period Passover and the festival of *Maṣṣôt* (Unleavened Bread) were closely united, while at a later period they were clearly distinguished. The evidence indicates that in the Mosaic period they were two entirely distinct festivals, which subsequently were connected, when the pastoral elements of Hebrew religion were combined with the agricultural observances of the Canaanites. Josephus, the New Testament and the Mishnah, while recognizing that they are in origin distinct festivals, all tend to treat them as one composite festival. Thus the situation is the reverse of that stated by the author. (Cf. further his note on p. 306.)

322 ff. Interesting is Vincent's suggestion that the *'egōrā* at Elephantine may have been the survival of the North Israelite *bamah* ("high place") with the altar and temple; more doubtful is his further suggestion that the *misgedā* may have corresponded to the *maṣṣēbāh* ("stele") of the earlier cult.

330 ff. In arguing that there was only a single cult among the Hebrews of the Mosaic period, Vincent seems to be attacking a man of straw and to miss the point of modern criticism.

335. The fact that the synagogue at Ain Duq was called *'athrā qaddîšā* ("holy place") hardly justifies the author's theory that it was anciently a cult center; the synagogue was not infrequently called a "holy place" on the basis of post-biblical conceptions, cf. Krauss, *Synagogale Altertümer* p. 24.

340. ff. Vincent's hypothetical description of the partially preserved temple at Elephantine is ingenious, but we do not know, of course,

how closely it resembled Canaanite temple areas, as the author assumes.

360 ff. The reviewer believes that Vincent has given convincing reasons for believing that the Elephantine colony was founded in the reign of Josiah and his Egyptian contemporary Psammetichus I, about B.C. 630, probably before the publication of the book of Deuteronomy. There remains one objection to this assumption, however, which Vincent does not discuss, namely the fact that the Jews of Elephantine called themselves Judaeans, rather than Israelites or Hebrews. This point should have been considered.

380 ff. In attempting to explain why the Persian governor of Judaea permitted the colonists to offer the *šelem* sacrifice and incense while failing to mention the *'ôlāh* ("burnt-offering"), Vincent would have done well to consider the suggestions made by Mittwoch and Morgenstern that it was a matter of regulating the Persian policy toward the Jews rather than of regarding the objections of the Egyptians to animal sacrifice.

422 ff. The discussion of the personal names of the colonists is excellent, and little can be added to the material here presented.

468 ff. Also good is the author's discussion of the duties of the priests at Elephantine, who seem to have been far less important than those of Jerusalem. Vincent concludes that in general their position was similar to that of the priests at the high places before the reform of Josiah.

480 ff. Less convincing is the author's theory that the priests at Elephantine did not know the difference between ritual purity and impurity; at least he offers no adequate proof.

505. Vincent is in error in stating that "modern Judaism refuses officially to assign a place to women in the synagogue."

509. One of the few blunders in philology made by the author is to connect the Semitic root *'rk* "to be long" with the Iranian word *'arîk* ("worthy") in the book of Ezra.

540. The author has made a real contribution in showing that the administration of oaths at Elephantine follows the procedure of Egyptian law.

542 ff. Vincent also adds to our understanding of the system of temple revenues among the colonists by supplying the background of Egyptian policy at this period.

The last four chapters, dealing with the Canaanite gods Bethel, Ḥarambethel, Anat and Aŝîmbethel, worshipped together with Yahu at Elephantine, are particularly interesting and valuable, as they contain a great amount of comparative Semitic religious material which throws light on the forms of popular belief and practice in Syria and Palestine from the Bronze Age to the Hellenistic period, and also helps to explain the conflict between the prophets and the priests of the local high places in Israel and Judah. It is in this section that the author shows his unusual gift of synthesis to best advantage.

As the above comments will have made clear, there is much controversial matter in this comprehensive treatise, but the reviewer trusts that they have also made clear that Vincent's book is an important contribution not only to the study of Diaspora Judaism but also to the larger study of Hebrew religion.

RALPH MARCUS

Columbia University

The Wisdom of God; a Brief Summary of Sophiology. By the VERY REV. SERGIUS BULGAKOV. London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd.; New York: Paisley Press, Inc., 1937. 223 pp. $1.50.

This volume is by no means easy reading but it gives in a remarkably clear form an outline of the doctrine of the Wisdom of God, Sophia, as it is conceived by Dean Bulgakov and the other representatives of sophiological thought, especially those connected with the Theological Academy of St. Sergius in Paris. It deals with problems that Western theology has almost consistently ignored at all times, and yet these problems offer abundant ground for interesting speculations.

The Russian interest in Sophia has developed anew during the last half century, but its origin is to be sought in the early periods of Russian history, and still more in the interesting and important controversies that developed in Byzantium and Mount Athos about the nature of the Light of Thabor and other manifestations of God. The name of St. Gregory Palamas is closely connected with these movements which agitated Orthodox thought for nearly a century, and which could not fail to make an impression upon the minds of the Slavs who were under Byzantine influence.

Dean Bulgakov makes very clear his starting point, and he definitely shows that Sophia, Wisdom, is not a mere name for the Second Person

of the Trinity, nor is it somehow or other, as has been commonly alleged, really a Fourth Person. He shows that scholars from the time of Nicea have stressed the fact that the Son was Homoousios with the Father but that there has been almost no discussion as to the nature of this Ousia which is common to both and also to the Third Person of the Trinity. To him, this Ousia consists of Sophia, Wisdom, and also the Glory of God, both of which are mentioned in the Bible.

In all this, Dean Bulgakov seems to have added much that is unexceptionable and indisputable to Christian thought, and to have drawn out from the texts of the Bible and the Church Fathers more or less justified inferences. Likewise there is much to commend in his teachings as to the Incarnation and God-manhood, which are favorite objects of meditation and consideration at the present time.

The difficulties begin to arise with a consideration of the relation between the Divine and the created Sophia. It goes without saying that the sophiologists like most of the Orthodox thinkers are in the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition, and we very soon find that we are plunged into the problem of type and prototype. Dean Bulgakov believes that there is from eternity in the Wisdom of God a prototype of the world and of humanity. Such a passage as this illustrates the difficulties at this point: "Human nature is elsewhere to be found only in the possession of a human person, and seems to admit of no other owner. From this we must infer that, since the person of the Word found it possible to live in human nature as well as in its own, therefore it is itself in some sense a human person too. It must be somehow co-natural not only with God, but also with Man, that is with the God-man. In order to serve as a person to manhood, the divine person of the Word must itself be human or, more exactly, 'co-human.' Its union with human nature will then appear not as doing violence to the latter, dissolving or annihilating it, but as corresponding to the original relation between them" (p. 129).

Such a passage almost implies that through Sophia the Second Person was God-man before the actual Incarnation, but this is more or less forced by the whole theory of type and prototype. Such a view of the God-man is not held by most Orthodox theologians (Cf. Nikolay Velimirovich, *Nove Besede pod Gorom*, Beograd, 1922), nor is it apparently consistent with much of Christian teaching. However

it is a logical result of the development of the theory of Wisdom in this form.

Through this development of the theories of the Divine and created Wisdom, it is possible to argue that there is a certain pantheistic element in the teaching, although Dean Bulgakov has escaped any crude form of it. His reply is that his theory is not pantheistic, since it does not go further than recognizing the immanence of God, and is also not Manichean in that it does not entirely separate the world from God. He is probably correct here, for we must remember that the doctrine of Wisdom is really an effort to explain the *how* of the universe.

Yet it explains it so well that it creates a strong probability of the pre-existence of each individual, and it also shifts the emphasis from the Atonement to the Incarnation, which takes a far greater position in sophiological doctrine. Perhaps it too much ignores the Atonement in its desire to account for the divinization of the universe as well as man. Also it is hard to realize how the problem of evil or sin or Satan can be developed when we remember that there is a prototype for everything in Wisdom. Of course no one has yet explained evil, but the difficulty is especially strong in sophiological thinking, for if we can once be satisfied on this point, we can follow easily his Mariological views and those on the Church.

Yet here again we must notice his calm assumption that the State is the "beast," the elements of this world, and for this he quotes II Thessalonians, 2:5. Thus he says: "But it is in conflict with the beast that the Church appears in its true colours as a community united on the basis of love, not by any kind of constraint, which for the State, on the other hand, is only natural" (p. 214). Of course at the present time when the tension between Church and State is growing in certain totalitarian countries, both of right and left, this idea may be popular, but it involves a frank identification of Antichrist and the state. This idea is one that has long been familiar to the Russian Raskolniks and similar sects, but it may be a very dangerous idea to apply in the large. In fact Dean Bulgakov comes to this through his assurance of the reality of the created Sophia, and of the spiritual manhood of the believers who are possessed, to some degree, of a share of God-manhood.

It is these passages which lend themselves to the implication that Dean Bulgakov, with his mystical vision and his spiritual awareness, yearns to develop a spiritual aristocracy which may suffer in this world but will surely be rewarded with existence in the next, whereas those not belonging to this group may meet with annihilation as persons unaware of their spiritual nature. Yet this interpretation, which does away with the objective world in the usual sense, is similar to some of the modern teachings in the physical sciences, and may lead to a closer understanding between the two fields of thought.

On the whole this is a very valuable book which opens up long-neglected pathways. It is still too early to say that the role of the Wisdom of God in the Ousia of the Three Hypostases is settled. We may well believe that the teaching must undergo many variations before it reaches an accepted form. Not all the opponents of Sophiology are narrow-minded ecclesiastics and obscurantists who believe only in impassivity and the dead hand of the past. Some are remarkably keen thinkers who see weird connotations in its defiles. Yet these opponents must not blind us to the fact that Dean Bulgakov is a man of ardent faith and great knowledge, and that the controversies over the role of the Wisdom of God must interest all theological scholars, and that the book is an important guide to the future of Christian, and especially Orthodox theology.

Clarence A. Manning

Columbia University

Types of Modern Theology. By Hugh Ross Mackintosh. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. viii + 333 pp. $5.00.

By the universal estimate, the foremost Scottish theologian of the present century has been Professor H. R. Mackintosh of New College, Edinburgh. A scholar of meticulous conscientiousness, who allowed no day to pass without at least a brief exercise in translation from the German, a thinker of such ingrained modesty that he devoted his energies to making known the thought of others and left no adequate exposition of his own mind,[1] a preacher of restrained yet moving eloquence who confessed that he would not dare teach theology unless

1. See his translations of Ritschl's *Justification and Reconciliation* and Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*, and *Selections from the Literature of Theism* (edited jointly with A. B. Macaulay), as well as the volume here under review. Even *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* is half historical exposition.

it were tested weekly in the crucible of the pulpit,[2] a man of almost painful natural reticence who yet admitted to the most intimate confidence students many decades his junior, a trusted leader of the Church of Scotland who served her with peculiar distinction as Moderator, Dr. Mackintosh was above all a devout and humble Christian believer.

It is altogether appropriate that this volume of posthumous lectures should be one further contribution to Professor Mackintosh's services of theological introduction. A brilliantly condensed and lucid chapter of general background leads into the exposition of the most formative theological systems of the modern period, from Schleiermacher to Barth.

It is gratifying, too, that this final work should disclose the author's literary and expository powers at their highest. Clearly the material has been revised and reworked until almost every sentence stands forth as a model of clarity, incisiveness, and gracious felicity. Here is the mature fruit of a mind which had given its best efforts, through a long discipline of painstaking labor, to entering into sympathetic understanding of other men's views and then sharing that understanding widely.

One wishes he could speak with the same unqualified enthusiasm of the *content* of the exposition. In his last years, Professor Mackintosh found his earlier convictions sharply disturbed, and his faith deeply stirred by the Barthian challenge. With characteristic humility, he allowed his mind to be swayed by this dogmatic and insistent pressure perhaps slightly beyond true center. In any event, the Barthian influence colors every essay in the book. Where it is the theologians of crisis who are under review, this is clear gain. We are given an introduction to Kierkegaard which has no equal in the space of a single chapter, and a charmingly appreciative exposition of Barth which is not without considerate and sound warnings. But the discussion of Professor Mackintosh's earlier masters, Schleiermacher and Ritschl, proceeds largely from the Barthian perspective; strictures so quickly qualify exposition that the theologians are not permitted to speak for themselves. Those who heard these lectures in the New College seminar of some years back will regret the altered temper.

2. A volume of *Sermons* with an introductory memoir by his lifelong friend, Professor A. B. Macaulay has just been issued.

But perhaps this is proof that we live in an hour of such vital theological issues that purely dispassionate exposition is not possible. If so, it is to Karl Barth that we owe the present situation. In any event, here is a volume which will hold undisputed eminence through the years as one of the great introductions to theology in our time, as well as a fitting monument to one of the most beautiful and beloved Christian minds of this century.

Henry P. Van Dusen

Union Theological Seminary

Le Communisme et les Chrétiens. By François Mauriac, R. P. Ducattillon, Nicolas Berdiaeff, Alexandre Marc, Denis de Rougemont, H. Daniel-Rops. Paris: Librairie Plon. 1937. ii. + 264 pp.

In 1936 the French Communist leader, Maurice Thorez, made a direct appeal to Catholics, especially to Catholic workers, to co-operate with the Communists in seeking economic and social justice and in working against war and the forces of Fascism. In recent speeches he has reiterated and reinforced this challenging appeal to progressive Catholics. "Our hand is outstretched to you . . ." he declared.

A collective but not entirely homogeneous reaction to Thorez' gesture appears in this book by a group of liberal French Catholics, together with Berdiaeff, philosopher of the Greek Orthodox Church, and Denis de Rougemont, who represents a French trend of the Karl Barth school of Protestantism. Some members of the group have been connected with the religious advocates of progressive social action known in France as "Sept." The book contains a critical analysis and evaluation of Marxist theory and communist practice, judged by the criteria of the Christian.

François Mauriac briefly states the dilemma of the earnest Catholic. Shall he work with the Communists in good faith on the basis of the potential compatibility of certain aims of communism and Catholicism, or shall he proceed to live, think, and act as if communism did not exist, or were of no concern to him, or were only to be feared and hated?

The Dominican Father Ducattillon, in a series of lectures, undertakes the task of analyzing Marxist theory, first in its philosophical, then in its social and economic aspects. He does his work with coolness

and an admirable degree of objectivity. One of the points that he emphasizes is that certain critics of Marxian materialism have fallen into the error of vulgarizing it, conceiving it as epicureanism or mechanical materialism, without doing justice to the dialectic which distinguishes it from—in fact opposes it to—other conceptions of materialism. He shows that Marxism has produced its own mystic devotions and sacrifices, its own martyrs, its own flame of consuming faith, calling for the admiration, not the ridicule, of its critics and opponents.

Ducattillon is convinced that communism errs in opposing Christianity as if the Christian faith and idealism were synonymous. He feels that communism originally and basically opposed philosophical idealism, and then through a confusion of terms and concepts came to oppose religion, whereas in reality it is still idealism against which the Marxian attack should be directed. Christian, especially Catholic, doctrine is in itself opposed to the concepts of pure idealism, he says, and it is precisely these elements in communism which Christianity opposes.

He feels that common elements may be found in communism and Christianity, and thus he does not dwell upon the fact that there is an irreducible opposition between the dualism of Catholicism and the unity of mind and matter implicit in Marxian materialism.

Ducattillon takes up the question of property, showing that the communist and Christian attitudes toward property, its use and abuse, are not far apart. However, there is a basic difference in emphasis, the concept of property and its socialization being central in communism, but of only minor importance in Christian doctrine, which is concerned largely with the inner man, not his external surroundings. This supports one of Ducattillon's final conclusions, that Marxism and Christianity differ fundamentally in approach, in that spiritual values are primary in Christian doctrine, while in communism they are neglected or subordinated to material values. This conclusion is scarcely borne out by the evidence Ducattillon presents elsewhere to show the stimulus which Marxist conviction gives to spiritual effort and devotion. The Dominican is hopeful, but not confident, that Christians are strong enough to establish the primacy of spirit in what he regards as a basic conflict of human values.

Alexandre Marc's essay departs from the standard of objectivity maintained throughout most of Ducattillon's discussion. Marc gives

interesting if incomplete information, about the vicissitudes of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union after 1917. He shows that certain progressive elements in the Church, after the schism, constantly held out the hand of co-operation to the Soviet authorities. In spite of this, he concludes, the Soviet state is determined to wipe out religion, and he foresees little change even under the new Constitution.

In dealing with this trusting and fraternal attitude of liberal Orthodox elements toward the Soviets, Marc says nothing of the various overt acts and pronouncements which caused the suspicion of the authorities to be directed against the Church. Even if one grants that injustices have been done the Orthodox Church, it cannot be assumed that the clerical authorities themselves have been guiltless in the ferment of embittered political elements in the Soviet Union. Marc devotes most of his sympathy and factual argument to organized religion with all its hierarchical trappings, rather than to the religious spirit in its essence.

Berdiaeff's philosophical concept of personalism, as distinct from individualism, involves acknowledging the existence of a spiritual world from which the "person" emerges—the active, creative principle in man which resists the external determinism of nature and society. Berdiaeff feels that Marx absorbed anti-personalist doctrine from Hegel; that Marxism, while stating correctly that capitalism has crushed and destroyed personalist values in man, is in itself a dehumanizing doctrine, in that it regards man "as a function of the social process, a material entity, entirely preoccupied with economics and technical matters, devoting his leisure to a sort of art intended to embellish an industrialized existence."

On the basis of this deft caricature, Berdiaeff reproaches Marxism with affirming human values for the future, but denying them present expression. He himself believes that the economic order must be socialized, that economic and social justice will create conditions essential for the full spiritual flowering of man. Berdiaeff challenges Marxism and communism with a socialism conceived in personalist terms. That the very spiritual values he seeks could well emerge as products of applied Marxism he either does not see or will not admit.

Denis de Rougemont begins his essay with a display of prejudice that bodes ill for his subsequent observations and conclusions. He points out, rather casually, a similarity that he feels has been estab-

lished between the Soviet and the Fascist regimes. This leads him to dispose mockingly of the Marxian dialectic as being nothing but blind obedience to party and to Stalin, and therefore a complete renunciation of truth.

In his calmer moments of discussion of Marxism and communism, he finds that their essence is the will to change the world. The Christian and the Communist agree, he says, on the need for a basically changed economic order. He quotes Paul's letter to the Romans (12:2) to show that the Christian wishes first to transform man, and through him the world, while Marxists intend to change the world, the external environment, and in this way eventually change the nature of man. De Rougemont fastens upon Marx the responsibility for launching and perpetuating the error that the cause of man's misfortune is in objects, not in himself. This, he feels, has led to a serious over-emphasis on material factors, and, in Russia, to the dictatorship of Stalin, which he professes not to be able to distinguish from Fascism. To Marxist materialism de Rougemont opposes the Christian principle of individual responsibility for evil, and individual conversion.

Again, de Rougemont fails signally to understand the spiritual values implicit in Marxism. His reaction against the externals of material well-being and industrial progress is so strong that he cannot admit the possibility that from this material foundation will spring a rich cultural and spiritual growth. He underscores the affirmations of Christianity, and ignores the equally valid affirmations of Marxism crystallizing in a society in which scientific techniques and broad cultural opportunities release and replenish the human spirit.

Daniel-Rops is temperate in his discussion. Like Ducattillon, he deals with communism as an adversary to be respected. He calls Christianity to account for its sins of worldliness, of unfaithfulness to its essential principles. He points out that Christianity, in its time, has called for most of the corrections of injustice which communism demands. Christians, he says, must acknowledge their fault and their responsibility. They must realize that communism, however formidable in its appeal to the masses, is divisive in its approach, and that it thwarts the unity of man and of human society. He challenges Christians, "the salt of the earth," by their vigor and their faith to restore to man his wholeness, to society its unity. "If Christianity battles against communism, it will not, like capitalism, do so in the

name of economic interests, but on an infinitely higher plane, that of the very concepts of life, man and destiny." Daniel-Rops does Marxism less than justice, in the sense that he takes the class-struggle concept in its negative aspect only, and ignores the unifying principles of a functioning socialism. This error is characteristic of the book as a whole, although Ducattillon shows greater understanding of the point than the others.

The book will persuade an earnest Christian to perform his duty more thoughtfully, more searchingly. It will convince him that Marxism should be studied and known. It may even suggest to him that Marxism contains worthy principles of action and dynamic spiritual values. For, in spite of the prejudice of Berdiaeff, Marc, and de Rougemont against what they see as concrete results of Marxist thought in Russia, Ducattillon builds up an ineradicable concept of the spiritual force in Marxism. Moreover, he indicates the course that Marxism, as expressed in scientific socialism or communism, will follow in terms of the ultimate expansion and dignity of the human spirit.

MARGARET I. LAMONT

New York City

When Half-Gods Go: A Sketch of the Emergence of Religions. By CHARLES LEMUEL DIBBLE. New York and Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Company, 1937. 202 pp. $1.75.

Many hypotheses have been advanced to explain the origin and development of religion: fear, ghosts, magic, nature-worship, totemism, animism, defence-mechanism, sex, priestcraft, social instinct, and the like. It has been studied, for the most part, as a purely human institution, and it is generally conceded to have much subjective value —very good for those who like that sort of thing. When such-and-such a religion or religious phenomenon has been classified more or less accurately, has been duly labeled, and been neatly pigeon-holed, investigators usually rest content, ignoring the fact that description and explanation are not the same. Only too seldom has religion been scientifically studied with sympathy for its adherents, though sympathy is the *sine qua non* of true understanding. That religion may have an objective value, and that it may have a Divine origin, are hypotheses which few have the courage to set forth. Of these few,

Dr. Dibble is one, and his views are those which this reviewer has long since found himself constrained to hold. All other hypotheses indeed explain parts of religion; all have played, and still play, more or less important roles; but only the theory that they are human outworkings of parts of a Divine plan in the emergence of religion as a whole, and that they were and are essential components of the *praeparatio evangelica,* from the first crude manifestations of the religious instinct to the present day, and on into the future, seems to this reviewer to meet even approximately all the data of the problem. Exactly why it should be supposed to be "scientific" to operate only with purely materialistic and mechanistic factors, and to exclude from consideration all possibility of God Himself as the *mens (quae) agitat molem,* the present reviewer is unable to understand. Indeed, he is strongly tempted to define most studies in comparative religion as "atheistic interpretations of theism."

Using the term "emergence," rather than "evolution" or "development," to describe the upspringing of religious beliefs and practices and the modifications which they have undergone, the author says (p. 38): "Lloyd Morgan and others have made us familiar with the idea of emergence in physical processes. They point out that on certain occasions physical objects and organisms suddenly begin to exhibit qualities that are wholly new, wholly different from their previous qualities, entirely unpredictable from anything that has gone before."

In his discussion of such religious phenomena as animism, mana, sympathetic magic (or "representative transference"), and tabu, of which the first two were most important, and from which emerged the concept of the Holy, Dr. Dibble follows conventional lines—his purpose is interpretation, not description. From mana, in his view, the Christian doctrine of Grace has emerged. The one thing which here seems to have escaped his notice is the great step forward when man learned to distinguish between the vague, general idea of *numen* and the active principle implied by *deus.* He rightly stresses man's capacity for wonder, awe, and—one may add—love of the Divine, as exemplified, for example, in the hymns of the Rigveda and of the Avesta, where there is, indeed, flattery, but also, it would appear, sincere homage and admiration. He justly lays much emphasis upon "the Holy," "the things and events which arouse wonder and awe and which incite to worship" (p. 81), this concept involving "dedication

by men to the service of the God and acceptance and consecration by Him" (p. 91).

Successive chapters deal with *creed*, the intellectual element which keeps religion sane and mediates religious experience from man to man, its emergence traced from animistic *numina* to nature-gods and local deities, to monotheism, and finally to the Incarnation, together with the rise of individualism and the concept of personal salvation and redemption; with *conduct*, with well-founded denial of the evolution of purely secular morality from religious tabus and emphasis on its failure in practice, the rise of the concept of personal responsibility to the God for man's wrong-doing, and the bridging of the gulf between the human and the Divine in the Incarnation, continued in the Catholic Church; with *cult*, "for the believer the peculiar and intimate meeting-place between himself and his God . . . the divine language, each ritual act a word, whereby faith speaks and is answered" (p. 139), possession of a common cult constituting a common religion, the rituals, dedicated to and accepted by the God, having real and effectual symbolism, addressed to the God, not to man, forming a true transaction between the God and man, involving the co-operation of both, and comprising holy places, holy priests and prophets, holy worshippers, and holy institutions, so vital that a religion dies if deprived of it; and with *sacrifice*, the very heart of cult, primary in non-Christian religions, but uniquely secondary in the Orthodox, Roman, Anglican, and Lutheran communions, since in them the Eucharist is not a repetition of the Sacrifice on Calvary, but its re-presentation, a "shewing of the Lord's death till he come," the sacrifice always involving "the solemn dedication to the God of a thing of value, which thereby becomes holy, and the immolation of the Holy Thing for the pleasure of the God" (pp. 168-169), usually combined with the worshippers' solemn partaking of the victim with the God, the priest representing the worshippers to the God and the God to the worshippers, and the rite containing the elements of preparatory purification of priest and people, oblation, immolation, thanksgiving, and communion, performed for the Deity's pleasure, adoration of Him, solemnisation of contracts, propitiation, expiation, and petition.

In discussing the objective truth and value of religion, the author seems to lay insufficient stress on a point which has long appeared to this reviewer to be of cardinal importance: *if the religious sentiment*

has no foundation in objective truth, it is the only phenomenon which has no real reason for existence; in other words, if there is no active Divinity—not merely a *fainéant* Supreme Being or philosophically imagined First Cause—man would never have conceived the idea of God(s).

The conclusion reached in the volume is that, while all religions possess truth, Christianity, judged by strictly objective standards, is the highest and best. Within Christianity, only Catholicism, Roman, Orthodox, and Anglican, have preserved all the cardinal principles of religion in emotion, creed, cult, and sacrifice—a conclusion which seems to this reviewer difficult, if not impossible, to escape. The book is avowedly written from the Catholic (more specifically, from the Anglo-Catholic) point of view; but the author seems driven to his conclusions, not to have started from certain confessional prepossessions. A legal expert, he states his facts with scientific accuracy and impartiality in language completely intelligible to the non-technical reader. Small in physical compass, his contribution is of much more worth than many volumes far greater in size and pretence. A comprehensive survey of the emergence and the history of religion from his point of view would be of inestimable value as a text-book. As an introduction to its subject, this reviewer can scarcely imagine anything more sound in every respect.

Louis H. Gray

Columbia University

Ends and Means. By Aldous Huxley. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1937. v + 386 pp. $3.50.

A recent contribution to ethics, social philosophy, and religion comes from an unexpected source. Aldous Huxley, outstanding sophisticate of English letters, persistent pharisaical cynic, and self-styled disciple of the "philosophy of meaninglessness" has had a change of heart. The gaping wounds of our civilization have touched him in a new way: not to ridicule and revolt, but to charity and attempts at intelligent reform. Consequently, we are presented with a serious book, a book illumined with clever discernment about people —too fallible people, their weaknesses, their endless social deceptions and self-delusions. Written with a talent for the "mot juste," and embellished with a wealth of psychological, anthropological, scientific,

and literary reference, *Ends and Means* is *living* philosophy. As such, it will undoubtedly influence a wider range of our contemporaries than more profound, but more academic, treatments of social and spiritual problems. It is questionable whether the influence of this book will be a good one; and certainly no one can decide this independently of a *parti pris*. But to bring the issues involved into the open air of explicit statement and analysis should be a preliminary step for all who pretend to endorse or reject on rational grounds. Nor need this destroy the purity of Huxley's spiritual renaissance; indeed, only by such a formulation can it be subjected to honest appraisal.

Surveying the great march of ethical and religious teachers throughout the history of western man, Huxley is impressed by this startling fact: that the utopias, the ideals, the visions of the good life are fundamentally the same; but that the means advocated to realize the desired ends vary as the shifting winds. Every prophet "from Isaiah to Karl Marx," Huxley says, envisioned an ideal society where "liberty, peace, justice and brotherly love" ruled the thoughts and behavior of men. Intent upon implementing these stainless ideals, however, the prophets (the moralists, the poets) fail to agree, and fall into discord, dialectic, opposed and hostile ideologies. In short, given perfect unanimity on the formal requirements for a good life, this inevitably degenerates into a war of all against all, when confronted with the endless seductive variety of material possibilities. What value shall be conceded, then, to a purely abstract similarity of *ends*, when it is powerless to net us a solid agreement over *means?* How unfortunate, Huxley complains, that so few realize that means are not divorced from ends; but rather that means are part of an integral process, logically determined by ends, and actually terminating in them. If an individual desires to have a keen insight into nature (including any part of it) he must grant that it is a system of interrelations, of reciprocities. A particular member of a group cannot be understood without his species, nor a species without its individual members; an action is not to be dissociated from its reaction; the part of a process from the whole in which it exists and acquires meaning. So it is dangerous to pry loose the means one advocates using from their proper moorings in ideal ends. Nor should the ends be relegated to some remote realization, while makeshift means are made to do for the present. This is the course of Huxley's argument, and it em-

bodies, for him, a first principle for any critically aware morality. The gravest betrayal of good ends comes through the ministrations of inferior or "evil" means tolerated temporarily, but developing a parasitical suction upon the good ends which, in the long run, subtly removes life and substance from them.

Huxley's presentation of the problem of means and ends drives home these simple (but not sufficiently familiar) truths: just as means are harnessed to ends, and derive their character from them, so ends are never inviolate (except abstractly). Good ends can be transformed into their opposites, if corrosive means are used in their service. Bad ends, however, are somehow always more potent than whatever good means can be used for realizing them. The greater danger then lies in the relation between bad means and good ends. Too often have the aspects of divinity, the form of truth and justice, the raiment of beauty and harmony, been invoked as a justification for the use of violence. Force, physical power, combat, war (the perpetual destroyers of daily life, the sporadic assassins of a whole people or civilization) are justified "temporarily" or "provisionally"; as a "transition," a brief interlude, an unwanted but necessary deviation. Egregious blindness, not to see that the fruits of violence are more and more violence.

Morality can submit to no compromise, in Huxley's opinion. One failure to live peacefully is a sin that will be visited upon the children —indefinitely. One concession to the spirit of war, and soldiers will spring up in place of the dragon's teeth. Peace must be our creed; our daily life as well as our highest goal. Tolstoy, reacting similarly from individual and collective betrayals of the spirit of peace, claimed that a new vision had been revealed to him, pondering over the crucial passage from Matthew: "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil. . . ."

In peace, in charity, in steady and enlightened love Huxley finds his basic values. Violence is bad, unconditionally; its use can *never,* under any circumstances be justified. Huxley's method here is characteristic of his entire book: he claims a philosophical ("spiritual" is used synonymously by him) validation for the position advocated, but he cannot rest content until he has "proven" his case in the dispassionate terms of precise intellectual analysis. Since Huxley is at pains to enlist *rational* assent for his elected values, it is fair to take his in-

tellectual arguments on their own ground, to see whether or not they actually suffice as a proof of pacifism.

Should one entertain a fleeting doubt about the absolute evil inherent in all violent means, Huxley is ready to battle with him on "pragmatic" grounds. Indeed, he affirms that violence can be condemned either *philosophically* or *pragmatically*. The philosophical justification is nothing other than the discovery (disclosed in great detail later in the book) that violence is not assimilable with a philosophy of mysticism. This defence has no place at this point, however, because at first Huxley wants to reason with all men, including naïve laymen, and, I suppose, not excluding his philosophical opponents. The pragmatic proofs, however, are focal for this discussion; and it is undeniable that Huxley offers a thorough piece of penetrating analysis in this connection. If the hasty soothsayers of fascism or communism (the "war-makers" under any sky, at any time) would heed these impressive warnings against the dynamite carelessly held in their own hands, they could not continue to support their present programs. Certainly they would not advocate violent measures wholeheartedly and *honestly;* for it would at least be clear that loose talk about war, or any instrument of force for that matter, is not intellectually reputable; the issues between a life in some sense obedient to reason and a life devoted soley to a "Might makes Right" rationalization, would be sharply etched for all to see.

"Violence," Huxley maintains, "produces only the results of violence and the attempt to impose reforms by violent methods is therefore foredoomed to failure." However, as he further adds, "non-violence can prove its value pragmatically—by working . . ." (p. 161). Peace works on two counts: (1) personally and (2) socially. The efficacy of the Christian attitude of charity, ideal "non-attachment" to the fleshpots, and peace in the relations between person and person, is traditionally a strong point for a Christian ethics. Serious opposition to private virtues of benevolence and non-resistance is encountered only when the *social* efficacy of such an attitude is considered. Therefore it is to the role of peace and disinterested kindliness in society that Huxley devotes his greatest fervor. The wisdom of a policy of non-violence is well-attested, in Huxley's eyes, by the history of its several successes: for example, the Gandhi peace movement in North Africa and in India; the British general strike in 1920; the non-

violent resistance of the Finns against Russian oppression, 1901-1905; the Kulturkampf of the Catholics in Germany against Bismarck, etc. Admittedly the successes which Huxley makes much of are, nevertheless, sporadic. Everyone will admit that the negative cases, that is, the *failures* to use non-violent resistance, are overwhelmingly more numerous. Faced with this, Huxley can only take refuge in pretending that this really strengthens his position; since history abounds with the dangers inherent in violent techniques (the "wrong" technique for Huxley), but can offer very little material evidence on the shortcomings of non-resistance, which may be an alternative but as we have seen, one rarely put into practice. Indeed, it should not be surprising that the strongest feature of pacifist argument is its denial of the desirability of force as a solution to social problems.

The successful uses of non-violent technique on the part of governments or politicians is palpably absent; even Huxley despairs on this score. He avoids the resultant weakness in his argument by a generous application of epithets like "depraved," "immoral," and "dishonest" to politicians and governments alike. Large masses, guided by a private leader (or leaders), are more hopeful material than governments for adopting ideals of non-resistance. The examples cited above are Huxley's basis of comparison with the miseries and failures bred by the more pervasive technique of violence. The defeat of the socialist ideal in Russia, because of the increasing reliance on more and more violence; the long train of ceaselessly productive evils stemming from the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution; the World War, which, instead of ending war, developed occasions for new ones; and the League of Nations, which, while preaching peace, is bristling with the spirit of power politics and militaristic imperialism—these are typical illustrations of the morass to which customary behavior and normal social organization lead. No one can make use of triumph or conquest by force without bearing its stigma on his character; *a fortiori,* no group or nation or "civilization" can settle difficulties through war or military conquest. All that can issue therefrom is a tainted progeny—conquered but resentful—biding time and occasion to turn the tables on the oppressors. The imbalance of power, physical force, or might, never achieving actual stability or permanence, each flux or change is the signal for a fresh conflict. Man, if not nature, creates a fate "red with tooth and claw."

Pausing for a moment with the elements of Huxley's "pragmatic" argument before us, we see that it is *history* which is consulted for an answer. Now, at best, arguments based upon what has happened can furnish ground for only *probable* judgments about the future. Although this is a workworn philosophical commonplace, it needs underlining for Huxley. Should we grant for a moment that force has always given rise only to further force, we would still not be theoretically justified in asserting that it *must* always be so. Were we to assert that peace, unquestionably and always, is the highest value, it should be clearly recognized that this is tantamount to saying it is an *absolute* value, transcending contingency, accident, and natural necessity. In short, no matter how strong a case can be made for the bad effects following upon any use of violence in the past, there is still no certainty that the encounter of changed conditions will not entail a change in the character of the effects stemming from violence. And it is worthwhile to add that Huxley is not enough of a fatalist to pretend that no significant changes in human behavior and social arrangements can come about; since his own plea for the organization of peace groups, and the abolition of the prevalent greed for money and the "things" it buys assumes the possibility of very basic changes in man's personal and group life. Therefore, if one were inclined to defend the idea of violence so inaugurated and applied that the safeguards against its abuse were trustworthy, Huxley could not furnish a categorical disproof of the hypothesis. Only by making peace an absolute value would this be a consistent development. But Huxley's ethical absolutism would in no way evade the serious errors of traditional absolutism, simply because it is introduced surreptitiously. "Peace at any price" is a suitable slogan for a fanatic, or a person so broken in spirit and moral fibre that no disgrace seems worthy of resentment.

Sensibly enough, Huxley is eager to envisage the good society of peace as a society bent upon the realization of the co-ordinate values of "ideal non-attachment," of intellectual activity and freedom, of economic and political equality, of progress in charity. Were this not so, the ideal of peace would be devoid of all content; peace is a value so long as there are some other things (like truth, justice, friendliness) which are also values, and are released into full activity when the clamps of conflict, bitter prejudice, and war are removed. But Huxley, avoiding the stigma of "absolutism" in ethics (which is usual-

ly a technical synonym for fanaticism) does so at the price of a fundamental inconsistency. If there are several co-ordinate values, among which that of peace ranks as one, it is nonsense to assert that peace, and peaceful means, must prevail at any price, under any circumstances. "Let peace be won, though the heavens fall" is no more successful a slogan of formalism than the older, familiar version. After all, if Huxley sincerely means that the heavens should *not* be allowed to fall, that is, if he is serious about the other values of truth, progress, intellectual sensitivity, ideal non-attachment, etc., he should be willing to inquire *at what times* peace is a feasible policy, and at what times is there a chance that it might endanger, or negate, the other values in whose interest (as well as in its own) peace has been invoked. Nowhere, however, does such an experimental inquiry engage the author's talents. Having first declared that peace is but one among other real values, he later imports the jarring assumption that peace, under any circumstances, is worth any price. No real plurality of values can find quarter in this extreme and rigid pacifism; accordingly we are entitled to demand of Huxley *how* he has established the primacy of peace over all other values. In brief, *why is peace the absolute?*

By this time, it is almost necessary to add that the foregoing question is largely rhetorical; for we have already seen that no "pragmatic" argument will ever support the establishment of a necessary, final, unchanging judgment about values, and that, despite Huxley's promise to justify his position pragmatically, he has not done so. In that case, his "philosophical" defence is still to be heard. This is developed in the final chapters of *Ends and Means;* it will be accorded due consideration in the final section of this paper.

Now, it might be objected that even when an enthusiast does not achieve a bona fide proof of what he advocates, the question still remains "How plausible is the argument?" How convincing, in this instance, is the thesis that peaceful means alone are the right means to employ? It is almost a fundamental postulate of ethics that choices are rarely between the good and the bad, but rather between the better and the worse. Huxley generally closes his eyes to the necessity for compromises; he prefers to outlaw what may be, in reality, the relatively "better," and insists instead that the moral conflict is always between the bad and the good—violence *never* being useful, peace

always being unquestionably valuable. Huxley's reading of history has certain psychological blindspots which tend to vitiate the illustrative evidence he offers. It has already been mentioned that the instances adduced for the success of non-violent resistance are somewhat meagre; yet Huxley is always free to answer that, until men are educated to know the truth, it is only natural that they will make mistakes. On the other hand, his dogmatic declaration that violence or force has *never* been the right means can more easily be shown to be a misreading of the "facts" of history.

Let us take, for example, Huxley's illustration of the French Revolution. Undoubtedly the Reign of Terror was an evil, and one which was partially responsible for the successive evils which befell the French republic. But what right does Huxley have to separate the "peaceful" achievements of constitutional assembly from the outburst of violence which followed it? Did men suddenly turn perverse, become "possessed" and unexpectedly spread the spirit of ruin and hatred abroad? Or are not the obvious facts, instead, that the great gains of the new constitution were a premature olive branch, camouflaging the potentially explosive danger incident to displacing the church and the nobility from their ancient privileges? It would be difficult, indeed, to show that "the gains" could have been any more than *paper* gains without the use of militant action in some form. To deplore the *excessive* use of force, is also meaningless—since no sane person has ever condoned this. But to say that the French Revolution would have, in fact, been a revolution without the use of force at all, is a monstrous rewriting of history, no more supported by verifiable grounds than any other utopian wish.

Moreover, suppose we consider an illustration that Huxley failed to consider. The American Revolution was a revolution through force, and one which it is commonly agreed had beneficial results for which even our children's children should still remain thankful. What reason is there to assume that the same values could have been achieved by peaceful means alone? Indeed, peaceful means applied to an overseas government, committed to ignorant and short-sighted practices, would have had little effect other than to encourage more of the exploitation that the British had already solidified as national policy in relation to colonial America. The Americans acted decisively, and it seems, sufficiently realistically. Curiously enough, the "inevitable result" did not

follow; they were *not* corrupted by power, or tainted by the force which they had used as a temporary instrument. Anyone acquainted with the subsequent struggle of some of the founders of the American republic to preserve the ideals for which they had fought (a struggle, which, for the time at least they won) cannot assert that the only fruit violence bears is further violence. In some social situations, indeed, violence may have the same curative value that surgery has in dealing with grave physical illnesses.

To return, however, to a positive instance cited by Huxley in support of his position: the non-resistance movement organized by Gandhi in India. Huxley admits that Gandhi decided to suspend the activities of his non-violent army "rather than see his movement degenerate into civil war" (pp. 167-168). This is an important admission, for two reasons: first, because it is a confirmation that good means (peaceful non-resistance) are sometimes powerless to avert specific evils; secondly, peace emerges with its status of absolute value seriously impaired. The organization of peace groups is plainly secondary to the fundamental interest of not wasting human life on a large scale. Even a loyal pacifist like Huxley appreciates the mailed fist of determined imperialist powers raised above the heads of their colonial subjects; and, realistically enough, Huxley advises abandonment of the peace movement rather than acceptance of mass slaughter. The cause of peace is thus prudently made to wait upon some more favorable occasion. Surely this is not the attitude of a fanatic; but just as surely this is an admission that some alternatives offered human beings are so unpleasant that the choice is not between something good and something bad, but between two evils. And so it is altogether possible that many well-meaning peace-loving individuals are brought face to face with the stark truth that in some cases force is the only way of preserving their ideals or standards. To sidestep the issue, when peace is ineffective, by advising, "Withdraw, and let whatever miserable fate awaits you come, without active resistance" is just a fresh attempt to make the concrete content of a life seem unimportant from the perspective of a formal criterion, viz., peace. But this position places Huxley squarely in the camp of the ethical absolutists again; an action which not only involves the author in advocating mutually incompatible ethical principles, but unfortunately presents him with much more insoluble moral problems than those he is attempting to dispel.

No description of the contents of this rich and interesting book would be adequate if one were left with the impression that the author is content with a merely logical development of the problem of ends and means. Although Huxley is anxious to correct the inconsequentialities inherent in the theorizing which threads its way through his literary past, this essay in social philosophy is, perhaps, not as strong in formal argument as it is alive with insights, and liberal with inventive suggestions drawn from many fields—psychology, anthropology, natural science, Oriental philosophy, literature—all of which seem to fascinate the author's speculative fancy. Mysticism may be Huxley's ultimate religion, but it is rarely his technique or method. He hastens to make perfectly clear that he has not pictured an idle utopia. He has preached a gospel of peace and ideal non-attachment, but the vision must not antagonize English common-sense and everyday intelligence; at least, not yet. So once the reader is provided with a glimpse at the vision and the message, he needs to be shown that there are specific ways to act, and to *organize* in the interest of these ideals. The chapters on "The Planned Society," "Decentralization and Self-Government," "Individual Work for Reform," "Inequality," and "Education" are the most significant contributions to special ways and means of bringing about the objectives Huxley judges desirable.

The modern world, which, as almost anyone will agree, is sick with many diseases, seems, in Huxley's eyes to suffer from two principal and related catastrophes—militarism and nationalism. The fascist countries are diagnosed as the extremely, perhaps incurably, sick patients in the western world; but they are almost equalled by the Soviet dictatorship, which, although launched in better faith, has encouraged pestilences such as frequent blood "purges" and mock "treason trials." Democracies are but one step removed. Even though they claim allegiance to better ideals, they are competing for selfish ends with fascist countries; and inevitably they will drift into the same dictatorship patterns. " 'The defence of democracy against fascism' entails inevitably the transformation of democracy into Fascism" (p. 41). Unfortunately, within the context of militarism and nationalism, no attempt to forestall war, such as "economic planning," can reach a successful conclusion. The capitalist world cannot hope to achieve peace until it changes its basic motivations, and turns to the vision of a different kind of society. "In considering any plan," Huxley warns, "we must

ask whether it will help to transform the society to which it is applied into a just, peaceable, morally and intellectually progressive community of non-attached and responsible men and women" (p. 36). So far does Huxley advocate revolution, but no further. Inclined to discountenance great changes consciously introduced, he insists upon these three "principles" of change or reform: (1) that only strictly necessary reforms be undertaken; (2) that no change be imposed, no matter how desirable intrinsically, if there is likely to be widespread and violent opposition; and (3) that changes should be made by methods already familiar and approved by people. These are truly remarkable principles—but not of *change;* rather, of *conservatism.* The first slows down the rate of progress appreciably; after all, how many desirable changes are necessary ones? Or, more precisely, how does one know in advance what will prove to have been, in the light of history, a really necessary change? What an excellent opportunity to avoid the thousand onerous duties which contribute to the progress of civic liberties, beneficial political legislation, the overcoming of coercion in any form. How unimaginative and cautious, in addition, is the third proviso, that new methods be frowned upon—especially in a civilization noted for its rapid discoveries of technical and scientific "ways and means." For instance, at one time advertising would have been resisted as a means of introducing a change; must our approbation and use of a method be perennially after the fact, and, now that advertising has become familiar as a technique, can we from that alone conclude that it is a desirable method? Here is a dangerous tendency to confuse that which exists with that which ought to exist—a surrender to the doctrine that survival is the determinant of value. However, the crux of the "principles of change" is contained in the seemingly innocent second item. No matter how desirable a proposed change might be, it must be scrapped if it will arouse violent opposition; with this Huxley inadvertently discloses the decay in his own system of values, for this is significantly close to an admission that the cherished values of peace, equality, etc., are utopian wishes. The dangerous quality of passivity, resignation in advance of effort, withdrawal, not only from conflict but also from life, which is glimpsed now and then in the course of the book, is really laid bare at this point. So it follows that the progress of peace movements (the highest of moral goods) must wait upon an absence of violent opposition; yet Huxley himself points out that the

western world is fast turning into an armed camp of irrational and highly aggressive national states. In such a world is it likely that a widespread policy of non-violent resistance, if it could ever succeed in getting organized, would *not* arouse a fatal and ruthless opposition? Alas for the cause of peace and charity; reassuring though it may seem *sub specie aeternitatis,* from a practical and more immediate point of view its prospects look depressingly bleak.

In the other chapters, the fissure between reality and utopian impracticability opens up even more alarmingly. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to say that Huxley commits himself to a belief in the omnipotence of wishing. The whole approach to social and individual problems will remain ineffective, Huxley claims, until people become aware that they have been *wishing* for worthless things. Governments, social groups, the economic system of inequality, and education have been built on false premises, viz., premises that are vaguely identified as selfish, materialistic, and combative. No matter how extensively the outward, institutional reforms are introduced, the curse of "mechanomorphism" is still liable to reassert itself; only a change in our basic wishes and desires can effect a cure. Therefore, discontent with modern life should be harnessed to efforts to change the thinking and valuing activities of the average citizen. When everyone *wishes* to be peaceable and friendly, to eliminate the striving for profit and selfish ambition, then, and only then, will a new order materialize upon this earth. The troubles of government, economics, education, and even personality are alike interpreted as the external aspect of the bad wish. To quote Huxley, "The machinery for peaceful change is ready and waiting; but nobody uses it, because nobody wants to use it. Wherever we turn we find that the real obstacles to peace are human will and feeling, human convictions, prejudices, opinions. If we want to get rid of war we must get rid first of all its psychological causes. Only when this has been done will the rulers of the nations even desire to get rid of the economic and political causes" (p. 138).

Social problems, including the major problem of war, are in need of homogeneous treatment. This treatment is nothing other than individual work to spread the message of peace, ideal non-attachment to worldly things and selfish concerns. The inculcation of the right method in business, for example, would be the transformation of competitive private ownership into co-operative enterprise, or some form

of mixed control combining autonomous functional management with state supervision. In politics, the new method would emphasize self-government through decentralization. Each individual would have a direct and active share in the government if small local units or *wards* took the place of the prevalent tendency to control from the larger unit of the state or nation. In economic relations, the equalization of incomes is a necessary condition to the realization of the good life. In education, the liberalizing of a purely academic system, on the one hand, and a purely technical training, on the other (which Huxley considers characteristic of the specialized business age in which we live) would be accomplished by supplying a frame of psychological, sociological, and ethical reference to supplement the single frame of scientific reference used today. Huxley quotes with approbation the Talmudic saying, "He who does not teach his son a trade, teaches him to steal." The life of peace depends in part upon a willingness to work for one's bread. But having taught his son a trade, Huxley can be imagined to add, the father must also train his son in awareness, so that his wishes can terminate in genuine values. In the last analysis, however, education must be understood as education in non-attachment. Non-attachment, the rarest and best of virtues, requires the most strenuous of disciplines—of the body, of the will, of the mind. The techniques are not yet adequately developed; so Huxley is content with a hint that integration of personality will be the aim, and that inhibitions on the physical, emotional, and rational levels will be the means. Any further "verbal description" would be fraudulent; the author, as well as his readers, must attend further developments for fuller information. Finally, the problem of war, like all the other problems, stands in need of nothing but a changed psychology on the part of masses of people. The arguments for pacifism are patiently and exhaustively reviewed; the arguments for wars of any kind, somewhat impatiently "exposed." The work for the individual or social reformer is the same: to build up more and larger peace groups and societies; to educate them in the right values; and finally, when enough people stop wishing for war, war will cease to exist!

Even an exaggerated respect for the power of the idea, or the wish, must yield to incredulity at this dogma. For surely it is clear that the best will in the world goes astray where faulty social and economic relationships impede expression. Where is there any proof forthcoming

that the mass education of men's wishes can gain enough adherents, and be sufficiently cohesive and intense to offset the daily antidote of a world organized in terms of opposing values? War may not be eliminated until men wish that it be; but neither will it be eliminated when they only *wish* so. Something more is necessary; that something more must be in the nature of an architectural blueprint of a society, realistically planned so that its institutions do not need war. Socialism and critically aware liberal democracies have realized this. Huxley, however, finds a painless "solution" by placing pressing social problems in the domain of psychology, where cures can be effected by entertaining new wishes. If the wish, unaided, remains ineffective, the author can still denounce men's perverted souls; or he can turn his eyes to a visionary and utopian future, claiming that here at least his favored "psychology" will be accepted by all men. Thus does the omnipotence of wishing vanish into an infinitely remote future, where neither you nor I can call for further explanations.

Brief and inadequate as this account of *Ends and Means* has been, it should have indicated that many worthwhile and interesting speculations thread their way through its rewarding pages. Were it not judged that pointing out its ambiguities, vagueness, and unexamined prejudices were a better service than joining hands with the author to sing the praises of what is undeniably a lofty vision of man and society, a more sympathetic presentation of the individual wisdoms and insights in this "essay in social philosophy" would have been in order. But, in the reviewer's opinion, the weakest portion of the essay is what Huxley regards as the final justification of his position, the coping-stone of his ethics, and the deeper ground of his program of reform. I refer to his religion, which he alternately calls a "philosophy" or "metaphysics," or sometimes, more truthfully, "mysticism." Earlier in this paper a remark was made that Huxley's "pragmatic" arguments for peace would be reinforced by properly "philosophical" ones. For it is the author's contention that "Non-violence is the practical consequence that follows from belief in the fundamental unity of all being. . . " (p. 161). The last three chapters in the book, "Religious Practices," "Beliefs," and "Ethics," are with some show of reason accordingly declared the fundamental ones. Undoubtedly, if the author wishes to present a consistent system, these are the essential chapters. The truth of the matter is, however, that many of the distinct analyses

of social problems and moral techniques stand quite independently of this "metaphysical" basis—which, despite the author's disclaimer, is a safeguard to readers dissatisfied with the more ambitious philosophical portions.

Approaching the subject of religious practices, Huxley makes clear that he does so from a *humanistic* point of view. "Religious practices are valuable in so far as they provide methods of self-education, methods which men can use to transform their characters and enlarge their consciousness . . ." (pp. 267-268). In terms of such a perspective Huxley is plaintively worried about the dangers bound up with two of the commonest methods of religious practice; the physiological method, favored by the East, and the emotional method used almost exclusively in the West. The physiological method is suspect because it can so easily be valued for the wrong reasons; it lends itself to an unhealthy pride which easily degenerates into exhibitionism. Until there is much more scientific study of physiological control of bodily functions, ascetic disciplines, etc., there will always be the additional danger that such practices are actually harmful. A far greater problem, however, is presented by the Western addiction to emotional techniques which involve an intimate relation between the worshipper and a personal deity of some form. What is known to Indian religious philosophy as the *bhakti marga* is exactly this type of emotional theology, and it invariably eventuates in a *false* theology. This assertion is warranted by the experience of the "great mystics" of every age and country, all of whom agree that a rigorous training in mystcism yields, not a personal God with describable characteristics, but an ultimate reality that is impersonal—the integrating principle of the universe. This is the legitimate vision of the rational idealist, in Huxley's opinion. Therefore, the task confronting the rational idealist seems to be twofold: first, the task of positive education, making it known that there is another alternative to the emotional method, and also to the physiological method; secondly, since *bhakti marga* will continue to be popular with the people, the direction of *bhakti* into channels where it will do the least mischief. *Bhakti* is accountable for the outrages of fanatical religious persecution, as well as for the support of deified leaders and personified nations; these unfortunate outcomes of an emotional relationship between a personal God and the worshipper constitute the blackest chapters in the history of organized religion.

The true method for attaining an insight into the universe is that of meditation. Unhappily, the method of meditation is as difficult as it is excellent, requiring the highest concentration of pure intellect. Now, not all individuals are capable of great mental concentration. The author claims that, if we classify basic personality types, we will discover that the great majority of people fall into the two inferior classes of somatotonic (concentrating on muscular activity), and viscerotonic (concentrating on emotional expression). Only a small minority remain as members of the third class, the cerebrotonic; and the great mystics have been, and will be, drawn from this group. They will devote themselves to meditation industriously (they alone can do so), because through meditation the worshipper is aided in putting forth a special quality of will. The reward for using this technique of concentration is the highest vision to which man can attain—the principle of the order and unity of all being.

Huxley is confident that he has now prepared his reader sufficiently to reveal the genuinely metaphysical portion of his thinking; the chapter on "Beliefs" accordingly supplements that on "Religious Practices." In essence this chapter is little more than a restatement of idealism, supported tentatively in terms of three arguments. Scrapping the traditional idealistic proofs, i.e., the argument from design, first cause, ontology, etc., Huxley claims first that science testifies to man's craving for explanation. Explanation is nothing other than a reduction of diversity to unity. And this should be the key to metaphysics; *unity behind diversity*. Moreover, if we are interested in understanding any isolated thing, we will never progress until we place it in its natural setting with other things; these in turn need wider contexts; and so, the *systemic* character of knowledge and being is another basic principle for metaphysics. Thirdly, the laws of thought are the laws of things; to understand the nature of the universe is the same as investigating the nature of consciousness. These are the rational arguments which Huxley urges in support of idealism; yet he realizes that they can never constitute a *proof* of his metaphysics. At best, they can create a presumption in favor of idealistic beliefs,—"that the world possesses some integrating principle that gives it significance and value" (p. 330). But, "Final conviction can only come to those who make an act of faith." In truth, Huxley's idealism, accepting *"credo ut intellegam,"* hardly deserves to be named "rationalistic idealism,"

—"mystical," as the author occasionally grants, proving more appropriate. The last chapter on "Ethics" bears out this point. Here too, faith is the touchstone of goodness; every other minor virtue, like courage, chastity, loyalty, is made to depend upon the major virtues of love and intelligence. Love, however, is love of non-attachment to separate things in this world; and thus presupposes a faith in things not of this world. Intelligence, also, is restricted; for "intelligent fools" abound, but the intelligent wise man realizes that he must meditate in order to understand himself, and he must understand his own person only to discover that he can transcend it by concentrating on the unity of all being.

These final chapters are trying and perplexing to the reader. They oscillate vaguely between the higher mystical understanding, which is enough of a tax on a normal intelligence, and the humanistic practical point of view, which is more understandable but totally at variance with the other-worldly metaphysics and religion that Huxley elects for his own. To illustrate: how can one condemn, as Huxley does, the religious practices of devout Christian leaders imbued with so intense a loyalty to their God that, when the pen fails, they have recourse to the sword? But human lives are sacrificed, the humanist can reply. Yes, the crusading believer may answer, but faith reveals the greater value of religious purity and loyalty. Usually Huxley turns indignant at suggestions like these, and deprecates the kind of theology that condones such inhuman practice. However, is he entitled to his indignation? Why must we believe *his* oracle, trust *his* vision, rather than that of another? Because it embraces more *human* values? This is not altogether true, because in a way it advocates a consistent inhumanity in its ideal of non-attachment—which is really an abandonment of life, a flight from it, and its problems, via the desperate remedy of gaining security by sacrificing active participation. Moreover, the same values (non-attachment, meditation, etc.) can be supported independently of Huxley's mystical theology. Huxley must somehow persuade us that his type of mysticism is the truest and the best. But he cannot do this *rationally*. His sole proof, which is that all great mystics have agreed on the non-personal nature of their vision, is question-begging; since all mystics who disagree are by tacit definition not called great. Only one device remains; that is to point to his classification of three major personality types; all who disagree

with the author can conveniently be classed as "somatotonic" or "viscerotonic," and thus the validity of their objections would be reduced to the limitations of their abilities for mental concentration. It is noteworthy, however, that these classifications are hastily assumed, and ill-digested in the system of mysticism that Huxley advocates. Many plausible, but neither established nor certified, principles are introduced in just this way, and then are lost sight of in the rush of new detail and further argument.

The outcome of it all is that religion, like metaphysics, in Huxley's hands, becomes an amorphous idea—a baffling "system" whose structure is not revealed, a metaphysics not open to reason, a religion not susceptible to description, an ethics well intentioned, but shot through with theoretical and practical inconsistencies. Huxley apologizes for his book on social philosophy by admitting that it is a "fragmentary synthesis"; but he adds that even a fragmentary synthesis is better than no synthesis at all. This is not altogether adequate, however. Religion, metaphysics and ethics are not "synthesized" by converting them into a highly personal faith. Of course, criticism of any kind can hardly be expected to penetrate the sacred retreats of individual, subjective "vision," "faith," or "intuition." But if the author is as gravely concerned about the evils of modern life as his protracted essay in social philosophy would indicate, he should welcome criticism, and be intrigued by the invitation to tell explicitly *how* man and society can be made pure of heart and action without changing any of the fundamental institutions and functions of the *status quo*.

Nowhere do we find a patient analysis based on observation, experience, and experimentation, of which *specific* means destroy their respective ends; nor is there any attempt to separate the basic features of particular means-ends processes from the relatively accidental or dispensable conditions; and finally, conclusions are not suspended until scientific research furnishes the data that would warrant authoritative pronouncements. It is disarming to observe so guileless a belief in the potency of wishing. But wishes will not melt away stubborn social and economic realities. Huxley, like a contemporary American poet, has really been trying to erect a "tower beyond tragedy" for himself; and, in these stormy times, one cannot but sympathize. A tower, however, as we have been told, must be built upon rock, not sand. When Huxley develops the courage to recognize this, perhaps he will discard his

belief in the magic omnipotence of wishing, and set out to search for sturdier materials to build a stronger tower against the inclement weather of the future.

ADRIENNE KOCH

New York University

CRITICAL COMMENTS

A COMMENT ON VAN DUSEN'S DISMISSAL OF DEWEY

Considering his reputation as America's greatest living philosopher, it is surprising how easily John Dewey has been set down for touching on questions with which the theologians deal. It has been easy to get the impression that our great philosopher is quite "off his beat" in religion and theology. In fact, one of our younger theologians assures me that the author of *A Common Faith* is being quite properly ignored in contemporary theological discussion. In his spirited criticism,* Dr. Van Dusen charges Dr. Dewey, in his discussion of the problem of evil, with overlooking a distinction familiar to every elementary student of the matter. After partly summarizing, and partly quoting what he presents as Dewey's position, Dr. Van Dusen says: "Of course, the exact reverse is the case" (p. 125). A moment later he adds, "Were the situation as Doctor Dewey describes it, were obstacles which stimulate endeavor the only evils in life, there would *be* no 'problem or evil'—for either theist or naturalist."

Following my formula as to what to do when someone makes the wise look childish, I tried very carefully to examine Dr. Dewey's argument on page 45. I am intrigued by his seeming admission that the eager and vigorous search of evidence supplied by history, and by the presence of design in nature, will lead to the conclusion that God objectively exists. For his objection to the search proposed is that we are thereby involved "in all the problems of the existence of evil that have haunted theology in the past." I think it is quite clear that *some* of those problems do not arise from the *search* for evidence of the kind proposed, but assume urgent form only when the search is rewarded by *finding*, or when the seekers are led to conclude the objective existence of a Personality in whom the ideal is extant. Dr. Dewey himself recognizes this fact a moment later, however, and the passage seems to me to become primarily an objection to entering into ultimate metaphysical speculation,—somewhat disappointing, I confess, to one who has recently stirred a class by reading to them Dr. Dewey's noble plea for the more courageous exercise of speculative imagination. And I suspect that the endless labyrinths of theology, when searched by the ex-

* Henry P. Van Dusen, "The Faith of John Dewey." *Religion in Life*. Winter Number, 1935, pp. 123 ff.

perts, might prove that apologists have bowed to some of the problems which Dr. Dewey thinks they have neither faced nor met.

But criticism of the Terry Lectures is not my present purpose. It would require no great effort to find other passages where Dr. Dewey has left himself open to criticism, or has alienated friends, because his little volume is so condensed. Without now entering into discussion of the general positions taken in *A Common Faith*,—which is, I believe, far more common than Dr. Dewey's theological antagonists would have us believe—I wish to scrutinize the rather easy dismissal of our eminent philosopher with the theologian's assurance that "Of course, the exact reverse is the case."

First, with regard to Dr. Van Dusen's parallel, and apparently appositive clauses, "Were the situation as Doctor Dewey describes it, were obstacles which stimulate endeavor the only evils in life. . . ." My own diligent search of the pages under discussion fails to discover where Dr. Dewey describes the situation as being that which Dr. Van Dusen attributes to him. I make no assertion with regard to the other writings of Dr. Dewey, but certainly he neither says nor implies, in the passage which Dr. Van Dusen is attacking, that "obstacles which stimulate endeavor are the only evils in life." What he does say is that "the significance of ideal ends and meanings is, indeed, connected with the fact that there are in life all sorts of things that are evil,"—with the term evil being defined by the words which follow—"evil to us because we would have them otherwise." As I understand him, Dr. Dewey then closes his brief paragraph by saying substantially the same thing in another way, this time, however, using a correlative definition of the term *good*, asserting that "were existing conditions wholly good, the notion of possibilities to be realized would never emerge."

I would not attempt to deprive anyone of the right to attack the definition of *evil* and of *good* which Dr. Dewey uses in the passage under discussion. But one merit, at least, should be conceded him. He makes evil consist in an inacceptable discrepancy of actual conditions with the wish and will of a personal being. If I as a personal being regard as evil something I would have otherwise, you cannot well regard my definition of evil as entirely in the wrong direction, if you insist that evil is not what is contrary to the will and wish of one personal being (myself), but rather that which is contrary to the will of some other personal being. When and how evil can become good, I cannot here discuss. I recognize, of course, the fact of the so-called transmutation of evil into good,—and the fact, also, of the reverse experience, which the theologians are not always so quick to recognize. With regard to such questions, I think I see ways in which Dr. Dewey and orthodox Christian theologians could agree.

But such digressions are quite beside the present point. Just now I am concerned only to point out what Dr. Van Dusen has quite misconceived Dr. Dewey's position in the passage attacked. Dewey maintains that the discernment of things we would have otherwise, that is, the experience of

evils, is necessary for the emergence of the notion of possibilities to be realized, which latter is the pre-requisite for genuine ethical endeavor. We may thus paraphrase his position, without, I think, making any essential distortion of his meaning: "All endeavors to realize ideals are stimulated by evils,"—bearing in mind the definition he has given of evil. But Dr. Van Dusen falsely converts this (if that is the proper logical jargon), and presents Dr. Dewey as maintaining that "all evils in life stimulate endeavor to realize ideals." Or to quote Dr. Van Dusen again exactly, "Were the situation as Doctor Dewey describes it, were obstacles which stimulate endeavors the only evils in life. . . ." Is it not perfectly clear that I get the words I put into Dr. Van Dusen's mouth by a valid conversion? But is it not equally clear that our eminent theologian has committed something for which Aristotle has established a permanent place among the fallacies?

Again, when the attempt is made to maneuver Dr. Dewey into maintaining that "obstacles which stimulate endeavor are the only evils in life,"—in order to get an easy victory over him by pointing out, as Dr. Van Dusen does, "factors in the nature of things which render any realization of possibilities impossible,"—two points further need to be noticed.

First, does Dr. Van Dusen seriously maintain that the factors constituting 'evil' as a metaphysical perplexity render *any* realization of possibilities impossible? What about the stimulus thus given to system-building theologians? Certainly we do not expect him to agree with Dr. Dewey as to how theology has been "haunted" by problems "the most ingenious apologetics have not faced, much less met." Are there no *thought-results* which have been realized through the discernment of the actuality of such factors in the nature of things? We hardly demand that its slaughter should be good for the young bullock before we admit the possibility of man's experiencing a blessed forgiveness through a ceremony of atonement which uses the blood of the bull!

If Dr. Van Dusen means "impossible to the insane person himself," or "impossible for the one who prematurely dies," isn't that true only on the basis of accepting as true Dr. Dewey's naturalistic position? The frequency with which some religionists have conceived possibilities remaining for those dying prematurely, and comforting compensations for the bereaved, shows that conceiving such possibilities is not impossible. When Dr. Van Dusen declares that it is impossible for the insane or for the prematurely dead to realize possibilities of good through these evils (if that is what he means), has he not abandoned the positions of common Christianity, and really sided with Dr. Dewey?

Secondly, how could Dr. Van Dusen make Dr. Dewey say that obstacles which stimulate endeavor are the only evils in life? On pages 14-15 Dr. Dewey refers to "periods of darkness and despair." By the only definition of *evil* I can find at the place, Dr. Dewey would certainly not regard these periods of darkness and despair as good. Rather, in accord with common

usage, he regards them as evil, that is, for the person who is having the said periods of darkness and despair. But how far Dr. Van Dusen has gone astray in representing Dr. Dewey now appears. Instead of saying that all evils in life stimulate endeavor, Dr. Dewey seems to me to assert that these evils which he has named, "periods of darkness and despair," can, under circumstances which he has pointed out, "*lose their usual depressive character.*" I surmise that his imagination would not be greatly taxed to enumerate quite a few other evils which are not to be essentially described as stimulating endeavor for ideal ends.

MARION J. BRADSHAW

Bangor Theological Seminary

THE RIGHT UNDERSTANDING AND CRITICISM OF KARL BARTH

(A Reply to Dr. Homrighausen)

From Dr. Homrighausen's review of my book, *Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation*, in the May issue of the REVIEW, it is clear that we differ in our understanding of Barth. As I see it, our principal difference concerns Barth's conception of discontinuity between God and man. Dr. Homrighausen apparently feels that Barth recognizes little more than an ethical dualism between God and man, while I believe his conception is one of absolute discontinuity.

As one's evaluation of a man's thought depends largely on one's understanding of it, I should like to emphasize certain features of Barth's thought that form the basis of my belief. I think it is clear from the whole development of his thought, as I try to outline it in my book, and from his carefully worded *Prolegomena zur kirchlichen Dogmatik*, as well as later works, that he conceives of an intellectual, or conceptual, discontinuity between God and man; that is, according to Barth there is no likeness between man's thought and speech and God's.

How strictly he conceives of this discontinuity becomes evident when, in treating of the essence of the Word of God, he contends that man has the Word of God only in the mystery (*Geheimnis*) of its worldliness, that is, always in a form that, as such, is *not* the Word of God, and that, as such, does not betray the fact that it is the *form* of the Word of God. By this "worldliness" of the Word of God is to be understood, not only that the Word of God comes to man in the garb of creatural actuality, but that, since this creatural actuality is that of fallen man, man's cognition of the Word of God occurs throughout by means of his fallen reason. This means that the speaking and hearing of the Word of God is an act of God, not only in creatural actuality as such, but in an actuality that contradicts and that veils God.[1] Furthermore, because of this difference, and even

1. *Prolegomena zur kirchlichen Dogmatik*, pp. 171-180.

contradition, between the form and content of the Word of God, what becomes understandable for man is always the form without the content, or the content without the form. Man cannot synthesize the form and content of the Word of God. The two are one for man only in his God-given faith. But faith is not concerned with the thinking of the synthesis; even it is a matter of repeated forward and backward movement between the worldly form and the content of the Word of God, and viewed as human experience, doing, and thinking, it is the faith of a man who precisely in his triumph needs correction and completion, indeed, a wholly new binding to God.[2]

Barth's recognition of a conceptual discontinuity between God and man seems clear also from his contention that all cognition of God's Word, in so far as it is experienced, is exposed and convicted by that Word, not with respect to its definite imperfection and insufficiency, but with respect to its complete wrongness and nothingness, as certainly as it, as well as all other things that we are able to do, is the work of the human heart, the thoughts of which are evil from youth up.[3]

What Barth says in connection with his discussion of the nature and function of dogmatics points in the same direction. According to this, a man's philosophical ideas and conceptions do not have to disappear, but they must give way before the dictum of revelation, they must simply and completely subordinate themselves to it. They are to receive from it, not only a new import, but also a new form. They are not only improved and enriched, but turned about. They are put into a service of which they are not at all capable, so that it must ever be conceded that God remains incomprehensible for man; that is, that man cannot comprehend in how far in the speech of his philosophical ideas and conceptions on the basis of God's revelation he really speaks concerning God.[4] Man's thought and speech can only have a secondary meaning, and as activities of the creature they cannot possibly coincide with the truth of God, due to which there is truth in the world.[5]

Added to this is the fact that, though Barth recognizes the rationality of man, he denies that this means a necessary relation of man to God's revelation, and holds that it might be bound up with a complete incapability of man,[6] and the further fact that he teaches that revelation itself creates the necessary analogy or likeness between God and man, or the necessary point of contact (*Anknüpfungspunkt*) in man,[7] for man to hear the Word of God. Indeed, one reason why Barth objects to Roman Catholicism is that it posits an *analogia entis*, that is, the occurrence of a God-likeness of the creature also in the fallen world.

2. *Idem*, pp. 180-188.
3. *Idem*, pp. 223 ff., 229 ff.
4. *Credo*, p. 15.
5. *Idem*, p. 160.
6. Class notes of the author.
7. *Prolegomena zur kirchlichen Dogmatik*, pp. 27 f., and *idem*, pp. 250 f, 253.

Pacific School of Religion Berkeley, Calif.

And in keeping with all that precedes is Barth's significant denial of a divine revelation in nature and history that is accessible to man despite the fall.[8]

Besides this evident conceptual discontinuity between God and man, Barth clearly maintains a practical discontinuity. He rejects doctrine according to which God's activity disappears in, and merges with, the activity of men who have experienced grace, and the personal act of God changes immediately into a constant present relationship.[9] Faith, which is wholly God-given, is an experience, a concrete, confirmable, temporal act of a particular person, yet it is independent of any innate or acquired properties and possibilities of man, who, considering himself, must always admit that he cannot believe, and who throughout remains the same ungifted and inactive, or gifted and spirited, man that he was and can again become as a non-believer.[10]

From the foregoing evidence it seems quite clear that for all practical purposes, at least, Barth conceives of an absolute discontinuity between God and man, and that, therefore, my logical criticism of his position, and my statement at the conclusion of it that discontinuity and revelation at bottom are and remain incompatible, still stand. When Dr. Homrighausen contends that without discontinuity the idea of revelation would be nonsense, that it would be unnecessary and impossible, he is evidently thinking merely of an ethical dualism or a partial discontinuity between God and man, not of the absolute discontinuity of which I speak.

Besides this principal difference between Dr. Homrighausen and myself, there are a number of other things on which we differ, at least some of which are related to it. Dr. Homrighausen contends that Barth never championed an absolute cosmological dualism. I have not contended that he did. Yet there is reason to question whether such a dualism is not implied in what he teaches. It may be that Barth does not speak of it, but he does hold that the Creator is not identical with a world-ground, and that the doctrine of creation has nothing to do with *"Weltanschauung"* and is not a part of a general science, not even if this science be conceived of as consummated by Christian knowledge.[11] And in view of the discontinuity between God and man to which Barth evidently holds, what could an affirmation of cosmological oneness still mean? How can such oneness not be questioned when an absolute conceptual discontinuity between God and man implies that even man's concepts of being and existence do not apply to God?

Dr. Homrighausen says that the major issue for us all is how to reconcile the Word of God that is not naturally generated, and which confronts us as "other," with the plane of the natural and human. But in the light

8. *Theologische Existenz heute*, Heft 7, p. 10.
9. *Prolegomena zur kirchlichen Dogmatik*, pp. 39 f.
10. *Idem*, pp. 241 f., 249 f.
11. See *Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation*, pp. 199 f.

of the preceding it ought to be clear that this is not Barth's major issue. It is, rather, how to reconcile the Word of God which is wholly other in conceptual content or meaning with the human word, how to conceive of the supposed fact that the one becomes intelligible in terms of the other while they are absolutely different. One might very well adhere to a revelation "not naturally generated" without facing Barth's real problem, and Dr. Homrighausen misunderstands my critique of Barth when he apparently thinks that I criticize him for adhering to such a revelation. What I attempt to do is to show that Barth's idea of revelation is objectionable because revelation as he conceives of it does not do what he thinks it does, i.e., bridge the gap he places between God and man.

In this connection Dr. Homrighausen's surmise that I find Barth's trouble in his refusal to allow "the miraculous" to become a mere "historism" is true only if by "the miraculous" he means God's Word, and by "historism" a matter to some extent, at least, intelligible to man, and if he will, furthermore, consent to drop the adjective *mere*. For I do not find Barth's trouble in his regarding God's Word as something more than mere history.

Dr. Homrighausen doubts whether the idea of revelation is central in Barth's theology, and affirms that his theology is based upon the Word of God, and that in attempting to understand the phenomenon of the Word of God Barth has run into the problem of revelation and human faith, which are subordinate to the Word itself. It seems hardly defensible to limit Barth's idea of revelation in this way and not to include in it his belief in the reality of the Word of God and of its advent in man's life, especially since Barth himself identifies the Word of God and God's revelation.[12] Taken in this full sense, Barth's idea of revelation is doubtless not just one phase of his thought, but its core, and an impugning of it impugns not all Barth says, but certainly the distinctive feature of his theology.

In commenting on my questioning the alleged character of Barth's faith, Dr. Homrighausen apparently fails to distinguish between questioning the alleged character of one's faith and its genuineness. I do the former, not the latter. I question neither the fact nor the genuineness of Barth's faith, but only its alleged wholly God-given character. Dr. Homrighausen may feel that even this goes too far, that one man cannot question the character of another man's faith. When, however, one has talked about one's faith to others and disclosed its supposed origin, it would seem that others are no longer wholly outsiders to that faith; and when the development of a man's conception of his faith can apparently be traced and its alleged character seems to imply self-contradictory factors, it would seem that others have ample grounds for questioning that alleged character.

At the end of his review Dr. Homrighausen expresses the feeling that I do not answer Barth on his own ground in the light of the sweep of his

12. *Prolegomena zur kirchlichen Dogmatik*, pp. 114-124.

total work. This seems to indicate that he has misunderstood my critique as a whole, which seeks to point out only internal weaknesses of Barth's thought, and nowhere tries to attack Barth from an external basis. Dr. Homrighausen objects that I have not quoted Scripture to disprove Barth's contention. In a sense this is true, but it hardly takes into consideration my questioning Barth's interpretation of the Bible in general.[13] When, however, Dr. Homrighausen says that only the Word of God can refute itself, I believe he is affirming too much, at least if he means by the Word of God that which he knows or experiences as such; for, when he says this, he is excluding even the law of non-contradiction as a standard of the truth and dependability of his experience.

Finally, Dr. Homrighausen feels that my treatment is rather negative. I intended it to be such, for I believe Barth is steering Christian thought in the wrong direction. His idea of revelation, and more especially his conception of faith, I feel, is unacceptable, and must be avoided if Christian thought is to progress rightly. Instead of agreeing with Barth, I believe we should recognize that Christian faith in any of its forms, Roman Catholic or Protestant, conservative, liberal, or newly evangelical, is such as depends at least in part on some kind of human justification.

PETER H. MONSMA

Lansing, Michigan

13. *Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation*, pp. 197 f.

BOOK NOTES

Primitive Religion. By PAUL RADIN. New York: The Viking Press, 1937. x + 322 pp. $3.50.

This book will be found stimulating by all students of the origin and development of religion, although anthropologists in particular will be likely to take issue with some of the author's sweeping generalizations. The approach is completely evolutionary, with the assumption of world-wide stages in the development of culture. These stages are based upon different methods of food-getting, as the food-gathering stage, the hunting or hunting-fishing stage, etc. It is assumed that with each of these economies there was associated a constant, or nearly constant, constellation of other culture characteristics. It is to be regretted that the author did not make clear just what these constellations were in each case, since this would have made it easier to visualize the particular phase of religious development which he assigns to each stage in its functional setting. He accepts, apparently without question, the posulate that magic always and everywhere preceded religion in the ordinary usage of the term, and outlines the evolution of religion as primarily a shift from attitudes of compulsion to those of supplication. That there must have been an evolution of religion, as of all other aspects of culture, no one can doubt, but that it followed such a uniform and logical progression remains to be proved. In fact it never can be either proved or disproved, since the assumption that contemporary groups of simple economy are similar in most respects to early man must always remain an assumption. Even if we grant such to be the case, the evidence for such religious evolution of the sort outlined is by no means conclusive. The examples which the author has cited have been presented honestly and without distortion, but it would be possible in several cases to present other examples which would throw serious doubts upon his conclusions.

In spite of these criticisms the book makes a highly important contribution in the emphasis which it places upon the role of the religiously-minded individual in the development and systematization of the group's concepts of the supernatural. The relative rarity of such individuals in any population is quite justly stressed, together with the tendency of average individuals to ignore the supernatural except in times of stress. It is the shaman or priest who develops ritual and theology, and who keeps the importance of the supernatural steadily before the minds of the group. However, that his motives for doing this are predominantly economic ones, as the author seems to feel, is not demonstrable in all cases. Although he mentions the desire for prestige as one factor, it seems to the reviewer that it should be given much greater weight. Although in the examples cited the religious practitioner does profit directly and in economic terms, it would be possible to cite a number of other cultures in which his economic gains are so small as

to be almost negligible. There are, for example, cases in which the shaman's fee is set by his spirit helper at the outset, and placed so low that it can hardly recompense him for the labor involved. At the same time, the prestige returns are always considerable.

In spite of these criticisms the book is an important contribution to the theory of religious origins and should be in all religious libraries.

RALPH LINTON

Aftermath. By SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. xx + 494 pp. $3.00.

This volume is uniform with the twelve volumes of *The Golden Bough*, the last enlarged edition of which was published in 1915. It consists of more jottings from Sir James Frazer's card catalogue, but, except for less than half a dozen minor citations, the file seems to have been closed some ten years ago. It is in no sense an attempt to bring *The Golden Bough* up to date by the use of fuller modern investigations, and in several cases the older information thus reprinted has been superseded by more recent detailed and documented studies, or worse still, has been shown to be incorrect. The sources from which citations are made are limited, not only to older works, but also to the output of European writers; in the only instance in which reference is made to the field work of an American anthropologist the citation is grotesquely misspelled.

The book, as the author says in the preface, is in no sense an independent treatise. It is a series of seventy-five chapters following through the subject matter of the earlier many volumed work. These vary from extended chapters on Magic to mere paragraphs on "Not to See the Sun," and "The Mistletoe." These annotations have the usual scrap-book charm of *The Golden Bough*, and continue the romantic tradition in anthropology to which Sir James Frazer has so richly contributed.

RUTH BENEDICT

Die Muttergöttin im Vorderen Orient und in Europa. By LEONHARD FRANZ. (Der Alte Orient, Band 35, Heft 3.) Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich's Verlag, 1937. 28 pp. 24 figures. RM 1.35.

This is a study of terra-cotta and sun-dried clay figurines of the 'mother-goddess' type, and animals of the paleolithic and neolithic periods, found in the Near East and in Europe. The characteristic features of these 'mother-goddess' figurines are: nudity, strongly emphasized sex organs, steatopygous rump, and the invariable absence of a head. Dr. Franz traces these female figurines throughout their history and comes to the conclusion, with good reason, that the Assyrian Ishtar and the Greek Aphrodite are direct descendants of these early crude representations.

What was the significance of these naked figurines? The author is right when he maintains that prehistoric art was not an art for art's sake, nor was it a product of man's desire to create art objects, but that it had a

definite materialistic purpose, namely, the increase of the family and the food supply. In other words, these figurines represent magical symbols of fertility.

A short remark: among the books cited as "einschlägige Schriften" on the Near East the reviewer missed *Der Tell Halaf* by Max Freiherr von Oppenheim (Leipzig 1931), and *Prehistoric Assyria* by M. E. L. Mallowan and J. C. Rose (Oxford 1935).

I. MENDELSOHN

Tao Tê Ching: A New Translation. By CH'U TA-KAO. Foreword by DR. LIONEL GILES. London: The Buddhist Lodge, 1937. 94 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*

There is no dearth of translations for this classic text of Taoist literature. From the early days of the Jesuit Fathers in China generations of Western scholars have tried their hands, with widely varying results, at unraveling the abstruse sayings connected with the name of the ancient philosopher Lao-tzŭ. The distinction of this new translation is that it has been done by a Chinese whose thought is not primarily conditioned by Western categories, and that it is based on an amended text published in 1930 by the contemporary scholar Ch'en Chu. Ch'en Chu has taken account of the previous labors of Wang Pi, Fu Yi, Pi Yüan, Wang Nien-sun, Ma Hsü-lun, Lo Chên-yü, Hu Shih and others; and has redistributed the contents of the chapters in the light of recent research. His corrected text, the translator believes, "throws more light on the Tao Tê Ching, and renders its contents more consistent an intelligible than any other I know." (p. 8) In Mr. Ch'u's translation the Western reader can thus share something of the results of the latest Chinese scholarship in the field.

On the whole it is a most readable book, in spite of the close adherence to the terse ruggedness and almost cryptic style of the original. The pregnant lines are arranged in brief chapters—one chapter to a page, with interpretative footnotes embodying wisdom from the Chinese commentators. Whether or not the problems connected with the enigmatic utterances are all solved, the reader has the assurance that he is at least seeing them through the eyes of Chinese understanding. It is characteristic that the central concept "Tao" is throughout left untranslated by any fixed English equivalent. This has the advantage over such a rendering as Paul Carus's "Reason" in that it builds up the meaning of the term through the natural associations of its context, instead of fastening upon it an a priori Western significance.

The deep quietism of the Taoistic doctrine; its faith in an all-inconclusive moving order of the universe; its teaching that human happiness depends upon pliant conformity to the cosmic course; all these appear in Mr. Ch'u's careful presentation with fresh suggestiveness.

Sinologues may be disappointed that the Chinese text itself does not accompany the translation, and that more linguistic notes on precise meanings of specific terms are not included. Such features, however,

would probably make the volume less suitable for the general public.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

To Become or Not To Become (That Is the Question). By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. London: Luzac and Company, 1937. x + 164 pp. 1*s*. 9*d*. (cloth-bound, 2*s*. 6*d*.).

In this little volume, the veteran Pāli scholar and student of Buddhism makes a plea for a consistent translation of the verb *bhavati, hoti* by 'become' rather than by 'be.' Her thesis is so well founded, and its justness so obvious, that it is hard to see why its truth has not been recognized from the very first, for Buddhism is so eminently a philosophy of becoming, not merely of static being, and the force of *bhav-* is so clearly the former, not the latter, that is is difficult to excuse those whom she criticizes. She brings out very successfully the philosophical implications of the verb in its connexion with a cardinal principle of Buddhist thought.

Mrs. Rhys Davids is an exegete of Pāli, and does not claim to be a linguist. There are, however, certain points in her argument which receive explanation and support from a purely linguistic point of view. She notes the fact (Chapter VI) that *as-* 'to be' has no future, but that *bhaviṣyati, bhavissati* assumes that function, so that it becomes difficult to determine when they mean 'will become' or 'will be.' The reviewer knows of only two futures of the base **es-* (both linguistically late formations), Greek ἔσομαι, and the Romance type of French *sera* from Vulgar Latin *essere habet* (Latin *erō* is a subjunctive used with future force). Where a future is assigned to **es-*, it is *bheu̯e-*, as in Latin *amā-bō*, 'I am becoming to love, I shall love,' Lithuanian *búsiu*, 'I shall be' (i.e., literally, 'I desire to become'), Old Irish *bie(i)d*, 'will be' (as a copula, the form is *bid, bith* corresponding to the present *is* as *bie(i)d* does to *-tá*, literally 'stand'; contrast the Spanish distinction between *estar* 'be transitorily' and *ser* 'be permanently,' where the meanings are exactly reversed). The future force is also present in the gerundive *bhabba-* (Sanskrit *bhavya-*), and here, as in the future and in the gerunds *bhavitā, hutvā, hutvāna*, the base **bheue-* serves to supplete **es-*. Nowhere does the reviewer know of any analogous forms of **es-*.

As regards the perfect participle *bhūta*, Mrs. Rhys Davids seems not quite to appreciate the exact force of the perfect tense. It properly denotes not past time, but the present result of what has existed or been done in the past. *Bhūta-* literally means 'having become in the past and so being in the present.' We might put it thus: *bhutaṁ na bhavissati*, 'the having-become will not become'—what has reached completion will progress no further.

The pejorative meaning of *pari-bhav-*, 'mis-become,' which puzzles the author (p. 157), recurs elsewhere, as in Latin *per-vertō*, Old Prussian *per-weddā*, 'turn around (in a wrong direction), mis-lead.' Through no fault of her own, she has been misinformed as to Hebrew *hāyāh* and *yēš*.

The former means 'be' in the sense of 'exist'; the latter is really a noun in the construct state denoting 'being, subsistence, existence.' Semitic has no copula 'is'; in Hebrew 'become' is *hāyāḥ lə*, 'to exist into.' The book must be regarded as a valuable contribution to Buddhist exegesis.

L. H. G.

Creative India. By B. K. Sarkar. Lahore: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1937. x + 714 pp. Rs. 15.

Dr. Sarkar protests against the almost universal opinion in the West that Hindu literature at its best deals with other-world ideas, the soul, and the Divinity, the "themes which constitute the stock-in-trade of pessimistic metaphysics." One of the unfortunate results of the publication of the *Sacred Books of the East* has been that they have "diverted the attention of scholars from the achievements of Oriental races in exact science. . . . It has also militated against the recognition by the Occident of the Oriental endeavours in civic administration, social service, conciliar enterprise, industrial activity, and institutional life."

The author says that "metaphysical subjectivism is the least part of Hindu thought, and pessimism the farthest removed from actual Indian life and institutions. . . . Hindu literature and art . . . [deal with] every human passion and activity from sex to salvation." His study, then, is not particularly concerned with religion; and an examination of the table of contents will show that Dr. Sarkar's interest is in political, economic and sociological problems, from the standpoint of India's contributions in these fields, and in the world-wide aspects of her influences and borrowings.

He lays emphasis upon "Hindu positivism" as it expresses itself in Buddhism, Jainism and Mohammedanism, in fact in all Indian philosophies. "Positivism is the fundamental feature of all the Indian systems." He continues: "The Hindu has no doubt often placed the transcendental in the foreground of his life's scheme, but the positive background he has never forgotten or ignored. Rather, it is in and through the positive, the secular, and the material that the transcendental, the spiritual and the metaphysical have been allowed to display themselves in Indian culture-history." Furthermore, "Hindu religion is nothing if it is not in the main a handmaid to worldly progress and material prosperity." Although "the entire literary material of India is generally presented to the world as the handmaid of creeds, dogmas and rituals," this is an utterly absurd position. "There is encountered, in such literature as the *Dharma mangala*, the *rapprochement* of folk-Hinduism and folk-Buddhism on a common Tantric foundation. . . . No matter what be the name, and what the formal affiliation of these gods or goddesses to the leading pantheons, their sociological significance is self-evident." (He is writing particularly for Bengal.)

It will surprise many to read that "Hinduism has all through the ages been a very proselytizing, all-conquering and aggressive religion, a religion of world-conquest." One aspect of this is the assimilation of aboriginal

tribes which has been going on all the time. "The aboriginals of yesterdays become the depressed classes of today." The problem here is lest the "untouchables remain to all intents and purposes unassimilables." However, a process of vertical assimilation is going on; and emphasis on the cult of the most popular goddess, Durgā, has helped to remove untouchability and break down the social barriers.

The author gives considerable attention to men of the modern period, Rammohun Roy, Dayānanda, Rāmakṛṣṇa and Vivekānanda, and insists that they are very much more than mere religious reformers. His remarks about them are significant, but Swāmi Vivekānanda is over capitalized as "world-conquerer," and "Rāmakṛṣṇa-Vivekānanda as a new category" represents also a too hasty appraisal of men of the immediate past.

The book represents a very wide range of contacts with cultural studies, perhaps too wide a range; and this, combined with the method which is in essence that of an orator speaking for Creative India, suggests its limitations. Nevertheless Dr. Sarkar has rendered a real service to India and to the West in this elaborate undertaking. The printing and binding deserve commendation.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Hanukkah: The Feast of Lights. Compiled and edited by EMILY SOLIS-COHEN, JR. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1937. xvii + 374 pp. 11 illustrations. $2.50.

This compilation is intended to provide a handy anthology in which the Jewish Feast of Lights is presented as it appears in history, in ritual and in literature, and to suggest forms for its celebration today. The first essay, "Judaism and Hellenism," by Rabbi Milton Steinberg, explains simply and lucidly the traditional view of the conflict out of which the festival arose. Professor Grayzel, of Gratz College, adds historical data to supplement the traditional view in his two essays, "Hanukkah and Its History," and "Hasmonean Coins." Israel Abrahams' report of medieval celebration of the feast, "Ḥanukkah in Olden Times," is reprinted.

The illustrations, photographed from specimens in various collections of Jewish ceremonial objects, are clearly revelatory of the dominant symbols in Jewish religious art, and of the skill and artistry which entered into the design of Hanukkah lamps. Paul Romanoff's "Hanukkah and the Menorah" details the historical development of these lamps. Fifteen pages of musical scores of traditional melodies illustrate and amplify "Hanukkah in Music," by Abraham W. Binder.

In the second part, "Hanukkah in Literature," appropriate selections from the Apocrypha, the Talmud, Josippon, and the Shulhan Aruk are presented with Act V of Longfellow's "Judas Maccabeus," and many plays, poems, and stories by modern Jewish authors.

The third part includes the service for Hanukkah, and directions for a children's party, with candle drills and dances.

In short, this is not a work intended for scholars, but a work of charm for the average household.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

The Alexandrian Halakah in Apologetic Literature of the First Century C.E. By SAMUEL BELKIN. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America. No date (1937?). 70 pp.

This is an interesting attempt to show that the halakah or legal interpretation of the Pentateuch given in the apologetic work of Philo, the *Hypothetika*, preserved only in part by Eusebius, is different from that found in his exposition of Mosaic law, the *De Specialibus Legibus*, and similarly that the halakah in Josephus' apologetic work, *Contra Apionem*, is different from that in his *Antiquities;* also that several interpretations in the *Contra Apionem* agree with those in Philo's *Hypothetika* against Palestinian traditions found in rabbinic literature. The author concludes that Josephus' apologetic works are in these passages dependent upon Philo or some other Alexandrian source. He underestimates the apologetic elements both in Philo's *De Specialibus Legibus* and in Josephus' *Contra Apionem*, and he seems not sufficiently aware of the difficulties in dealing with the scanty evidence preserved by Eusebius; on the whole, however, he has made out a good case for his main thesis, and has certainly made a contribution to the understanding of the halakic passages in both ancient sources.

R. M.

The Old Testament: Its Making and Meaning. By H. WHEELER ROBINSON, Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1937. 247 pp. $2.00.

This brief book by the Principal of Regent's Park College, and Reader in Biblical Criticism in the University of Oxford, is a clear and readable presentation of the now conventional conceptions of the making and meaning of the Old Testament, J, E, D, P appear as we know them, consisting of myths, legends, poems, laws, etc. The myths have meaning in that they reflect the faith of the Hebrews "in their God as controlling the course of events" (p. 46); the legends concerning the patriarchs have a "high religious value" as containing "concrete embodiments of moral and religious ideals" (p. 46); the Book of Deuteronomy is of great "religious interest" in so far as it declares "the oneness of Yahweh," reflects "the moral emphasis and humanitarianism" of the great prophets which preceded its composition, and establishes "the doctrine of divine retribution" (pp. 50, 51); P does not seem to have contributed anything of religious significance. "The Chronicler" reflects post-exilic interest in "religious rites and institutions" (pp. 72-78).

Concerning prophecy the reader is warned against taking a dualistic and supernaturalistic attitude toward it (pp. 83-84). Emphasis is placed upon certain experiences of the prophet; ecstasy and possession are presented as essential to prophesying; and much emphasis is placed on "corporate per-

sonality" as a trait of prophetic consciousness (pp. 82-85, 89, 105, 145). The author does not seem to be impressed very much by Amos (pp. 90-91); Hosea fares better because of "fine humanity and deep religion"; Micah 6:6-8 is described as containing "the best epitome of prophetic religion"; Isaiah is the prophet of holiness and faith; Zephaniah is described indifferently, and Nahum contrasted with Jonah, of course to the disadvantage of the former; Jeremiah appears as a champion of the "ideal of an inward personal relation to God in which consists the essence of religion"; Ezekiel "the sacramentalist" arouses psychological interest, and not much else; while Second Isaiah (40-55) is an exilic evangelist, rated highly because of the Servant passages which refer to Israel. The contributions of the prophetic movement in Israel to the growth of religion are discussed under the headings: the ideas of God, of sin and judgment, of grace and salvation, and of the interpretation of history (pp. 126-129). The discussion of the Apocalyptic Literature covers four pages (129-132).

A good general chapter on the Psalms is followed by a discussion of Wisdom Literature. We are told that "Job suffered to prove that disinterested religion is a reality." The significance of the Book of Ecclesiastes is seen in its teaching of prudence, and as offering "negative evidence as to the significance of the Jewish faith" concerning the problem of suffering. The chapter on "The Law Literature" is descriptive and orthodox (e.g., the views of Welch and Hölscher on Deuteronomy are mentioned and set aside). There is an appendix of twenty pages containing synoptic descriptions of the growth of the Pentateuch, and of the contents of the Prophetic Books and the Writings, and a chart showing the development of the religion and literature of the Old Testament, useful for the elementary student.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

The Pastoral Epistles. By SIR ROBERT FALCONER. Oxford: at The Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1937. viii + 164 pp. $3.75.

The Pastoral Epistles are perhaps the most neglected part of the New Testament. Interest in them has mainly centered on the two questions of their authorship and their bearing on the rise of the episcopal system. In the heated controversy over these questions, neither of them of great consequence, the Epistles themselves have usually been forgotten. Of late years, however, their value has come to be appreciated, and a number of scholars have set themselves to the task of interpreting them. The latest is Sir Robert Falconer, the former President of Toronto University. He deals fully with the question of authorship, and believes that Paul was behind the Epistles, although on linguistic grounds they must be assigned in the main to some editor, who worked up the material, oral and written, which Paul had supplied. Sir Robert Falconer deals also at some length

with the ecclesiastical interest in the Epistles, but rightly insists that they only lend a further sanction to a system already existing. He might have added that they do not pretend, in anything but an incidental way, to provide a manual for church order. For the most part, however, Sir Robert Falconer devotes his study to the ethical and religious teaching of the three writings. He subjects their language to a close analysis, and seeks, with the clues thus discovered, to trace out their cardinal ideas. The book is emphatically one which will rejoice the heart of a New Testament scholar. All the problems are clearly defined, and are discussed on the ground of a full knowledge of sources. Some of the positions adopted are open to question, but the other point of view is always put fairly, and judgment is pronounced in a calm and judicial spirit. The book does not speak the last word on the Pastoral Epistles, and the author makes no such claim for it. But it will take something like a permanent place as one of the books which every student of this part of the New Testament will require to know.

E. F. Scott

Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils. By H. J. Schroeder. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1937. viii + 669. $6.00.

As a work of reference this book supplies a long felt need by gathering up both in the originals and in English the canons of the councils recognized as ecumenical by the Roman Church from the beginning through the fourteenth century. Hitherto we have had only the canons of the first seven ecumenical councils in English in volume xiv of the *Post-Nicene Fathers*, series 2.

The text of the canons is comparatively brief, and the body of the work is made up of introductions and annotations with bibliographical references of an exceedingly useful and illuminating character for the development of the organization, penitential discipline and theology of the Church. The point of view is "Catholic" rather than "Orthodox" on matters which separate the Roman from the Greek Churches. On the famous heresy of Pope Honorius any view other than that of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* is regarded as absurd. Heretics are treated with respect and understanding, for example Paul of Samosata, but I missed a reference to the work of Loofs, who demonstrated that Nestorius was not a Nestorian in the accepted sense. Likewise in the case of Joachim of Fiore there is no use of the recent general works of Grundmann, Buonaiuti and Ernst Benz, nor of a particularly important work for the understanding of the condemnation of Joachim by the Fourth Lateran Council, namely Carmelo Ottaviano, *Ioachimi Abbatis Liber contra Lombardum* (sculoa di Gioacchino da Fiore) Roma; Reale Accademia d'Italia, 1934.

At one point, and one point only, I wondered whether a pre-conceived attitude might not have colored the interpretation. The Council of Nicaea penalized any Christian who, having left military service should return

to it. This is interpreted to refer to enlistment in the armies of Licinius, who in his last campaigns espoused paganism. The interpretation may be correct, but the language would apply equally to one who took service with Constantine. The simplest interpretation of the words would take them as a survival of early Christian pacifism.

These suggestions and queries apply only to a fraction of an extensive work of a very thorough and serviceable character, which should become a standard manual.

ROLAND H. BAINTON

Bartholomew of Exeter, Bishop and Canonist. By DOM ADRIAN MOREY. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937. xi + 320 pp. $6.50.

This is a most valuable contribution to the ecclesiastical history of medieval England. While the twelfth century has received much attention, study has been mostly concerned with the struggle between Henry II and Thomas of Canterbury. Bishops such as Bartholomew of Exeter have been passed over in comparative silence. Yet he was a man (as Leland describes him) "in philosophy not mediocre, in theology learned to the fingertips" (p. 103). Though the materials for a biography of this bishop are scanty enough, the author has managed to give an accurate picture of English Church life in the twelfth century, especially from the point of view of the papal system of judges-delegate and the diocesan administration of Bartholomew.

The first part of the work is taken up (pp. 3-112) with the biography of the bishop, with his relations with Thomas of Canterbury, and with a careful analysis of the cases which came before him as papal judge-delegate. The author's researches substantiate the view that "the real period of canonical activity in England was subsequent to the Compromise of Avranches" (p. 75). He has also gathered much interesting material in a chapter on the literary circles in which Bartholomew moved (pp. 100 ff.) and on the intimacy of the bishop with John of Salisbury.

The Appendices to Dom Morey's work are especially important. They include an account of the early archdeacons of Exeter (pp. 114-26), and a number of charters and documents (e.g., the decretals of Alexander III addressed to Bartholomew, and judgments of the bishop as papal judge-delegate).

The second part of the book is devoted to the reproduction of the Latin text of Bartholomew's *Penitential*, a work whose importance has been noted by previous medievalists, but which has never before been published. While Dom Morey has added a number of useful footnotes on the sources of the *Penitential*, he regrets that he has not yet been able to prepare an elaborate criticism of the sources—a task to which he hopes later to return.

To the book are added a useful bibliography (pp. 301-05) and indices. Altogether medievalists will be greatly indebted to Dom Morey for a

learned, accurate and interesting work on a figure so long neglected in the study of twelfth century England.

C. C. R.

The Theory of Religious Liberty in England, 1603-39. By T. Lyon. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. ix + 242 pp. $2.25.

The author analyzes the reasoning by which the familiar and more easily distinguished religious groups of the period justified their position on the subject of religious liberty and of the relation of church and state. Mr. Lyon confines himself to certain fairly well-known printed texts dealing directly with the question. He does not attempt to deal comprehensively with the literature of the period which has to do with religion and liberty. Within definite limits his book is a useful supplement to W. K. Jordan's *Development of Religious Toleration in England, 1603-1640.* After a brief survey of sixteenth-century theory, for the substance of which he acknowledges his debt to Mr. Jordan, Mr. Lyon presents the official Anglican theory from James I to Laud, the attitude of Puritan churchmen both Presbyterian and independent, the development of separatist theory with particular attention to the Barrowists and early English Baptists, the Anglican latitudinarians, Hales and Chillingworth, and certain authors classed as lay latitudinarians, Bacon, Sir Thomas Brown, Robert Burton, Lord Herbert, Selden and Wither. There is also a brief chapter on the English Catholics. The writer notes the emergence of two phases or types of theory concerning toleration. There was the tolerance of the latitudinarians springing from charity and humanistic skepticism. There was the theory of the Baptists springing from fanatic zeal and demanding liberty in order that truth might be discovered and made known. Milton is classified with the Baptists in a statement which is correct as far as it goes but hardly does justice to the author of *Areopagitica.* Pryne and Henry Burton are slightly mentioned, Bastwick and, a more important omission, Liliburne, the most signal exponent within Mr. Lyon's dates of Baptist ideas in their most startling form, not at all.

William Haller

Makers of Christianity from John Cotton to Lyman Abbott. By William W. Sweet. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937. viii + 351 pp. $2.00.

This is a distinctive survey of the religious history of America: it not only emphasizes biography, but it selects the lives of "pioneers." To put it facetiously, the emphasis is on "makers" rather than on "Christianity." With few exceptions the men here described were leaders into relatively unexplored domains. The men in the first group are "founding fathers" of the chief American churches; then "apostles of religious liberty"; then revivalists, pioneers (in the most literal sense), and missionaries; and

lastly, leaders of Christian thought. Some of the names celebrated in this volume are familiar in American history; a few are quite obscure, though justly included, but on the whole, Professor Sweet's selection is systematic and judicious. It would be dfficult to argue for the exclusion of any he has included, with the possible exception of Borden P. Bowne, who, though a significant figure, was hardly a leader in the sense exhibited by the other Christian "thinkers."

One who has read Professor McNeill's Volume Two in this series, with its impressive array of the great figures in Christian history, will be almost shocked by the contrast presented in this volume. Few are great men, and both they and their work may soon be forgotten in the larger perspectives of Christian history. Nevertheless, the story of humble labor and self-sacrifice, which is the central theme of Professor Sweet's book, is a welcome and instructive antidote for the lives of the great.

H. W. S.

Seminary Militant: An Account of the Missionary Movement at Mount Holyoke Seminary and College. By Louise Porter Thomas. South Hadley, Mass.: Mt. Holyoke College, 1937. x + 117 pp.

This delightful little book, one of the Mount Holyoke College Centennial Publications, presents a spirited account of the missionary fervor of the faculty and students of the first experiment on our shores in the higher education of women. "Miss Lyon proclaimed Mount Holyoke 'a school for Christ,' and said that she had made a covenant with God for every pupil who should come within its walls." It is not surprising that, in such an atmosphere, the new enthusiasm for the mission field should have found a fertile soil. From the very beginning the faculty was being constantly diminished by recruits for the mission field, and it was not long before graduates were travelling toward the Orient, both as missionary teachers and as wives of missionaries, for the visits of theological students with an eye to matrimony were never discouraged at Mt. Holyoke!

M. B.

American Contacts with the Eastern Churches, 1820-1870. By P. E. Shaw. Chicago: The American Society of Church History, 1937. 208 pp. $3.00.

The author here brings together a detailed history of the Protestant Episcopal Missions to Greece and Constantinople, and of the relations of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions with the Orthodox Churches, together with lesser missionary movements. He seems on the whole to have covered the sources for the period, especially in regard to the Greek situation, and there can be relatively little question as to this side of his work.

On the whole, he has tried to be objective and fair, but the reader must remember that he has certain presuppositions which seriously injure the

book for all who are not members of his own Faith. Thus, throughout, the author seems to imply consistently that the "Tractarian" and "Anglo-Catholic" (he does not make clear what difference he considers between the two terms) positions of the Episcopal Church and the Church of England were new positions, and represented some element which had been totally absent in the past. Hence Bishop Southgate and the other missionaries who sought harmony with the Eastern Churches almost inevitably become the villains of the piece, although from the author's own showing, we may well wonder whether the methods of Dr. Hill in Athens would not have produced more results with less friction than did the activities of the American Board.

The other presupposition is that the Orthodox Churches were backward, not only because of the hard conditions under which they had existed for centuries, but also because of the lack of Evangelical Faith, and Evangelical Faith is perhaps to be interpreted as "American Christianity of the Puritan type, transplanted to Greece, but given a Greek character because of the apostle and genius of the movement (Kalopothzkes)" (p. 152). Likewise in the introduction, he speaks of the Orthodox: "It is not improbable, however, that fellowship and co-operation with the type of Christianity prevailing in English-speaking lands would increase both their opportunities and their efficiency as evangelizing agencies (among the Mohammedans)" (p. 14). Such an attitude on consideration comes much closer to the philosophy of the German Christians than we would like to admit, especially when we remember the resolutions of the American Board that if the Orthodox Churches do not conform to the Gospel as the missionaries see it, the latter are "to turn from them as apostate, to shake off the dust of their feet as a testimony against them, and to call on all God's children to come out from among them and not to be partakers of their plagues" (p. 194). Besides that, the author does blame the Episcopalians apparently for being American and sympathizing with the East, as in some way a violation of national or Christian comity.

It was a hard task to bring the Eastern Churches into the modern world, and for that undertaking there were needed men of great faith, endurance, and energy. The educational work of the American Board and its later developments have played an enoromous role in this, and today the Orthodox Churches are ably represented at all the great world conferences of Christians, and in the future they may take a commending role. Their religious work has had less direct results, and some quarters has aroused hard feelings. Perhaps after all, Bishop William Stevens Perry was right when he said of Bishop Southgate: "He was a half-century ahead of his times" (*The Episcopate in America*, p. 103).

Despite the breadth of vision of the author, for most men are better than their principles, he still feels that the Evangelicals must support and protect the memory of their early agents (cf. pp. 166 ff.), even at the risk of continued schism. Here there must be a continued clash of emotions,

but this is inevitable. The author has tried to be fair, and on the whole has succeeded, although there are many expressions which would be changed, if his vision were to be revealed in his account of the past.

C. A. M.

First Chapters in Religious Philosophy. By VERGILIUS FERM. New York: Round Table Press, 1937. xii + 319 pp. $3.00.

This book, by a professor of philosophy in the College of Wooster, fittingly supplements his *First Adventures in Philosophy*. The first section of the study consists of a commendable, if somewhat laborious, attempt to state the nature of religion. After showing how inextricably religion is associated with other aspects of human life, and surveying various inadequate conceptions of it, he puts forward his own definition. "To be religious is to effect a vital adjustment to whatever is reacted to or regarded as worthy of serious and ulterior concern" (p. 61, omitting several of the author's refinements). Except for his refusal to use "ultimate" instead of "ulterior," this is sound as a phenomenological description. He then goes on to distinguish "being religious" from "religion-in-general" and "a religion." Such an attempt at precision is praiseworthy, but it inevitably runs the risk of losing the interest of a beginning student.

The second section of the book comprises a survey of "some typical themes in religious philosophy": traditional and contemporary arguments for belief in God, current theories of value, the problem of evil, the soul, freedom, prayer, and immortality. In these chapters the author shows himself to be a fair-minded expositor and critic; he has not neglected great thinkers of the past, but most teachers will find the book especially valuable for its discussions of contemporary writers such as D. C. MacIntosh, W. E. Hocking and John Baillie.

After the opening section Professor Ferm keeps his own point of view in the background, doubtless because he realizes the impropriety of grinding axes in an introductory study. Nevertheless, this results in a lack of integration; the student is provided with a good survey of the literature surrounding each problem, but he is not given sufficient guidance in the crucial matter of finding a vantage point from which he can perceive their interrelations.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

Religion and Reality. By MELVILLE CHANING-PEARCE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. xiv + 190 pp. $2.75.

This is an extremely interesting book, even though one is inclined to think that at some points it is a wrong-headed book. Mr. Chaning-Pearce writes under the influence of German existential thinkers, yet he has not been carried to the extremes found in some of them. He presents an "existential view" of the Christian religion which is beautifully written, utterly sincere, and often very moving.

By "existential" the author means an attitude and outlook which are not rational in the narrow sense, but involve the whole man in a venture of faith. Life, he would say, is "existential" in this sense: it is a forced choice, and we must live on some basis or other. What shall this basis be? His argument is that Christianity so parallels, in its great doctrines and its central teaching, the demands of life that there is set up an almost irresistible case for its truth, even if some of the problems which it poses are impossible of a neat rational solution.

With all of this one would have no quarrel. Yet one may question whether or not Mr. Chaning-Pearce does not use the term "rational" in too narrow a sense. Certainly most of us would not mean by "rational" merely logic-chopping; and the Platonic meaning of "reason" is large enough to cover all that he wishes to say most of the time. When he goes beyond that, he tends to come out on a purely pragmatic platform—good so far as it goes, but evading the persistent question: "Is it *true?* Oh yes, I know that it works, but is it really based on fact and not just a temporary hypothesis?" Whether such questions can be answered clearly or no, they must be asked, unless we abdicate our human prerogatives.

The attitude taken towards sex is unusual. The author admits as much in his preface, but his actual statements are sometimes extreme to a degree, and sometimes ghastly in their negatives. True, he gives us back a "higher" meaning for the sexual life of man; but one questions whether the crucifixion of the flesh which he demands is in line with the Christian sacramentalism which, while it places the body and its desires in a subordinate place, does not trample them underfoot as hideous in their natural state.

There is a most unfortunate misrepresentation of Dr. H. D. A. Major, distinguished English modernist, on pages 126 and following. By quoting a few lines from an article of Mr. Major's, the Oxford theologian is made to say that he regards the historical side of the Christianity as quite unimportant. Mr. Major believes quite the opposite; and in the very article which is quoted (*The Modern Churchman*, June, 1935) he strongly speaks out for the historical side. He merely points out that if Biblical criticism should reduce the history as some extreme form-critics have proclaimed, all is not lost, for there are still ideals and values which are good in themselves. But his whole point is that Christianity as such would be profoundly changed, and he has said elsewhere, time and again, that he believes such a position is in no sense necessitated, even by the most radical criticism.

W. Norman Pittenger

Faith in an Age of Fact. By Edward H. Reisner. New York and Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc. 1937. 117 pp. $1.50.

"There *is* something in which we believe" (p. 109). In other words, this book deals, not with the loss of faith nor with the faith of the future, but with the fact of faith. Professor Reisner has attempted a useful and

probably thankless task. Disregarding our slogans of battle, our polemics and our individual prejudices or hopes, he exhibits here the commonplaces of contemporary belief. To one who shares the "common faith" there is nothing particularly new, controversial, or doubtful in this book. This bears testimony to the success of the author's attempt. Here (with minor exceptions, of course) is what we all believe, an outline of our faith. He calls it a naturalistic point of view, and justly so, but not in any overtly technical or exclusive sense. In short, it is natural for most "educated" readers to agree with most of the beliefs here stated. And, I believe, unless we have an academic ax to grind, we might admit without argument that there is something religious in the general outlook, despite its "directness" and "immediacy."

But the important and penetrating conclusion which Professor Reisner draws is that this actual contemporary faith is not so much a new faith, a distinct religion, as it is a vantage point from which our past faiths seem less distant and less natural.

> Is it not striking that there is nothing particularly new about this so-called "new world outlook"? Is it not identical with the insights and aspirations of the choicest spirits of a large part of the world for a long, long time? Saints and sages have proclaimed it, and prophets have thundered it as their message to renegade and stiffnecked generations. All of which suggests the though that this way of laying hold upon life is older than any particular descriptions of the natural order or any specific form of philosophic invention. Such a fact further suggests that the rationalistic philosophy with which the Western man's world view and his ethical aspirations have been tied up so closely is only an episode or incident in a form and process of life adjustment which is older and more fundamental than it by far.

Because it makes our past continuous with our present, this "new faith" has a genuinely religious quality; it gives us a "comprehensive orientation" (p. 32). It has this quality because it makes intelligible the history of faiths, their grounds, their sources in human nature and physical fact. In short, our faith is "direct" because it helps us understand the indirectness, the mythical constructions, of the past.

Future generations will, no doubt, smile at this book and its readers (more than at its author), for they will in turn see how much our age of fact lives in myth. But that, too, need not surprise us, if we are true to our "naturalism," and need not be disconcerting, for it is added evidence that our faith is growing. Thus to demonstrate that the secular faith of today has a positive value for any and all regions is a genuine contribution to the philosophy, and distinguishes Professor Reisner's book from the host of similar books which outline a new religion. H. W. S.

Religionsgeschichtliche Charakterkunde. By Richard H. Grützmacher. Heft, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlag, 1937. 49; 50; 53; 49; 49 pp. Each part R.M. 1.40.

Under the general title of *Religionsgeschichtliche Characterkunde* Dr. Grützmacher has prepared five little handbooks of folk-religion, in each

of which he attempts to present and illustrate certain basic themes of religion in general, as they happen to be emphasized in particular cults. As introductions to the study of religion these popular essays are admirable.

Part 1, *Primitive and Far-Eastern Religions,* emphasizes supernatural powers, kings, esoteric wisdom, and religious patriotism (Shinto).

Part 2, *Religions of India,* treats of Vedic religion as an expression of the joy of living; of Brahmanism as the attempt to unite man and God; of Jainism as an atheistic art of salvation; of Hinduism as essentially *bhakti.*

Part 3, *Near-Eastern, African, and American Religions.*

Part 4, *European Religion,* emphasizes the heroic element in Western paganism.

Part 5, *World Religions,* surveys the prophetic character and conquests of Buddhism and Islam.

H. W. S.

War Dance: A Study of the Psychology of War. By E. GRAHAM HOWE. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1937. 315 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*

This provocative little book by a medical psychologist places the responsibility for the threat of war squarely upon the individual, for it is only upon a stable foundation of peace within the individual that peace among the nations can exist. The implications for religion which Dr. Howe's "two ways of life," the three-dimensional way of aggressiveness, and the four-dimensional way of universalism, suggest are startling and radical. Apparently it is Zen Buddhism which conforms most closely to the author's ideal form of religion. His analysis of Christianity is most illuminating. The book is profusely illustrated by diagrams, in appearance naïve, but in reality both subtle and clarifying. Altogether, like it or not, it is a book one can ill afford to miss.

M. B.

Anakephalaiosis: La récapitulation pro Manuscripto. Thèse fondamentale de Missiologie. Essai de Synthèse sotériologique. By A. M. VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE. Ghent: Una Catholica, 1936. 128 pp. 12 fr. belg.

The Aesthetic Object: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Value. By E. JORDAN. Bloomington, Ind.: The Principia Press, Inc., 1937. 275 pp. $3.50.

Skeptic's Quest. By Hornell Hart. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 173 pp. $2.00.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Primitive Religions

Durkheim's Theory of Religion. By Dale H. Moore. *Personalist.* 1938. xix, 68-77.

Religious Beliefs and Practices in the Land of the Incas. By Pryns Hopkins. *Religions.* 1938. No. 22, 50-58.

The War Complex of the Plains Indians. By Marion W. Smith. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society.* 1938. lxxiii, 425-464.

Ancient Religions

On a Proto-Hebrew Poem from Ras Shamra. By Theodor H. Gaster. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1938. lvii, 81-88.

More Texts from Ras Shamra-Ugarit. By Theodor H. Gaster. *Religions.* 1938. No. 22, 20-26.

L'Orphisme. By Adhémar d'Alès. *Recherches de science religieuse.* 1938. xxviii, 134-149.

Les dieux ousiarques de l'Asclépius. By André-Jean Festugière. *Recherches de science religieuse.* 1938. xxviii, 175-192.

Oriental Religions

Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. By M. Winternitz. *Maha-Bodhi.* 1938. xlvi, 1-13.

Mahayanist Theories in Tibet. By A. David-Neel and Lama Yongden. *Buddhism in England.* 1938. xii, 168-171.

The Non-Dualistic Theism of Sankara. By Wendell Thomas. *Message of the East.* 1938. xxvii, 86-91.

The Hindu Conception of the Motherland. By Radhakumud Mookerji. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1938. xliii, 164-171.

Who Is a True Sri Vaishnava? By A. Srinivasachariar. *Vedanta Kesari.* 1938. xxiv, 422-427; 464-468.

Hinduism as a System of Life. By Sir George F. MacMunn. *Religions.* 1938. No. 22, 9-19.

Symposium on education, with special reference to India. *Aryan Path.* 1938. ix, 213-349.

The Story of the Ka'ba. By Grant Alexander. *Moslem World.* 1938. xxviii, 43-53.

Verses Missing from the Qur'an. By Arthur Jeffery. *Moslem World.* 1938. xxviii, 61-65.

The Quran and the Sword. By S. Z. A. Naqvi. *Muslim Review.* 1938. xxii, no. 1, 47-51; no. 5, 20-28.

The Conciliatory Tone of Ibn 'Arabi. By Edward J. Jurji. *Moslem World.* 1938. xxviii, 28-42.

Mullah Sa'eed of Sena. By FREDERICK G. COAN. *Moslem World.* 1938. XXVIII, 66-75.

Iqbal the Poet-Philosopher of Islam. By M. ZIAUDDIN. *Visva-Bharati.* 1938. IV, 39-54.

Islam: An Interpretation. By EDWIN E. CALVERLEY. *Moslem World.* 1938. XXVIII, 6-21.

JUDAISM

Shemesh, the Son of Yahweh. By SAMUEL I. FEIGIN. *Jewish Quarterly Review.* 1938. XXVIII, 225-242.

Introductory Study to *Pirke Abot.* By LOUIS FINKELSTEIN. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1938. LVII, 13-50.

The Kinship of Greek and Hebrew Poetry. By MOSES HADAS. *Menorah Journal.* 1938. XXVI, 7-28.

Greeks and Jews: The First Greek Records of Jewish Religion. By WERNER JAEGER. *Journal of Religion.* 1938. XVIII, 127-143.

Kritischer Idealismus und judische Theologie. By HANS J. SCHOEPS. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.* 1938. LXXXII, 73-85.

Art and Jewish Life. By IRA EISENSTEIN. *Reconstructionist.* 1938. III, no. 20, 6-9.

Liberal Judaism. By LILIAN J. MONTAGU. *Religions.* 1938. No. 22, 27-36.

Jesus and His Modern Kinsman. By ROBERT GORDIS. *Reconstructionist.* 1938, IV, no. 1, 5-10.

CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL

Bibliography. *Bulletin de Théologie ancienne et médiévale.* April 1938. III, nos. 527-616.

L'Histoire critique de l'ancien Testament. I. Les Origines. II. Les Orientations nouvelles. By J. COPPENS. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1938. LX, 513-550; 641-680.

Neue Wege der Bibelwissenschaft. By EFRAIM URBACH. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.* 1938. LXXXII, 1-22.

The Historical Value of the Fourth Gospel. By L. V. LESTER-GARLAND. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. XXXVI, 265-277.

Saint Paul et l'Ancien Testament. By J. BONSIRVEN. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1938. LX, 129-147.

Le problème du Christianisme primitif. Quatre conférences sur la forme et la pensée du Nouveau Testament. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses.* 1938. XVIII, 1-54.

I "dogmi del Signore,,. By ERNESTO BUONAIUTI. *Religio.* 1938. XIV, 9-17.

Das Syrisch-Monophysitische Mönchtum im Tūr-'Ab(h)-dīn—von seinen Anfängen bis zur Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts. By P. KRÜGER. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica.* 1938. IV, 5-46.

Les questions inédites d'Alexandre de Halès sur les fins dernières. By F. M. Henquinet. *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale.* 1938. x, 56-78; 153-172.

Aux origines de l'école théologique d'Anselme de Laon. By D. O. Lottin, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale.* 1938. x, 101-122.

Le symbole du IVe Concile de Tolède. By J. Madoz. *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique.* 1938. xxxiv, 5-20.

Traccie ereticali nel medio evo francese. By Renato Esnault. *Religio.* 1938. xiv, 18-53.

Il messagio gioachimita e la "religio„ francescana. By Ernesto Buonaiuti. *Religio.* 1938. xiv, 86-109.

The Abiding Significance of the Reformation. By C. J. Wright. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. xxxvi, 199-211.

Sources of Swedish Psalms. By Hilding Brodeen. *Augustana Quarterly.* 1938. xvii, 146-155.

Darstellung und Deutung der Sophia im Vorpetrinischen Russland. By A. M. Amman. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica.* 1938. iv, 120-156.

Der franziskanische Ordensnachwuchs in der chinesischen Mission. By O. Maas. *Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft.* 1938. i, 33-45.

Poverello and Methodist. By Cyril C. Richardson. *Religion in Life.* 1938. vii, 218-230.

William Chillingworth. By Canon A. E. Simpson. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. xxxvi, 235-245.

Grandeur d'Ostervald. By Maurice Neeser. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie.* 1938. No. 106, 5-30.

Early English Baptists. By W. T. Whitley. *Chronicle* (Baptist). 1938. i, 15-22.

The Religion of Charles Dickens. By J. M. Connell. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. xxxvi, 225-234.

The Intellectual Background of William Ellery Channing. By Herbert W. Schneider. *Church History.* 1938. vii, 3-23.

L'Image de Jésus-Christ dans l'art chrétien. By G. de Jerphanion. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1938. lx, 257-283.

Zurbaran. By Gabriel Rouches. *L'Art sacré.* 1938. iv, 101-104.

L'Art religieux baroque en Tchécoslovaquie. By Victor-L. Tapie. *L'Art sacré.* 1938. iv, 69-73.

Christianity: Contemporary

Church Congress Syllabus No. 2, Part i: The Evangel in History. By Edward R. Hardy, Jr. Part ii: The Constant Element in Evangelism. By B. A. E. Taylor. *Anglican Theological Review.* 1938. xx, 27-45. Part iii: Modern Criticism of the Christian Evangel. By Gregory Vlastos. *Ibid.* 120-133.

Doctrine in the Church of England: Lay Comments on the Commission's

Report. I. By GUY KENDALL. II. By E. N. MOZLEY. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. XXXVI, 365-379.

The Present Religious Crisis. By E. W. BARNES. *Chronicle.* 1938. XXXVIII, 83-87.

Christian Apologetics Today. By THEODORE O. WEDEL. *Religion in Life.* 1938. VII, 72-80.

American Christianity and the Church Universal. By WILLARD L. SPERRY. *Christendom.* 1938. III, 55-66.

Die gegenwärtige Lage der amerikanischen Theologie. By HEINZ-HORST SCHREY. *Theologische Rundschau.* 1938. X, 23-56.

Walter Rauschenbusch and the Brotherhood of the Kingdom. By C. HOWARD HOPKINS. *Church History.* 1938. VII, 138-156.

Volkskirche und Konfessionen. By JULIUS RICHTER. *Christliche Welt.* 1938. LI, 42-47.

Friedrich Rittelmeyer. By GERHARD NIEDERMEYER and MARIA KLEIN. *Christliche Welt.* 1938. LII, 301-305.

Friedrich Rittelmeyer und die Christengemeinschaft. By KARL BETH. *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.* 1938. XI, 42-47.

Sportgeist und evangelische Gemeindejugend. By HUGO HEIM. *Christliche Welt.* 1938. LII, 397-402.

The Present Religious Situation in Soviet Russia. By NICHOLAS ARSENIEV. *World Dominion.* 1938. XVI, 10-22.

The Religion of Masaryk. By MATTHEW SPINKA. *Christendom.* 1938. III, 9-20.

An Estimation of the Importance of the Work of Monsieur Loisy. By L. J. COLLINS. *Modern Churchman.* 1938. XXVII, 611-622.

Das Problem der "Anpassung" der christlichen Mission in buddhistischen Ländern. By G. SCHULEMANN. *Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft.* 1938. I, 46-59.

Die Gründung klösterlicher Genossenschaften für Eingeborene. By M. BIERBAUM. *Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft.* 1938. I, 9-21.

La médiation universelle de la Sainte Vierge. By P. AUBRON. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1938. LX, 5-35.

A Revolution in Church Architecture. By H. A. REINHOLD. *Liturgical Arts.* 1938. VI, 123-133.

Sisyphus Essays Propædeutics. By MATTHIAS R. HEILIG. *Crozer Quarterly.* 1938. XV, 30-41.

The Half-Way House. By H. E. BRIERLEY. *Congregational Quarterly.* 1938. XVI, 51-56.

Protestant Tradition in Literature. By JOSEPH B. CODE. *Thought.* 1938. XIII, 113-136.

Is Wieman Empirical Enough? By PETER A. BERTOCCI. *Personalist.* 1938. XIX, 56-67.

Baptists and Ecumenicity. By ROBERT A. ASHWORTH. *Crozer Quarterly.* 1938. XV, 14-21.

The Bible and Protestantism. By H. WHEELER ROBINSON. *Congregational Quarterly.* 1938, XVI, 40-50.

Authoritarianism in the Free Churches. By GWILYM O. GRIFFITH. *Congregational Quarterly.* 1938. XVI, 23-32.

The Cure of Souls. By JOHN S. BONNELL. *Religion in Life.* 1938. VII, 106-117.

The Nonconformist Conscience. By A. H. DODD. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. XXXVI, 212-224.

The New Orthodoxy. By WALTER M. HORTON. *American Scholar.* 1938. VII, 3-11.

GENERAL THEORY OF RELIGION

Quelques aspects spirituels du désert. By CHARLES TEISSIER DU CROS. *Foi et Vie.* 1938. Nos. 99-100, 168-183.

The Sociological Interpretation of Religion. By L. L. BERNARD. *Journal of Religion.* 1938. XVIII, 1-18.

Religion as a Factor in Human History. By R. B. MOWAT. *Hibbert Journal.* 1938. XXXVI, 180-186.

Religious Categories as Universal Expressions of Creative Personality. By BENOY KUMAR SARKAR. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1938. XLIII, 76-85; 135-142.

Contemporary Viewpoints on Religion. *Aryan Path.* 1938. IX, 97-142.

Art as the Vehicle for Religious Worship. By THEODORE M. GREENE. *Religion in Life.* 1938. VII, 93-105.

Religious Education in a Democracy. By CHARLES C. JOSEY. *Journal of Religion.* 1938. XVIII, 19-50.

Modern Physics and Religion. By ARTHUR HAAS. *New Scholasticism.* 1938. XII, 1-8.

Miguel de Unamuno as a Religious Philosopher. By T. HYSLOP. *Modern Churchman.* 1938. XXVII, 646-652.

Concerning Purpose in Nature. By HENRY H. KNOX. *Personalist.* 1938. XIX, 32-40.

NEW PERIODICALS

The Chronicle. A Baptist Historical Quarterly. Vol. I, 1938. Published by The American Baptist Historical Society. Chester, Pa. Editor, R. E. E. HARKNESS.

Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft. Viermonatsschrift des Instituts für missionswissenschaftliche Forschungen. Vol. I, 1938. Aschendorff. Münster (Westf.) Editors: MAX BIERBAUM and JOHANN PETER STEFFES.